Bar complaints filed against Yoo, Bybee, Addington, Ashcroft, Gonzales, Mukasey, 6 others

Justin Blum at Bloomberg (h/t Zachary Roth at TPMMuckraker) reports that state bar complaints have been filed against twelve Bush administration lawyers involved in the authorization and sanctioning of torture by the United States of America, including two attorneys, Alberto Gonzales and John Yoo, whose disbarments I have long been advocating. [A complete list of the grieved attorneys – with links to the complaints – is included at the end of this post]. See also these reports by UPI, CNN and Scott Shane at NYT. Upon signing and filing the complaints on behalf of VotersForPeace (donate here ) and a coalition of organizations led by Velvet Revolution, attorney Kevin Zeese, Executive Director of VotersForPeace, stated in part:

Today, we filed complaints with the District of Columbia Bar and with four other states seeking the disbarment of 12 Bush-Cheney torture lawyers. These lawyers misused their license to practice law to provide legal cover for the war crime of torture. This misuse of their license requires the bar association to disbar them or the bar will become complicit in torture.

Complaints have been filed against: John Yoo, Judge Jay Bybee, and Stephen Bradbury who authored the torture memoranda. As well as attorneys who advised, counseled, consulted and supported those memoranda including Alberto Gonzales, John Ashcroft, Michael Chertoff, Alice Fisher, William Haynes II, Douglas Feith, Michael Mukasey, Timothy Flanigan, and David Addington. These detailed complaints, with over 500 pages of supporting exhibits, have been filed with the state bars in the District of Columbia, New York, California, Texas and Pennsylvania, and they seek disciplinary action and disbarment. …

This cadre of torture lawyers colluded to facilitate the abuse and torture of prisoners (detainee) that included, evidence suggests, deaths at overseas U.S. military facilities. Human Rights Watch reports 98 deaths of people in custody of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Making torture even worse in this case is that it was used to try and get information to tie Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda – a relationship that did not exist – as well as information about non-existent weapons of mass destruction in order to justify the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq.

We have asked the respective state bars to revoke the licenses of these attorneys for moral turpitude. They failed to show “respect for and obedience to the law, and respect for the rights of others,” and intentionally or recklessly failed to act competently, all in violation of legal Rules of Professional Conduct. Several attorneys failed to adequately supervise the work of subordinate attorneys and forwarded shoddy legal memoranda regarding the definition of torture to the White House and Department of Defense. These lawyers further acted incompetently by advising superiors to approve interrogation techniques that were in violation of U.S. and international law. They failed to support or uphold the U.S. Constitution, and the laws of the United States, and to maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers, all in violation state bar rules.

Torture is illegal under United States and international law. It is illegal under the U.S. Constitution, domestic law and international treaties to which the United States is a party.

* * *

The torture memoranda did not provide objective legal advice to government decision-makers, but instead twisted the state of the law so that it was unrecognizable. They were so inaccurate that these memoranda are more justifications about what the authors and the intended recipients wanted the law to be, rather than assessments of what the law actually is.

* * *

We decided to take action today because the federal government seems unable and unwilling to act. The Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility has taken nearly five years to complete its report, as some of the memoranda at issue became public in June 2004. Further, this OPR investigation is focused only on two lawyers, John Yoo and Jay Bybee rather than all those involved. This inexcusable delay is unfair to the public because the consequences of any wrongdoing are diminished. The delay has already benefited the two men under investigation, John Yoo now has tenure at Berkeley law school and Jay Bybee now has a lifetime appointment as a federal court of appeals judge. If OPR had completed its duties in a timely manner it is unlikely that either appointment would have been made.

In addition to inaction by OPR, the Congress where select Members were briefed 40 times by the CIA, seems unable to take action because of fear of its own complicity being exposed. And, Attorney General Eric Holder, has now testified that he approved renditions – which results in prisoners being tortured by other countries at the behest of the United States – during the Clinton administration. And, sadly, the President of the United States has now decided to hide evidence of war crimes by refusing to release photographic and video evidence despite a court order to do so. Finally, the administration is appointing General McChrystal to be the head of operations in Afghanistan despite being responsible for commanding Fort Nama in Iraq as well as special forces involved in torture[.]

* * *

Therefore, the people must act to face up to this issue and restore morality and Rule of Law to the United States. In addition to filing these complaints we are starting a campaign for disbarment, public torture hearings and for the appointment of an Independent Prosecutor. People who want to get involved are urged to go to DisbarTortureLawyers.com and VotersForPeace.us.

Only by taking torture out of politics and allowing an independent prosecutor to pursue the facts and apply the law will the United States recover from these war crimes. Application of the rule of law, beginning with disbarment, is a necessary part of the process of healing the nation.

The Velvet Revolution statement regarding the filing of the complaints adds, in part, that:

The individually tailored complaints allege that the named attorneys violated the rules of professional responsibility by advocating torture. The memos written and supported by these attorneys advocating torture have now been repudiated by the Department of Justice, the White House, the Department of Defense and other experts in the field. The recently released Senate and Red Cross reports on detainee treatment provide uncontroverted evidence that the torture techniques advocated by the attorneys were used on human beings over an extended period of time. We have also sent a letter to House Judiciary Chairman John Conyers, asking that he initiate impeachment proceeding against Jay Bybee, who is now a sitting federal judge. The evidence is clear that, during his confirmation hearings, Mr. Bybee misused the classified status of his torture memos to portray a false picture of his legal history. Several Senators have stated publicly that Mr. Bybee would not have been confirmed if they had been aware of his torture memos. The bar complaints have been signed by our board attorney, Kevin Zeese, who also directs the Campaign for Fresh Air and Clean Politics, and Voters for Peace.

We ask other organizations to sign on to this campaign by sending an email to DisbarTortureLawyers@velvetrevolution.us. Individuals can sign on using the form below. This campaign will include a broad public relations push so we urge everyone to spread the word and for the press to contact us for comment and interviews.

You can make targeted donations to this campaign at with an earmark comment in the box at http://www.velvetrevolution.us/donate.php.

The complaints were filed against the following attorneys:

Links to the complaints can also be found at Velvet Revolution here, where you will find a Sign On Form to add your name to the campaign as well as links to the exhibits attached to the complaints, the released torture memos and other information.

Updated 05-19-09 to correctly identify William James Haynes II (instead of Michael Haynes) as one of the dirty dozen torture lawyers.  (h/t earlofhuntingdon)

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E-mail to Matthew Garrett Davis

Crossposted here at Oxdown Gazette.

Matthew Garrett Davis
Witte Law Offices
119 E Kalamazoo St.
Lansing, MI 48933
Phone: (517) 281-9374
Fax: (517) 485-0187
foster5701@hotmail.com

Mr. Davis,

Please accept this e-mail as an offer to reply to criticisms leveled against you as a result of the complaint you filed on behalf James Carabelli against the Center for Independent Media, the Michigan Messenger, Eartha J. Melzer, Jefferson Morley and David S. Bennahum. As I’m sure you knew it would, the litigation you filed has generated a fair share of publicity.

On September 17, 2008, Rachel Breitman reported in The AmLaw Daily that the Obama campaign filed class action litigation on behalf of “three county residents whose homes are undergoing foreclosure” against the Macomb County Republican Party. Ms. Breitman also reported that: response to this class action you:

Matthew Davis of Witte Law Offices in Lansing responded to the Obama suit Wednesday by releasing a letter addressed to the Center for Independent Media on behalf of [Macomb County Republican Party Chairman James] Carabelli and the state party threatening a countersuit if the Messenger’s story is not retracted within seven days.

“Mr. Carabelli has said that the quote attributed to him was fabricated by the reporter who interviewed him,” Bill Nowling, communications director for the Michigan Republican Party, told The Am Law Daily. “This is a page right out of the Democrats’ playbook of tricks.”

But the Center for Independent Media was nonplussed by the threatened libel action, saying that this was only a tactic to distract from the Obama campaign’s claim.

“We still have received no letter from the Michigan Party Republicans at this point, but we stand by our story,” said David Bennahum, the center’s chief executive officer. The publication is represented by John Pomeranz, a partner at Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg in Washington. “No threatened suit can change the facts.” [Emphasis supplied.]

Because the Center for Independent Media did not retract the story, you followed through with the intentions stated in your demand letter and filed Mr. Carabelli’s lawsuit claiming both negligent and malicious defamation. Kate Klonick, Who’s Paying the Lawyer for the Michigan GOP Official?, TPMMuckraker, October 3, 2008.

In reviewing the news of this matter, Marcy Wheeler at emptywheel alleges the litigation you filed is a SLAPP* suit:

By all appearances (particularly given the confidence MM has in their story), this is a SLAPP suit designed to either cow MM, or the larger CIM organization, which has outlets in key swing states: Minnesota, Colorado, Iowa, New Mexico, and Washington (and employes [sic] Spencer Ackerman in their DC Independent site).

According to Professors George W. Pring and Penelope Canan of the University of Denver, SLAPP suits generally have four (4) criteria:

“[SLAPPs] (1) involve communications made to influence a government action or outcome, (2) which result in civil lawsuits (complaints, counterclaims, or cross-claims), (3) filed against non-governmental individuals or groups (4) on a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance.”

Under the circumstances as I understand them, I tend to agree with Ms. Wheeler. Please note, however, that I’ve been unable to find a copy of the complaint online, including at the Macomb County Clerk website. Accordingly, I haven’t had a chance to review the specific allegations contained in the complaint. With that caveat, however, it does appear that the litigation you filed on behalf of Mr. Carabelli is, in fact, a SLAPP suit:

  1. The subject of the specific reporting by Ms. Melzer is the stated intentions of the Macomb County Republican Party to challenge any Macomb County voter whose home is in foreclosure and to influence the Macomb County Supervisor of Elections into accepting these challenges as legitimate; s/counts any challenge(s) to any Macomb County voter whose home is in foreclosure; – as well as the Michigan Messenger, generally
  2. The reporting has resulted in civil litigation;
  3. The litigation is filed against non-governmental individuals and groups: the Center for Independent Media, the Michigan Messenger, Eartha J. Melzer, Jefferson Morley and David S. Bennahum; and
  4. The subject of the litigation – the voting rights of Macomb County residents – is clearly a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance.

First, I would appreciate a copy of your demand letter to the Center for Independent Media, any reply you received to that letter and a copy of the complaint so I can better understand and evaluate this matter.

Second, the accusation that this lawsuit is a SLAPP suit necessarily infers that you are in violation of Rule 3.1, Meritorious Claims and Contentions, Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that:

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous. A lawyer may offer a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. [Emphasis supplied.]

Comments to Rule 3.1 state, in part, that:

The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person. Likewise, the action is frivolous if the lawyer is unable either to make a good-faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. [Emphasis supplied.]

Did you consider Rule 3.1 and the comments before filing this suit? If so, how did you conclude that the litigation was not filed primarily for the purpose of delay? What is the reason, if not for the primary benefit of harassing the defendants, that you advised your client to litigate against media publications, reporters and other individuals instead of intervening in the Obama campaign class action lawsuit when both lawsuits are based on the same statements allegedly made by Mr. Carabelli? What actionable damages has Mr. Carabelli suffered as a result of the publication of Ms. Melzer’s article. When was the last time you read Rule 3.1 and the comments to the rule?

Third, in determining the standard to apply in determining whether a lawsuit is frivolous or not pursuant to MRPC 3.1, Michigan Ethics Opinion R-009 (October 26, 1990) considered, inter alia, the Michigan statute which taxes costs for frivolous claims, MCR 2.625(A)(2), which defines frivolous:

“(a) ‘Frivolous’ means that at least 1 of the following conditions is met:

“(i) The party’s primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the defense was to harass, embarass, or injure the prevailing party.

“(ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party’s legal position were in fact true.

“(iii) The party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit.” [Emphasis supplied.]

Michigan Ethics Opinion R-009 further states:

Two standards have developed over the years regarding frivolous claims: one is a subjective test which asks whether this lawyer knew that the client’s case was without merit; and, the other is an objective test which asks whether a reasonable lawyer would have known that the case was without merit.

Although MRPC 3.1 does not specifically identify the nature of the investigation the lawyer should undertake or which of the two tests it adopts, this Committee has held in previous opinions that the objective test of a “disinterested lawyer” should be used.

* * *

The objective standard requires the lawyer to inquire into all facts presented by the client which are, for instance, contradicted by readily available evidence. Refutable or contradictory evidence must be investigated by the lawyer to ascertain the validity of the client’s claim.

Were you aware of Michigan Ethics Opinion R-009 and the comments before filing this suit? If not, why didn’t you conduct any research into your ethical obligations regarding this matter? If you were aware of the opinion, and considering that there is evidence contradictory to your client’s claims, what investigation of these claims did you conduct prior to filing this suit, as required by Michigan Ethics Opinion R-009?

Fourth, have you represented any other plaintiff or defendant in any other litigation or matter in which you have been accused of engaging in SLAPP tactics?

Thank you for your attention to this matter. I look forward to your response.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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E-mail to Robert H. Bork, Jr.

Robert H. Bork, Jr.
gonzalesfacts@gmail.com

Mr. Bork,

As the media contact for GonzalesFacts.com, I would request a response on the record to these allegations that Alberto Gonzales has engaged in conduct that calls into question his fitness to practice law. I have also previously requested a response from George J. Terwilliger III via this e-mail:

George J. Terwilliger III
White & Case LLP
701 13th Street NW
Washington, District of Columbia 20005
Telephone: 202-626-3628
Fax: 202-639-9355
gterwilliger@whitecase.com

Dear Mr. Terwilliger:

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys who, in the service of the government of the United States, have engaged in conduct that violates the rules of professional conduct with which each attorney must comply. I have prepared factual allegations of the conduct of various attorneys, including your client Alberto Gonzales, that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility. (I have also prepared complaints for Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, Lisa Murkowski, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Marie Goodling, Thomas W. Hartmann and Michael J. Elston.) The conduct of your client has violated several of the rules of professional conduct of the Texas Bar. His actions raise a substantial question as to his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

The purpose of this e-mail is to offer your client, or you on his behalf, the opportunity to respond to these allegations. I look forward to your response.

I look forward to your reply.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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E-mail to George J. Terwilliger III, counsel to Alberto Gonzales

George J. Terwilliger III
White & Case LLP
701 13th Street NW
Washington, District of Columbia 20005
Telephone: 202-626-3628
Fax: 202-639-9355
gterwilliger@whitecase.com

Dear Mr. Terwilliger:

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys who, in the service of the government of the United States, have engaged in conduct that violates the rules of professional conduct with which each attorney must comply. I have prepared factual allegations of the conduct of various attorneys, including your client Alberto Gonzales, that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility. (I have also prepared complaints for Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, Lisa Murkowski, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Marie Goodling, Thomas W. Hartmann and Michael J. Elston.) The conduct of your client has violated several of the rules of professional conduct of the Texas Bar. His actions raise a substantial question as to his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

The purpose of this e-mail is to offer your client, or you on his behalf, the opportunity to respond to these allegations. I look forward to your response.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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Virginia lawyers file grievance against Monica Marie Goodling

As reported by Frank Green in the Richmond Times Dispatch (h/t Debra Cassens Weiss at the ABA Journal via Matt Berman at TPMMuckaker ) on September 16, 2008, attorney William R. Wilder prepared a grievance complaint against Monica Marie Goodling and he and several other attorneys filed the complaint with the Virginia Bar:

Monica Goodling resigned as the department’s liaison to the White House last year. A Justice Department investigation recently concluded that she violated civil-service law and department policy by considering political affiliations in hiring decisions.

Lawyer William R. Wilder, who drafted the complaint signed by a dozen other lawyers, said yesterday he was concerned about Goodling’s conduct and that she has apparently not been charged with a crime or disciplined elsewhere.

The Sept. 8 letter to the state bar alleges that Goodling violated at least two rules of professional conduct and asks that the state bar start a disciplinary investigation.

I sent this e-mail to Mr. Wilder thanking him for preparing and filing the complaint, advising him of the complaints I prepared against Ms. Goodling as well as Michael J. Elston, a fellow member of the Virginia Bar and requesting to discuss these matters with him. I also copied Ms. Goodling’s attorney, John M. Dowd , Esq.

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E-mail to William R. Wilder

William R. Wilder, Esq.
Baptiste & Wilder, P.C.

Mr. Wilder,

Thank you for preparing the complaint against Monica Marie Goodling and filing it with the Virginia Bar. Legal ‘professionals’ of the likes of Ms. Goodling have severely damaged the reputation and effectiveness of our legal system. I believe that the rehabilitation of the standing of our profession will require that attorneys like yourself file complaints regarding these unethical actions with the appropriate bar associations.

To encourage the filing of complaints like yours, I started The Grievance Project on October 1, 2007, nearly one (1) year ago, to provide both the resources any person needs to file a grievance against any attorney in any state as well as to prepare and encourage the filing of grievance complaints against deserving attorneys in the service of the federal government. For example, I prepared this complaint against Ms. Goodling last month. I would encourage you to review the complaint and, if you wish, to use it to supplement the complaint you filed.

Additionally, I have prepared a complaint against Michael J. Elston who is also a member of the Virginia Bar to supplement the complaint that CREW has filed against Mr. Elston because their complaint did not include allegations of his involvement in the US Attorney firing scandal. I would also encourage you to review and consider filing my complaint against Mr. Elston to supplement the CREW complaint. If you are interested, I would like to further discuss these matters with you.


E.M.

cc: John M. Dowd, Esq., attorney for Monica Marie Goodling, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
clerk@vsb.org

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E-mail to Michael J. Elston

Michael J. Elston
McGuire Woods, LLP
Washington Square, 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1200
Washington, District of Columbia 20036-5317
Telephone: 202-857-1700
Fax: 202-857-1737
melston@mcguirewoods.com

Dear Mr. Elston,

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, Lisa Murkowski, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Marie Goodling, Thomas W. Hartmann and, now, yourself. In addition to the allegations in the complaint recently filed against you in Virginia by CREW, your conduct in the firing of the United States Attorneys also violated several of the rules of professional conduct of the Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia Bars. These actions also raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct in your handling of both the firing of the United States Attorneys and hiring practices at DoJ violated your ethical obligations as a member of the Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia Bars.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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Michael J. Elston

On July 7, 2008, CREW filed a complaint against Michael J. Elston with the Virginia Bar for his role in the illegal politicization of hiring practices at the Department of Justice. However, CREW did not file a complaint with the Illinois, Kansas or Missouri Bars, jurisdictions in which Mr. Elston is also admitted, as explained here, but only sent these associations a copy of the Virginia complaint. More importantly, because the CREW complaint addressed only the illegal politicization of hiring practices at the Department of Justice, CREW notably failed to address Mr. Elston’s role in the politicized firing of several sitting United States Attorneys. As set forth below, Mr. Elston is also in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia regarding his role in the United States Attorney firings.

Personal Information:

  • Name: Michael J. Elston, Partner, McGuireWoods LLP
  • Washington Square, 1050 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 1200
    Washington, District of Columbia 20036-5317
  • Telephone: 202-857-1700, Fax: 202-857-1737

Bar Information: Illinois

  • ID No.: N/A
  • Date of Admission as Lawyer by Illinois Supreme Court: November 10, 1994
  • Registered Business Address: Mcguirewoods LLP
    1750 Tysons Blvd, Suite 1800
    McLean, VA 22102-4231
  • Registered Business Phone: (703) 712-5366
  • Illinois Registration Status: Active and authorized to practice law
  • Last Registered Year: 2008
  • Malpractice Insurance: (Current as of date of registration; consult attorney for further information) In annual registration, attorney reported that he/she has malpractice coverage.
  • Public Record of Discipline and Pending Proceedings: None

Grievance Information: Illinois

Bar Information: Kansas

  • ID No.: N/A
  • Status: Unknown
  • On July 2, 2008, Amanda Provorse, Attorney Registration, responded to my e-mail request for Mr. Elston’s status with the Kansas Bar that “Mr. Elston is currently active and in good standing. He was admitted 9/29/1998.”

Grievance Information: Kansas

Bar Information: Missouri

Grievance Information: Missouri

Bar Information: Virginia

  • ID No.: N/A
  • Status: Active
  • Registered Address: 1750 Tysons Boulevard, Suite 1800, McLean, VA 22102-4215
  • Registered Phone: 703-712-5366 and Fax: 703-712-5215
  • Member class: Active

Grievance Information: Virginia

While reviewing this matter, it is important to keep in mind that the privilege to practice law imposes duties and responsibilities on each attorney who accepts a license to practice law. These obligations are described in the Preamble to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct :

The practice of law is a public trust. Lawyers are the trustees of the system by which citizens resolve disputes among themselves, punish and deter crime, and determine their relative rights and responsibilities toward each other and their government. Lawyers therefore are responsible for the character, competence and integrity of the persons whom they assist in joining their profession; for assuring access to that system through the availability of competent legal counsel; for maintaining public confidence in the system of justice by acting competently and with loyalty to the best interests of their clients; by working to improve that system to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing society; and by defending the integrity of the judicial system against those who would corrupt, abuse or defraud it.

To achieve these ends the practice of law is regulated by the following rules. Violation of these rules is grounds for discipline.

* * *

The quality of the legal profession can be no better than that of its members. Lawyers must exercise good judgment and candor in supporting applicants for membership in the bar.

Lawyers also must assist in the policing of lawyer misconduct. The vigilance of the bar in preventing and, where required, reporting misconduct can be a formidable deterrent to such misconduct, and a key to maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the profession as a whole in the face of the egregious misconduct of a few.

These obligations are also expressly stated in the Preamble to the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, the Preamble to the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct and the Preamble to the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, which provide, in part, that

A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges,
other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.

* * *

The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or selfinterested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.

It is also important to bear in mind that although Mr. Elston denies improper motives or conduct, his denials and protestation must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. As noted in the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, for Mr. Elston to believe that his conduct was proper, he must have “actually supposed the fact in question to be true” (which belief “may be inferred from circumstances”) and for that belief to be reasonable requires “that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.” Additionally, because “a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question” to be improper, Mr. Elston reasonably should have known that his conduct was improper.

As detailed more specifically below, Mr. Elston’s conduct violated the following the following rules of professional conduct:

Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct:

Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct

Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct

Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct

File a grievance against Mr. Elston

  1. Print, complete and sign the official Complaint Form for Illinois, Kansas, Missouri (or .pdf) and/or Virginia (or .pdf );
  2. Print and attach this page to the Complaint Form; and
  3. Mail the complaint to the address noted on the Complaint Form.

Allegation: Michael J. Elston engaged in conduct that was a violation of federal laws that prohibit the obstruction of justice when he threatened four (4) recently-resigned United States Attorneys.

Michael J. Elston’s participation in the scheme to fire multiple United States Attorneys is at least unethical, if not actually criminal. As set out in greater detail below, Mr. Elston’s role in the firing of numerous United States Attorneys included placing telephone calls to several of these U.S. Attorneys in which he conveyed the threat that the Department of Justice would publicly attack the U.S. Attorneys if they chose to testify to the United States House and Senate. As reported by Paul Kiel at TPMMuckraker on May 2, 2007,

U.S. Attorney for Arizona Paul Charlton told Congress that Michael Elston, the chief of staff to Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, called him and warned him to remain silent. “I believe that Elston was offering me a quid pro quo agreement: my silence in exchange for the Attorney General’s,” Charlton wrote in answer to questions from the House Judiciary Committee.

Charlton did not expound on the conversation in his answer, only saying that the call occurred after the firing on December 7th, but before the attorney general testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 18th of this year.

It’s not the first time that Elston has been accused by one of the fired U.S. attorneys of trying to intimidate them into silence. Two others have said the same thing.

U.S. Attorney for Little Rock Bud Cummins testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that Elston had made a similar call to him in mid-February. Cummins produced an email written the day of the call that clearly laid out the threatening undercurrent to Elston’s message.

And U.S. Attorney for Seattle John McKay has said that he got a call from Elston in December. Newsweek reported that McKay says “he also got a phone call from a ‘clearly nervous’ Elston asking if he intended to go public: ‘He was offering me a deal: you stay silent and the attorney general won’t say anything bad about you.'” (Emphasis supplied.)

Prior to this article, Mr. Kiel had reported on the contents of Mr. Cummins’ e-mail on March 7, 2007:

In a February 19th article in The Washington Post, Cummins was quoted on the firings:

“They’re [the Justice Department] entitled to make these changes for any reason or no reason or even for an idiotic reason,… But if they are trying to suggest that people have inferior performance to hide whatever their true agenda is, that is wrong. They should retract those statements.”

The next day, Cummins got a call from Elston. And very unfortunately for the Justice Department, Cummins sent out an email no more than an hour after the call to the other fired prosecutors (you can see it here):

The essence of his message was that they feel like they are taking unnecessary flak to avoid trashing each of us specifically or further, but if they feel like any of us intend to continue to offer quotes to the press, or organize behind the scenes congressional pressure, then they would feel forced to somehow pull their gloves off and offer public criticisms to defend their actions more fully…. I was tempted to challenge him and say something movie-like such as “are you threatening ME???”, but instead I kind of shrugged it off…

Cummins, a lifelong Republican, continues in the email to refer to Elston’s “threat of retaliation” and the “threatening undercurrent in the call.” So it was abundantly clear to him that he was being threatened.

The most inflammatory part of the email is Cummins’ description of Elston’s reaction to the idea of the fired prosecutors testifying before Congress:

“He reacted quite a bit to the idea of anyone voluntarily testifying and it seemed clear that they would see that as a major escalation of the conflict meriting some kind of unspecified form of retaliation.”

Mr. Kiel also reported on these comments from fired U.S. Attorney John McKay:

Now another prosecutor, Seattle’s John McKay, says he got a similar call much earlier, before the firings had even been reported. From Newsweek:

After McKay was fired in December, he says he also got a phone call from a “clearly nervous” Elston asking if he intended to go public: “He was offering me a deal: you stay silent and the attorney general won’t say anything bad about you.”

Murray Waas of the National Journal reported on May 3, 2007 these details regarding Mr. Elston’s conduct:

The U.S. attorneys have said that Elston, in effect, told them that if they kept quiet about their dismissals, the Justice Department would not suggest that they had been forced to resign because of poor performance.

* * *

McKay, who was the first of the prosecutors whom Elston called, described Elston’s message to him: “The attorney general was not going to disclose that I or the other U.S. attorneys were fired or forced to resign.… ‘We have no intention of naming people.'”

McKay said that Elston never specifically suggested an explicit quid pro quo whereby Justice officials would not say that McKay had been fired for cause or poor performance if McKay did not talk to the media or Congress about his firing. However, McKay said, “a reasonable person would have felt both offended and threatened” by Elston’s call.

McKay said that the message he took away from the conversation was, “If you remain silent, we will not out you as someone who was forced to resign.”

McKay said that he made contemporaneous notes of his conversation with Elston, and dated them — something, he said, that was not his ordinary practice. He did so because of his concerns about what Elston was telling him, according to McKay.

Charlton said he got a similar phone call from Elston on the same day. In formal response to written questions posed to him by the House Judiciary Committee, Charlton said, “I believe that Elston was offering me a quid pro quo agreement: my silence in exchange for the attorney general’s.”

Cummins testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 6, at which time a contemporaneous e-mail he wrote within an hour of his phone call with Elston was released. In the e-mail, which he sent to five of his fellow prosecutors, Cummins said that the “essence of [Elston’s] message” was that if any of the fired U.S. attorneys had pressed their case in the media or before Congress, senior aides to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales might “feel forced to somehow pull their gloves off” and accuse the prosecutors of ineptitude or poor management.

Cummins also wrote in his e-mail that Elston had called him because he was upset about comments Cummins had made in the press about his firing. “[Justice officials] feel like they are taking unnecessary flak to avoid trashing each of us,” Cummins said in the e-mail to his fellow prosecutors. “I also made it a point to tell him that all of us have turned down multiple invitations to testify. He reacted quite a bit to the idea of anyone voluntarily testifying, and it seemed clear that they would see this as a major escalation of the conflict meriting some kind of unspecified form of retaliation.”

McKay, one of the prosecutors who got the e-mail, said: “[Cummins] wanted to send a message to all of us. We got that message, loud and clear: If you talk to the press or go to Congress, the Department of Justice will not consider you a friend. I considered it an act of intimidation.”

* * *

At the March 6 Senate Judiciary hearing, Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I., asked Cummins and three others U.S. attorneys what they would have done in their capacity as federal prosecutors had they learned that an interested party in one of their investigations had tried to discourage a witness from providing information or testifying. All four said that they would have investigated the matter to determine a possible obstruction of justice.

“Mr. Cummins, let me ask you first. I’d like to ask you to put your U.S. attorney hat back on,” Whitehouse said. “You’re still in office, and think of a significant grand jury investigation that you led as United States attorney in your district. And consider that a significant witness in that grand jury investigation has just come into your office to relate to you that prior to his grand jury testimony he was approached about his testimony and [told]… essentially exactly the words that Mr. Elston approached you. What would your next step be as United States attorney?”

Cummins responded: “We take intimidation of witnesses very seriously in the Department of Justice and the U.S. attorney’s office, so we would be very proactive in that situation.”

Attempting to moderate his statement, he added: “I would qualify that by saying that at the time this discussion was had, we weren’t under a subpoena; the idea of testifying was just kind of a theoretical idea out there. And I would say … to the extent we talked about testimony at all, it was the idea that running out and volunteering to be part of this would not be viewed charitably by the people that it would affect.”

Whitehouse pressed Cummins: “But if that sort of approach had been made to a witness in an active proceeding that you were leading, and you were extremely proactive about it, that would lead you where?”

“Well, we’d certainly investigate it and see if a crime had occurred.”

“And the crime would be?”

Cummins responded: “Obstruction of justice. I think there are several statutes that might be implicated — but obstruction of justice.”

Whitehouse posed the same question to John McKay, the fired U.S. attorney from Washington state.

McKay responded: “I would be discussing it with the assigned prosecutor and federal agents.”

“With regard to?”

“With regard to possible obstruction of justice.”

Whitehouse next put the question to David Iglesias, the fired U.S. attorney from New Mexico:

Iglesias replied: “Same answer, sir. I would contact the career [assistant U.S. attorney] and probably the FBI and talk about what’s the evidence we have to maybe move forward on an obstruction investigation.

Finally, Whitehouse looked toward Carol Lam, the fired U.S. attorney from San Diego.

She answered without hesitation: “Fundamentally the same answer: witness intimidation.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Lara Jakes Jordan adds in this article on June 16, 2007:

“I believe that Elston was offering me a quid pro quo agreement: my silence in exchange for the attorney general’s,” wrote Paul Charlton, the former U.S. attorney in Nevada.

John McKay, former top prosecutor in Seattle, said he perceived a threat from Elston during his call. And Carol Lam, who was U.S. attorney in San Diego, said that “during one phone call, Michael Elston erroneously accused me of ‘leaking’ my dismissal to the press, and criticized me for talking to other dismissed U.S. attorneys.”

A fourth former U.S. attorney, Bud Cummins in Little Rock, Ark., had made a similar accusation in an e-mail released in March. At the time, Elston said he was “shocked and baffled” that his Feb. 20 conversation with Cummins could be interpreted as threatening.

Finally, Dan Eggen and Amy Goldstein report in the Washington Post on June 16, 2007:

Former U.S. attorney John McKay of Seattle told Congress that on Jan. 17 — before McKay stepped down — he received a call from Elston that he “greatly resented.” He said Elston attempted to “buy my silence by promising that the attorney general would not demean me in his Senate testimony.”

“My handwritten and dated notes of this call,” McKay told Congress, “reflect that I believed Mr. Elston’s tone was sinister and that he was prepared to threaten me further if he concluded I did not intend to continue to remain silent about my dismissal.”

Paul K. Charlton, who was the U.S. attorney in Phoenix, said that he, too, received a call that day in which Elston offered “a quid pro quo agreement: my silence in exchange for the attorney general’s.” Another former prosecutor, Carol C. Lam of San Diego, said Elston accused her of “leaking” word of her dismissal to the press “and criticized me for talking to other dismissed U.S. attorneys.”

Former U.S. attorney Bud Cummins of Little Rock also recounted a Feb. 20 conversation with Elston that Cummins said contained a “threatening undercurrent” warning that Justice Department officials would retaliate if he or his colleagues spoke to journalists or volunteered to testify in Congress.

As described by fired United States Attorneys John McKay, Bud Cummins, Paul Charlton and Carol Lam and as reported in the public record as noted above, the conduct of Mr. Elston clearly establishes that he committed criminal or deliberately wrongful acts that reflects adversely on the his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law. Additionally, Mr. Elston clearly engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Allegation 2:

Michael J. Elston engaged in conduct that was a violation of federal laws that prohibit politicization of hiring within the Department of Justice when he selected candidates for employment based on political criteria.

As described in thisletter to Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, and The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives from A Group of Concerned Department of Justice Employees, dated April 9, 2007, Mr. Elston engaged in conduct that was a violation of federal hiring laws:

Needless to say, many people were upset and confused. Why had so many potential interviewees been removed from the list? [Italics in original] Top supervisors requested answers, and on December 5 a meeting was held with Michael Ellston [sic], Chief of Staff to Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty. Many division attorneys and staff were present, and Mr. Ellston [sic] was offensive to the point of insulting. Claiming that the entire group had not “done their jobs” in reviewing applicants, he said that he had a “screening panel” go over the list and research these candidates on the Internet; he refused to give the names of those on his “panel.” Mr. Ellston [sic] said that people were struck from the list for three reasons:grades, spelling errors on applications, and inappropriate information about them on the Internet, When the meeting attendees protested that these interviewees had excellent grades, Mr. Ellston [sic]replied that a Harvard graduate in the bottom half of the class was more desirable than the top students at a second-tier law schools. Although Mr. Ellston [sic] stated that he would entertain appeals to his decisions, few of these appeals were granted.

When division personnel staff later compared the remaining interviewees with the candidates struck from the list, one common denominator appeared repeatedly: most of those struck from the list had interned for a Hill Democrat, clerked for a Democratic judge, worked for a “liberal” cause, or otherwise appeared to have “liberal” leanings. Summa cum laude graduates of both Yale and Harvard were rejected for interviews. There are also reports that officials at Harvard’s Career Placement Office called DOJ personnel to ask why their students were not getting interviews and also to ask why decisions had not yet been made about the Summer Law Intern Program.

These allegations were confirmed by the United States Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility and Office of the Inspector Generals in their report,An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring in the Department of Justice Honors Program and Summer Law Intern Program, which provided the following details regarding Mr. Elston’s conduct:

…. However, we believe the most significant misconduct was committed by ELSTON, the head of the Screening Committee. ELSTON failed to take appropriate action when he learned that McDonald was routinely deselecting candidates on the basis of what she perceived to be the candidates’ liberal affiliations. We also concluded that ELSTON deselected some candidates – and allowed the deselection of others – based on impermissible considerations.

* * *

As explained below, we concluded that ELSTON violated federal law and Department policy by deselecting candidates based on their liberal affiliations. First, the data analysis indicates that highly qualified candidates with liberal or Democratic Party affiliations were deselected at a much higher rate than highly qualified candidates with conservative or Republican Party affiliations. Second, ELSTON admitted that he may have deselected candidates in a few instances due to their affiliations with certain liberal causes. ELSTON also was unable in specific cases to give a credible reason as to why highly qualified candidates with liberal or Democratic Party affiliations were deselected.

While ELSTON generally denied that he considered political or ideological affiliations in evaluating candidates, he admitted when questioned about certain candidates that he considered aspects of those candidates’ ideological affiliations in his evaluation. ….

In addition, ELSTON consistently was unable to provide credible explanations as to why he denied the appeals of the highly qualified candidates who had liberal or Democratic Party affiliations. His proffered reasons were also inconsistent with other statements he made or actions he took. ….

Similarly, we did not find credible ELSTON’s explanation that he may have denied the appeal of a highly qualified candidate who had worked for the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military because he concluded the candidate would not “stand up for the law with respect to sentencing and Department policy” due to the statement in her essay that she would be able to exercise prosecutorial discretion as a federal prosecutor. We also did not credit ELSTON’s other explanation for denying this candidate – that she was not academically qualified because she was in the top third rather than the top quarter of her class at Stanford Law – since it was inconsistent with his actions in approving other candidates from lower-tier law schools with lower grades. During his interview, ELSTON also frequently pointed to lines in candidates’ essays that may have been a basis for deselecting candidates because he said these statements could be indications that the candidates would improperly follow their own consciences rather than the Department’s policies. These included statements such as the candidate wanting to work for the Department because the job would allow the candidate “to consider what is best for my country.”

In addition to ELSTON’s failure to provide credible explanations for his actions during his interview, we concluded that ELSTON was not candid with others in the Department who questioned him during the hiring process about why candidates were being deselected. ….

Moreover, ELSTON tried to minimize his role in selecting candidates when he was questioned by others about the Committee’s decisions. ELSTON frequently explained that other Committee members had been responsible for the decisions and described his role as a conduit. However, the evidence demonstrated that he was casting the deciding vote on a significant number of candidates that Fridman had approved and McDonald had rejected.

In sum, we found that ELSTON was aware that McDonald was rejecting candidates based on her perception of the candidates’ political or ideological affiliations and that he failed to intervene, discuss it with her, or stop her from doing so. We also concluded that ELSTON committed misconduct, and violated federal law and Department policy, when he deselected candidates and denied appeals based on his perception of the political or ideological affiliations of the candidates.

* * *

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

* * *

The documentary evidence and witness interviews also support the conclusion that two members of the 2006 Screening Committee, Esther Slater McDonald and Michael ELSTON, took political or ideological affiliations into account in deselecting candidates in violation of Department policy and federal law. For example, the evidence showed that McDonald wrote disparaging statements about candidates’ liberal and Democratic Party affiliations on the applications she reviewed and that she voted to deselect candidates on that basis.

We also found that ELSTON, the head of the 2006 Screening Committee, failed to take appropriate action when he learned that McDonald was routinely deselecting candidates on the basis of what she perceived to be the candidates’ liberal affiliations. The evidence also showed that ELSTON himself deselected some candidates – and allowed the deselection of others – based on impermissible considerations. Despite his initial denial in our interview that he did not consider such inappropriate factors, he later admitted in the interview that he may have deselected candidates in a few instances due to their affiliation with certain causes. In addition, ELSTON was unable to give a credible reason as to why specific highly qualified candidates with liberal or Democratic credentials were deselected.

We concluded that, as a result of the actions of McDonald and ELSTON, many qualified candidates were deselected by the Screening Committee because of their perceived political or ideological affiliations. We believe that McDonald’s and ELSTON’s conduct constituted misconduct and also violated the Department’s policies and civil service law that prohibit discrimination in hiring based on political or ideological affiliations.

However, because both McDonald and ELSTON have resigned from the Department, they are no longer subject to discipline by the Department for their actions. Nevertheless, we recommend that the Department consider the findings in this report should either McDonald or ELSTON apply in the future for another position with the Department.

[Footnote] 59 However, we found evidence that McDonald knew that using political and ideological affiliation was inappropriate, but did it anyway. As noted above, in an e-mail dated October 25, 2006, unrelated to the Honors Program and SLIP, McDonald advised a friend applying for a career position with the Department “there’s not much I can do apart from recommending you because there are legal constraints on career hiring to ensure that it’s not political.”

[Footnote] 60 Although ELSTON stated that he did not know whether McDonald’s no votes were actually based upon the negative comments she was making about the candidates’ liberal affiliations, we found that statement disingenuous. Fridman told ELSTON that McDonald was doing this, and the notations on the applications, which ELSTON recognized as McDonald’s handwriting, showed that McDonald was circling and commenting on these groups. Moreover, many of these candidates had stellar credentials, and there was no other apparent reason for McDonald recommending their deselection.

[Footnote] 61 OPR Counsel H. Marshall Jarrett recused himself from the evaluation of DeFalaise’s conduct.

(Emphasis supplied.)

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Text of the Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct violated by Mr. Elston.

Web-mail to Sen. Lisa Murkowski

Updated 08-11-08 with this ‘reply‘ from Sen. Murkowski.

Sen. Lisa Murkowski
United States Senate
Contact via webmail

Washington, D.C. Office
709 Hart Senate Building
Washington D.C., 20510
202-224-6665
Fax 202-224-5301

Anchorage Office
510 L. Street, Suite 550
Anchorage, AK 99501
907-271-3735
Fax 907-276-4081

Fairbanks Office
101 12th Avenue
Room 216
Fairbanks, AK 99701
907-456-0233
Fax 907-451-7146

Juneau Delegation Office
P.O. Box 21247
709 West 9th Street, Room 971
Juneau, AK 99802
907-586-7400
Fax 907-586-8922

Kenai Delegation Office
110 Trading Bay Road
Suite 105
Kenai, AK 99611
907-283-5808
Fax 907-283-4363

Ketchikan Delegation Office
540 Water Street
Suite 101
Ketchikan, AK 99901
907-225-6880
Fax 907-225-0390

MatSu Delegation Office
851 East Westpoint Drive
Suite 307
Wasilla, AK 99654
907-376-7665
Fax 907-376-8526

Bethel Delegation Office
P.O. Box 1030
311 Willow Street
Building 3
Bethel, AK 99559
907-543-1639
Fax 907-543-1637

Dear Sen. Murkowski,

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Goodling. I’ve also included you in this group due to your conduct in the purchase and reporting of the Kenai River property. I believe your conduct violated several of the rules of professional conduct of the Alaska Bar and that these actions raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct in purchasing and reporting the Kenai River property violated your ethical obligations as a member of the Alaska Bar.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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E-mail to Harriet E. Miers, No. 2

Harriet E. Miers, Esq.
Lock Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP
hmiers@lockelord.com

Copy to:

Jerry K. Clements, Esq.
Chair, Lock Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP
jclements@lockelord.com

George Taylor Manning, Esq.
Jones Day
gtmanning@jonesday.com

Dear Ms. Miers,

As I mentioned to you in my prior e-mail , I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, D. Kyle Sampson and yourself . In my opinion, you have committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of both Texas and Washington D.C that raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

I have now updated the statement of facts alleging various violations, by you, of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct with the recent Memorandum Opinion in COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. HARRIET MIERS, et al., Civil Action No. 08-0409 (JDB). in which United States District Judge John D. Bates confirms conduct of Ms. Miers that calls into question her fitness to practice law.

I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct while employed at the White House violated the D.C. Rules of Procedure.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

E.M.

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Update: Harriet E. Miers

I have updated the statement of facts alleging various violations by Harriet E. Miers of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct with the recent Memorandum Opinion in COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. HARRIET MIERS, et al., Civil Action No. 08-0409 (JDB). in which United States District Judge John D. Bates confirms conduct of Ms. Miers that calls into question her fitness to practice law.

Personal Information:

  • Name: Miers, Harriet E.
  • Bar: Texas
  • ID No: 00000067
  • Status: Active

Grievance Information: Texas

Allegations:

Willful Failure to Appear pursuant to a Lawful United States House Judiciary Committee Subpoena

On June 13, 2007, Rep. John Conyers, Jr., and Sen Patrick Leahy, as Chairmen of the United States House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, respectively, issued multiple subpoenas to former White House Counsel Harriet Miers to produce certain requested documents and to appear for testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law on July 12, 2007. See Conyers: Are Subpoenas Optional or Not?, Paul Kiel, TPMMuckraker.com, July 12, 2007; See also page 39, Memorandum to the Members of the Committee on the Judiciary from Rep. John C. Conyers, Jr., Chairman, dated July 24, 2007. On July 9, 2007, George Manning, attorney for Ms. Miers, informed the House Committee that Ms. Miers would “comply with the White House ‘direction[]’ by current White House Counsel Fred Fielding who “‘directed’ Ms. Miers not to provide testimony to the Committee. Id. at page 41. Chairman Conyers and Subcommittee Chair Linda Sanchez wrote to Mr. Manning stating “that it was incumbent on Ms. Miers to appear so that the Subcommittee could consider her claims of privilege concerning specific documents or in response to particular questions posed as the hearing. Id. Ms. Miers failed to appear before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on July 12, 2007. Id. at page 42. After failing to appear, and in response to an inquiry by Chairman Conyers, “Mr. Manning informed Chairmen Conyers on July 17, 2007, that his client intended to remain noncom pliant with the subpoena. Id . In the Memorandum, Chairman Conyers states:

Even more extraordinary than the executive privilege claims in this matter is the assertion that Ms. Miers, a former White House official not currently employed by the federal government, is absolutely immune from even appearing before the Subcommittee as directed by subpoena. The Supreme Court has specifically held that even a President, while serving in that capacity, can be subpoena by a court and can be required to participate in a civil lawsuit for damages by a private party. [FN 281] The Court’s holding in Jones flies in the face of the claim that a former White House official is somehow immune from even appearing in response to a Congressional subpoena. As with Sara Taylor, who received a subpoena similar to Ms. Miers’ but chose to appear and answer some questions before the Senate Judiciary Committee, no one can doubt that Ms. Miers would have been asked some questions that would not have fallen within even the broadest assertion of executive privilege, but Ms. Miers simply refused to attend her hearing altogether. Id .

* * *

[T]here is an additional reason that Ms. Miers’ claims concerning executive privilege were and should be rejected. When a private party like Ms. Miers is subject to a subpoena, it is improper for the subpoenaed person simply to refuse to … testify based on an assertion of privilege by a third party, in this case, the White House. … To the extent that the White House objected to the subpoena to Ms. Miers as a private citizen, therefore, its proper recourse – which would have been more than adequate to protect its own asserted rights – would have been to seek a court order, rather than unilaterally “directing” Ms. Miers to disobey a lawful subpoena herself. Id. at page 46.

* * *

[M]s. Miers was not being misled by a government entity into thinking she was acting lawfully, but instead she chose, with full knowledge of the possible consequences, to follow the White House’s flawed “directive.” As the entity which issued the subpoena to Ms. Miers, only the Committee was in a position to give her “reasonable reliance” that she could lawfully refuse to comply, but in fact the Committee did precisely the opposite and made clear that she was required to obey her subpoena. Id. at page 48. (emphasis in original)

* * *

As explained in the July 12 and July 19 rulings upheld by the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, the refusal … of Ms. Miers to testify or even appear pursuant to subpoena [has] no proper legal basis. Id. at page 52. FN 281 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703-06 (1997). As the Court noted in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323-331 (1950), “persons summoned as witnesses have certain minimum duties and obligations which as necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery. …We have often iterated the importance of this public duty, which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform when properly summoned.”

As a result of her refusal to appear before the Subcommittee pursuant to a lawful subpoena, the House Judiciary Committee approved a contempt of Congress citation against Ms. Miers. House Democrats Approve Contempt of Congress Citations Wednesday Against 2 Presidential Aides, Laurie Kellman, AP News, July 25, 2007. See also House Committee Approves Contempt Citation, Paul Kiel, TPMMuckraker.com, July 25, 2007. Ms. Miers failure to appear pursuant to subpoena and her receipt of a contempt of Congress citation violate her ethical obligations under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct .

Chairman Conyers’ position has been upheld by United States District Judge John D. Bates in COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. HARRIET MIERS, et al., Civil Action No. 08-0409 (JDB). In his Memorandum Opinion, Judge Bates introduced the position taken by Ms.Miers as unprecedented, is without any support in the case law and fallacious:

Indeed, the aspect of this lawsuit that is unprecedented is the notion that Ms. Miers is absolutely immune from compelled congressional process. The Supreme Court has reserved absolute immunity for very narrow circumstances, involving the President’s personal exposure to suits for money damages based on his official conduct or concerning matters of national security or foreign affairs. The Executive’s current claim of absolute immunity from compelled congressional process for senior presidential aides is without any support in the case law. The fallacy of that claim was presaged in United States v. Nixon itself (id. at 706):

neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial [or congressional] process under all circumstances.

Id. at p. 3.

In footnote 1 of his Opinion, Judge Bates’ states that “The Court will refer to the defendants in this action, and to the executive branch and the current administration generally, as “the Executive.” Id. at p. 2. Accordingly, each and every reference to the Executive is a reference to, inter alia, Mr. Miers.

Because Ms. Miers presented no legitimate claim for absolute immunity, Judge Bates rules that Ms. Miers must, in fact, appear pursuant to the validly issued subpoenas of the United States House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary:

Clear precedent and persuasive policy reasons confirm that the Executive cannot be the
judge of its own privilege and hence Ms. Miers is not entitled to absolute immunity from
compelled congressional process. Ms. Miers is not excused from compliance with the
Committee’s subpoena by virtue of a claim of executive privilege that may ultimately be made. Instead, she must appear before the Committee to provide testimony, and invoke executive privilege where appropriate. [Footnote] 38 [is not included herein] And as the Supreme Court has directed, the judiciary remains the ultimate arbiter of an executive privilege claim, since it is the duty of the courts to declare what the law is. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-05; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.

Id. at p. 91.

In his analysis, Judge Bates provided an exhaustive review of the facts and then summarized the underlying facts in this matter:

The undisputed factual record, then, establishes the following. Notwithstanding a prolonged period of negotiation, [Footnote] 7[,] the parties reached a self-declared impasse with respect to the document production and testimony at issue here. Faced with that reality, the full House of Representatives voted to hold Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten in contempt of Congress and certified the Contempt Report to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia to pursue criminal enforcement of the contempt citations. The Attorney General then directed the U.S. Attorney not to proceed against Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten. The Committee, then, filed this suit seeking civil enforcement of its subpoena authority by way of declaratory and injunctive relief.

[Footnote] 7 Mr. Fielding’s final letter to Chairman Conyers reveals that the Chairmen had “written ‘on eight previous occasions,’ three of which letters contain or incorporate specific proposals involving terms for a possible agreement.” See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 34.

Id. at pp. 16-17.

Judge Bates also addresses Ms. Miers’ claim of absolute immunity, which was the basis for her refusal to even appear before the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary:

The Executive maintains that absolute immunity shields Ms. Miers from compelled testimony before Congress. Although the exact reach of this proposed doctrine is not clear, the Executive insists that it applies only to “a very small cadre of senior advisors.” See Tr. at 96. The argument starts with the assertion that the President himself is absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony. There is no case that stands for that exact proposition, but the Executive maintains that the conclusion flows logically from Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), where the Supreme Court held that the President “is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.” Id. at 749. “Any such [congressional] power of compulsion over the President,” the Executive asserts, “would obviously threaten his independence and autonomy from Congress in violation of separation of powers principles.” See Defs.’ Reply at 40. The Executive then contends that “[those] same principles apply just as clearly to the President’s closest advisers.” Id. Because senior White House advisers “have no operational authority over government agencies . . . [t]heir sole function is to advise and assist the President in the exercise of his duties.” Id. at 41. Therefore, they must be regarded as the President’s “alter ego.” In a similar context, the Supreme Court has extended Speech or Debate Clause immunity to legislative aides who work closely with Members of Congress. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972). Accordingly, forcing close presidential advisors to testify before Congress would be tantamount to compelling the President himself to do so, a plainly untenable result in the Executive’s view. Indeed, as the Executive would have it, “[w]ere the President’s closest advisers subject to compelled testimony there would be no end to the demands that effectively could be placed upon the President himself.” See Defs.’ Reply at 43.

Unfortunately for the Executive, this line of argument has been virtually foreclosed by the
Supreme Court. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the plaintiff sued “senior White
House aides” for civil damages arising out of the defendants’ official actions. Id. at 802. The defendants argued that they were “entitled to a blanket protection of absolute immunity as an incident of their offices as Presidential aides.” Id. at 808. The Supreme Court rejected that position. Notwithstanding the absolute immunity extended to legislators, judges, prosecutors, and the President himself, the Court emphasized that “[f]or executive officials in general, however, our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm.” Id. at 807. Although there can be no doubt regarding “the importance to the President of loyal and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office, . . . these factors, alone, [are] insufficient to justify absolute immunity.” Id. at 808-09 (discussing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).

Id. at pp. 79-80.

Judge Bates continues to decimate Ms. Miers’ claim of absolute immunity:

There is nothing left to the Executive’s primary argument in light of Harlow. This case, of course, does not involve national security or foreign policy, and the Executive does not invoke that mantra. The derivative, “alter ego” immunity that the Executive requests here due to Ms. Miers’s and Mr. Bolten’s close proximity to and association with the President has been explicitly and definitively rejected, and there is no basis for reaching a different conclusion here. Indeed, the Executive asks this Court to recognize precisely the type of blanket derivative absolute immunity that the Supreme Court declined to acknowledge in Harlow.

Id. at pp. 81-82.

Judge Bates also expressly pointed out that there is NO judicial precedent for Ms. Miers’ claims:

Thus, it would hardly be unprecedented for Ms. Miers to appear before Congress to testify and assert executive privilege where appropriate. Still, it is noteworthy that in an environment where there is no judicial support whatsoever for the Executive’s claim of absolute immunity, the historical record also does not reflect the wholesale compulsion by Congress of testimony from senior presidential advisors that the Executive fears. [Emphasis in original.]

Id. at pp. 83-84.

And that Ms. Miers’ claims are based solely on two (2) legal opinions issued by the Executive Branch itself:

Tellingly, the only authority that the Executive can muster in support of its absolute
immunity assertion are two OLC opinions authored by Attorney General Janet Reno and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury, respectively.

* * *

[T]he Court is not at all persuaded by the Reno and Bradbury opinions.

Id. at pp. 85-86.

Since Ms. Miers’ failure to appear pursuant to validly issued subpoenas is not supported by any colorable basis in law, her failure to appear is in violation of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, Ms. Miers’ conduct calls into question her fitness to practice law.

Supporting Links:

Conyers: Are Subpoenas Optional or Not?, Paul Kiel, TPMMuckraker.com, July 12, 2007

Memorandum to the Members of the Committee on the Judiciary regarding Full Committee Consideration of Report on the Refusal of Former White House Counsel Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten to Comply with Subpoenas By the House Judiciary Committee, Rep. John C. Conyers, Jr., Chairman, July 24, 2007

House Democrats Approve Contempt of Congress Citations Wednesday Against 2 Presidential Aides, Laurie Kellman, AP News, July 25, 2007

House Committee Approves Contempt Citation, Paul Kiel, TPMMuckraker.com, July 25, 2007

Rules Violated:

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E-mail to Judge Mark Everett Fuller

Judge Mark Everett Fuller
U.S. District Court Judge
mark_fuller@almd.uscourts.gov

Dear Judge Fuller,

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, D. Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers and yourself. In my opinion, you have committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of Alabama that raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct in your handling of the Don Siegelman matter violated the Alabama Rules of Procedure.

E.M.

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E-mail to Harriet E. Miers

Harriet E. Miers, Esq.
Locke Liddell & Sapp

Dear Ms. Miers,

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, D. Kyle Sampson and yourself. In my opinion, you have committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of both Texas and Washington D.C that raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. (For what it’s worth, I am an attorney licensed to practice in at least one of the 50 states.)

I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct while employed at the White House violated the D.C. Rules of Procedure.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

E.M.

(Whatever it does mean, the fact that I have not publicly identified myself changes neither the facts nor the severity of my allegations.)

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Employment of Kyle D. Sampson reflects poorly on Hunton & Williams, LLP

Updated March 10, 2009 to reflect Mr. Sampson’s leave of absence from Hunton & Williams.

Updated on July 29, 2008, with a July 28, 2008,  update to my post on Kyle D. Sampson.

I have not previously sent my copies of my posts directly to their targets. At time of posting, I had no e-mail address for Alberto Gonzales, Harriet Miers or Kyle D. Sampson and I didn’t send send a copy to Senator Lisa Murkowski through her webmail system. When I was writing my post about his unethical conduct in the Don Siegelman matter, though, I found Judge Mark Everett Fuller’s e-mail address in his Alabama State Bar profile.

While I was thinking about sending Judge Fuller a copy of my post, I read about the recent engagement of Grievance Project-eligible Monica Goodling at Above the Law. Scrolling down the page, I came across this reference to D. Kyle Sampson, another alumnus of the Alberto Gonzales-era Department of Justice.

As TPMMuckraker‘s Paul Kiel explained at the time:

So what’s next for Alberto Gonzales’ former chief of staff Kyle Sampson? Where does a senior Justice Department official with an expertise in politicization, who has experience orchestrating a purge of prosecutors, engaging in a clumsy cover-up, and getting drubbed when testifying before Congress, go next?

The answer: working for drug companies. The Salt Lake Tribune reports [Dead link. Article available in Salt Lake Tribune’s archives. Reg. req’d.] that Sampson has landed a gig with the mega-firm Hunton & Williams, in their food and drug practice. There, Sampson will help companies navigate the wilds of Food and Drug Administration regulation, among other duties.

And Mr. Sampson didn’t just land a ‘job’, he made partner at Hunton & Williams, a firm that prides itself on ‘excellence and hard work’, whose diversity programs and commitment to providing pro bono legal services (although they consider representing Super Bowl XLV for free to be pro bono work) make it possible for Hunton to ‘offer you the opportunity to work alongside creative and gifted people on interesting and real projects that matter‘.

If a firm such as this accepts Mr. Sampson as one of its own, maybe I’m wrong about him. Maybe his conduct at the Department of Justice was completely ethical and demonstrated excellence and hard work. So I asked Andrea Bear Field, Hunton & Williams DC Office Managing Partner, if either Mr. Sampson of Hunton wanted to respond to the criticisms that Mr. Sampson’s conduct while employed at the Department of Justice violated the D.C. Rules of Procedure.

My e-mail to Ms. Field:

Andrea Bear Field
DC Office Managing Partner

cc: D. Kyle Sampson, Partner

Dear Ms. Field,

It has now been several months since your colleague, Mr. D. Kyle Sampson, joined Hunton & Williams, as a partner no less. Since that time, I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility. Mr. Sampson is the second attorney about whose conduct I have written. (Alberto Gonzales was the first.) In my opinion, Mr. Sampson committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of both Utah and Washington D.C that raise a substantial question as to his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. (For what it’s worth, I am an attorney licensed to practice in at least one of the 50 states.)

Hunton & Williams is a firm that prides itself on ‘excellence and hard work’ and whose diversity programs and commitment to providing pro bono legal services (Do you really consider representing Super Bowl XLV for free to be pro bono work?) make it possible for Hunton to ‘offer you the opportunity to work alongside creative and gifted people on interesting and real projects that matter ‘. The corporate culture your firm describes, however, seems incongruous with the ethical judgment Mr. Sampson demonstrated in his recent past. I’m interested in both the firm’s and Mr. Sampson’s response to the criticisms that Mr. Sampson’s conduct while employed at the Department of Justice violated the D.C. Rules of Procedure.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

E.M.

(Whatever it does mean, the fact that I have not publicly identified myself changes neither the facts nor the severity of my allegations.)

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Mark Everett Fuller

The Preamble to the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct states, inter alia, that

A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.

As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, of the administration of justice, and of the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law, and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.

In multiple instances, Mark Everett Fuller has failed to adhere to these – and many other – standards of conduct.

Mark Everett Fuller was nominated by President George W. Bush on August 1, 2002 to the U.S. District Court in Alabama and was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on November 14, 2002. Since taking the bench, Judge Fuller has breached various rules of professional conduct, most notably in his handling of the prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman. Judge Fuller should be investigated by the Alabama State Bar Office of Legal Counsel to answer for his violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. The following analysis establishes the factual basis needed to file a grievance against Judge Fuller. Due to the complexity of the case, I have quoted extensively from the work of Scott Horton to establish a factual basis for Judge Fuller’s violations.

Personal Information:

  • Name: Hon. Mark Everett Fuller
  • Firm: U. S. District Court
  • Address: One Church Street
    Montgomery , AL 36104-0000
  • Phone: (334) 954-3640
  • Fax: (334) 954-3649
  • Date Admitted: September 27, 1985
  • Law School: Alabama, University of

Grievance Information: Alabama

Allegations:

Judge Fuller improperly failed to recuse himself from the prosecution of Don Siegelman

Scott Horton, a contributor to Harper’s Magazine and author of the weblog No Comment for Harper’s website, has been following the prosecution of Don Siegleman and has written extensively on the subject. In his article Mark Fuller and the Siegelman Case, Mr. Horton provides background for review of this matter:

In 2002, Don Siegelman lost the governorship of Alabama to Bob Riley by 3,000 votes, raising suspicions of electronic vote tampering. According to an affidavit 1

[Footnote] 1. The affidavit was prepared to serve a limited-purpose challenge to the role of Terry Butts, who appeared as a lawyer in the Scrushy/Siegelman case, had previously worked for Governor Riley.

by lifelong Republican Dana Jill Simpson, on November 18, 2002, soon after Siegelman’s defeat, a conference call was held among Bob Riley’s senior aides, and during the call William Canary, a prominent Alabama Republican, said “not to worry about Don Siegelman” because “his girls”— meaning two U.S. attorneys, Alice Martin and Canary’s wife Leura, both of whom subsequently indicted Siegelman—would “take care” of the governor; furthermore, Karl Rove was described as “pursuing” Siegelman with help from U.S. attorneys in Alabama. (Time has a thorough article on the issue, with a response from Canary.)

In November 2003, one year after Siegelman’s defeat, the Mobile Press-Register published a poll showing that in the event of a rematch between Riley and Siegelman, Siegelman would prevail. 2

[Footnote] 2. Bill Barrow, “Riley’s Ratings are Low: Governor Would Trail Moore, Siegelman in 2006 Race,” Mobile Press-Register, Nov. 16, 2003, p. 6..

I spoke with sources within the Alabama GOP who told me that this poll set off alarm bells and was cause for a number of meetings and discussions about how to deal with the “Siegelman problem.” Before long, I believe, a solution to that problem manifested itself in the form of an indictment.

The Tuscaloosa Case
In May 2004, Alice Martin brought the case on claims that Governor Siegelman, with two other men, had been involved in an effort to rig bids on a state project in Tuscaloosa. After a series of recusals, the case came before the Chief Judge of the Northern District, U.W. Clemon, in Birmingham. As reported in the Montgomery Advertiser, Martin was opposed to Clemon handling the case and attempted to force his recusal. Clemon, however, rejected the Justice Department’s request that he step aside. He also refused to allow the defense to portray the proceedings as a “political conspiracy,” but also expressed skepticism that the government had enough evidence to make out a case of conspiracy, which was the principal count. In my analysis of the case, I found that Clemon asked penetrating questions of the prosecutors, and when their answers reinforced his suspicions, he demanded that they present a prime facie showing of their case before allowing the matter to proceed. When they were unable to do this, Judge Clemon dismissed the conspiracy case with prejudice, and with that, the first effort to prosecute Siegelman imploded in October 2004.

Enter Mark Fuller
But there was more to come. In October 2005, federal prosecutors indicted Siegelman on new corruption charges in Montgomery, Alabama, a different judicial district distinct from the Northern Alabama district in which Clemon had previously dismissed similar charges without prejudice. In theory, federal judges are assigned to cases at random. But according to a well-placed Alabama GOP source who wishes to remain anonymous, some senior figures in the Alabama GOP appear to have known from the start that this case was going to be handled by a man they counted a friend, namely, George W. Bush–appointee Mark Fuller. Regardless of whether the GOP had the power to influence case assignments, Mark Everett Fuller was in fact assigned as judge who presided over the grand jury proceedings in this second effort to prosecute Siegelman.

* * *

Mark Fuller and the Siegelman Case, Scott Horton, July 31, 2007

Mr. Horton further describes the personal animosity held by Judge Fuller for Mr. Siegelman which should also have resulted in Judge Fuller’s recusal in this matter:

Fuller’s tenure as District Attorney for Alabama’s 12th Judicial Circuit lasted from 1997, when he was appointed by Republican Governor Fob James, through 2002, when, based on recommendations from Alabama Republican Senators Richard Shelby and Jefferson Sessions, he was nominated by President George W. Bush for a federal judgeship in the Middle District of Alabama in Montgomery. Fuller was confirmed in November 2002.

A routine state audit of Fuller’s office for the period from October 1999 to April 2001, found that “there were a few incidents of insufficient or incomplete documentation of disbursements” at the office. (A copy of the audit report can be found here.) State auditors recognized that Fuller, as district attorney, had very broad discretion in budget, so they did nothing to challenge these payments.

Fuller’s replacement Gary McAliley, however, 1

[Footnote] 1. Someone with direct knowledge of the situation told me that McAliley was Fuller’s “nemesis.” Whether this was true at the time, it is true that McAliley soon became a thorn in Fuller’s side.

appointed by then-Governor Don Siegelman, started another audit and began to investigate Fuller for salary spiking–the practice of making extraordinary payments to a person who is on the verge of retirement–in this case, presumably, because an Alabama rule for determining state pensions counts an employee’s earnings for the highest three years of the last 10 years of work. The McAliley audit concluded that Fuller allowed his chief investigator Bruce DeVane an extra $70,000 in 2000-–close to twice DeVane’s annual 1999 salary—to “compensate him for working nights and weekends on developing policies and procedures manuals for the district attorney’s office.”

[Image of a photo of Fuller at a 2005 law clerk reception appears in original post.]

The Retirement Systems of Alabama (RSA), which administers pension payments to former state employees, determined that the payments to DeVane were irregular and decided not to take them into account in calculating DeVane’s retirement benefits. DeVane went to court to force their hand. His star witness: Mark Fuller, now a federal judge in Montgomery. Fuller testified that he could legally pay DeVane any salary he wished and expressed the view that the state was bound to support his decision.

The following editorial, in the RSA’s newsletter Advisor in September 2003, described the case as the RSA saw it:

In December of last year, Judge Fuller appeared before the ERS Board wanting to “spike the retirement benefit” for a former employee, Mr. Bruce DeVane. When Judge Fuller was District Attorney for Pike County, he had given Mr. DeVane an 89% pay increase from $80,301 to $152,014 for one year only. If this additional payment were considered regular salary, his retirement income would have been increased by $1,000 per month or $330,000 over his expected lifetime. The Board rightfully denied the benefit spike. The Montgomery Advertiser editorial of December 5, 2002, congratulated the Board in standing tall to prevent a “ . . . back loading of salaries to boost pensions . . . .”

On February 22, 2006, the Enterprise Ledger summarized the case as follows: 2

[Footnote] 2. Kim Lewis, “Salary ‘Spiking’ Case,” Enterprise Ledger, Feb. 22, 2006. Reproduced in the Retirement Systems of Alabama Advisor, Vol. 31 No. 9, March 2006. [End Footnote.]

A former investigator for Coffee and Pike counties has not given up claims that the state owes him an additional $14,000 a year in retirement. Even though a Montgomery County judge dismissed Bruce DeVane’s case against the Retirement Systems of Alabama, DeVane’s attorney is hopeful the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals will reverse the judge’s decision.

In a civil lawsuit that took nearly two years to settle, Judge Eugene Reese, upheld a decision by RSA to spare Alabama taxpayers and deny DeVane’s claims to what RSA refers to as “extraordinary compensation.” During the January 2004 bench trial, DeVane’s former boss, U.S. District Judge Mark Fuller, who was district attorney for Coffee and Pike counties at that time, testified on behalf of DeVane. As DeVane’s boss, Fuller claims he could legally pay DeVane any salary he deemed suitable . . . .

Indeed, RSA lawyers had argued successfully that the jump in DeVane’s salary constituted an “extraordinary” circumstance that did not merit attention in calculating DeVane’s overall retirement pay. D.A. Gary McAliley, who did not return calls requesting comment, testified that the payments were, as a matter of operating procedure within his office, extraordinary. The state court sided with the RSA and McAiley, rejecting the views put forth by Fuller.

The head of the RSA is David G. Bronner—a highly regarded figure in Alabama’s state administration who oversees billions in pension funds. Bronner did not respond to my requests for comment, but he did publish a column on the matter, entitled “Sarcasm: Justice in Bama,” in the August 2007 Advisor. In the piece, he draws a connection between the DeVane case and the fact that Fuller later refused to grant the RSA the ability sue Enron in Alabama state court. He wrote:

I do not like U.S. District Judge Fuller nor does he like me. The RSA had to go through the entire state court system to prevent Judge Fuller’s buddy from ripping off the RSA. Shortly thereafter, Judge Fuller tried to sandbag the RSA by preventing our claim (by doing nothing) against the ultimate crook–Enron! Fortunately, the RSA prevailed on both issues.

In 2002, in the wake of the audit, Fuller simply said that the criticism of him was “politically motivated.” See also New District Attorney Named, December 23, 2002

But think about that for a moment. Fuller, an Alabama Republican stalwart, leaves for the federal bench—then finds his work as District Attorney under investigation by his replacement Gary McAliley. Fuller’s federal position was secure but his reputation was bruised, and he responded to his critics by insisting he left the D.A.’s office in “sound financial condition.” But he also let it be known that he felt that he was under political attack—by a recent Siegelman appointee. Given that, ask yourself: why would Fuller, a man with very good reason to have a grudge against Siegelman’s entire operation, not recuse himself from judging Siegelman?

To me, it looks like there was a score to settle.

Judge Fuller: A Siegelman Grudge Match? by Scott Horton, August 2, 2007.

Indeed it does. Judge Fuller’s personal animosity is further described by reporter Laura McGann at TPMMuckraker:

Dana Jill Simpson wasn’t just worried about Rove’s involvement in Gov. Don Siegelman’s (D-AL) case. She also testified that she heard about a behind-the-scenes arrangement to ensure which judge would get the case — a judge sure to “hang” Siegelman.

Simpson said that Gov. Bob Riley’s (R) son, Rob Riley, told her in a 2005 conversation — one where Riley also said that Rove was pushing to have the Justice Department investigate Siegelman — that Judge Mark Fuller would get the case because Fuller, an active Republican, had a beef with Siegelman over an audit.

We’ve posted the portion of the interview where Simpson discusses Fuller here.

Q And did he talk to you about Mark Fuller’s politics or political work?

[Simpson] He did.

Q What did you talk about in that regard?

[Simpson] I asked him — he made a statement that Fuller would hang Don Siegelman. And I asked him how he knew that, if he got him in his court. And he said that Fuller was — had been on the Executive Republican Committee at Alabama — in Alabama before he been a judge and he also told me about a backlogging case, which is what you call the salary spike. He called it the “backlogging.”

Q And did [Riley] say any more about what Don Siegelman had to do with those audits that put Mark Fuller out?

[Simpson] He said that Don Siegelman had caused Fuller to get audited. That’s what Fuller thought. He hated him for that.

Republican Lawyer Interview with House Judiciary Panel Released by Laura McGann, October 10, 2007.

Mr. Horton describes additional acts of misconduct by Judge Fuller in his handling of the Siegelman matter:

When the jury retired, half of the members favored acquittal, and the other half, who according to subsequent statements felt they were doing what Judge Fuller wanted them to do, supported conviction. The jury initially deadlocked, sending the judge a note stating that they could not resolve the case. The judge responded by suggesting that he would be prepared to hold them indefinitely, including over the upcoming holiday. An anonymous source supplied defense counsel with evidence that some jurors were engaged in inappropriate conduct, among other things reading press accounts of the case and discussing how to pressure other jurors into a conviction with outside evidence.

Two emails in particular, which I was able to obtain from pleadings filed with the court, indicate that outside materials were being downloaded from the Internet and used by these jurors in an effort to pressure their wavering peers:

Exhibit 23:
“….judge really helping w/jurors…
still having difficulties with #30
…any ideas???
keep pushing on ur side
did not understand ur thoughts on statute
but received links.
[first name of Juror B]

Exhibit 24:
“I can’t see anything we miss’d. u?
articles usent outstanding! gov & pastor up s—t creek.
good thing no one likes them anyway. all public officials
r scum; especially this 1. pastor
is reall a piece of work
…they missed before, but we won’t
…also, keepworking on 30…
will update u on other meeting.
[first name of Juror B]

Normally such evidence would result in dismissal of the jury and an order directing a new trial, but not here. Fuller refused to subpoena the email records in question, to question the jurors about the allegations of improper conduct, or to allow counsel to do the same. When the defendants sought to notify the Internet service providers so that the records could be preserved, the motion was summarily denied. Then Fuller, acting to protect the “sanctity of the jury,” adjourned the case for one year before sentencing—long enough for most Internet service providers to automatically dispose of emails maintained on their servers.

Judge Fuller and the Trial of Don Siegelman by Scott Horton, August 3, 2007.

Mr. Horton also reports on a motion filed by Don Siegelman’s attorneys to recuse Judge Fuller from hearing the case due to his conflicts on interest:

The recusal motion rested upon details about Fuller’s personal business interests. On February 22, 2007, defense attorneys obtained information that Judge Fuller held a controlling 43.75% interest in government contractor Doss Aviation, Inc. After investigating these claims for over a month, the attorneys filed a motion for Fuller’s recusal on April 18, 2007. The motion stated that Fuller’s total stake in Doss Aviation was worth between $1-5 million, and that Fuller’s income from his stock for 2004 was between $100,001 and $1 million dollars.

In other words, Judge Fuller likely made more from his business income, derived from U.S. Government contracts, than as a judge. Fuller is shown on one filing as President of the principal business, Doss Aviation, and his address is shown as One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama, the address of the Frank M. Johnson Federal Courthouse, in which his chambers are located.

[Image in original not reprinted here.]

Doss Aviation, Inc. (motto: “Total Quality Service Isn’t Expensive, It’s Priceless”) and its subsidiary, Aureus International, hold contracts with a number of government agencies. Quoting from defense counsel’s motion for recusal (emphasis in the original):

Doss Aviation, Inc. has been awarded numerous federal military contracts from the United States government worth over $258,000,000, including but not limited to: An , August 2002 contract with the Air Force for $30,474,875 for Helicopter Maintenance, a November 2003 contract with the Navy for $5,190,960 for aircraft refueling, a February 2006 contract with the Air Force for over $178,000,000 for training pilots and navigators, and a March 2006 contract with the Air Force for $4,990,541.28 for training at the United States Air Force Academy. The February 2006 contract with the Air Force for over $178,000,000 is for 10 ½ years, but is renewable from year to year . . .

An Enterprise Ledger article dated April 3, 2005, states that “FBI agents, military and civilian pilots and medical professionals all over the world wear (Aureus International) products which are cut, sewn, inspected, bagged and shipped from its home in Enterprise.”

Doss Aviation and its subsidiaries also held contracts with the FBI. This is problematic when one considers that FBI agents were present at Siegelman’s trial, and that Fuller took the extraordinary step of inviting them to sit at counsel’s table throughout trial. Moreover, while the case was pending, Doss Aviation received a $178 million contract from the federal government.

The Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice intervened, saying almost nothing about the merits of the motion, but attacking the professional integrity and motives of its adversaries. Here’s an excerpt from the government’s response:

[section title] II. The Petition is the Latest Implementation of Defendant Scrushy’s Bad Faith Strategy to Attack the Integrity of the Judicial Process

As discussed above, the United States submits that the defendant’s Petition is a meritless attack on the District Judge who presided over his conviction by a jury. In light of federal courts’ warnings, cited above, to avoid bad faith manipulations and forum-shopping, the United States notes the following indicators of defendant’s bad faith throughout these proceedings.

Even a quick review and judicial notice of the media accounts surrounding this litigation makes evident that the Petition is just another part of an ongoing and considered strategy of attacking every aspect of the judicial process . . . Immediately after the trial, counsel for defendants Siegelman and Scrushy falsely attacked the conduct of the jury . . .

This, of course, fails to address the legal merits of the motion, merely beating up on opposing counsel.

Judge Fuller denied the motion for recusal. His decision raises three issues:

First, Fuller suggests that he is merely a shareholder in an enterprise. In fact, Fuller’s 43.75% interest in a company with a handful of shareholders makes him the controlling shareholder in a tightly held business.

Second, Fuller derides as a “rather fanciful theory” that he would be influenced by the fact that his business interests derive almost entirely from Government contracts, including from the litigant before the court. It seems that Fuller would have us believe that the process of issuing these contracts is divorced from the political world in Washington. That’s absurd: an examination of press statements surrounding contracts awarded to Doss Aviation shows that Fuller’s political mentor, Representative Terry Everett, is regularly cited in connection with the contract awards. Moreover, the entire process of Department of Defense contract awards is now notoriously politicized through “earmarking” and similar processes that effectively allow legislators to steer lucrative contracts into the hands of their political friends. 1

[Footnote] 1. Case in point: immediately after Fuller’s sentencing of Don Siegelman, Siegelman’s Republican successor Bob Riley disappointed his G.O.P. supporters in Cullman County by canceling his appearance at a dinner there and making a sudden and unexpected trip to Washington. Riley stated that he was going to meet with officials at the Department of the Air Force with respect to an important new contract for Alabama—but Riley also met with Senator Jefferson Sessions and two White House aides. He may have missed dinner in Alabama, but that doesn’t mean he missed out on pork.

Third, Fuller states that he “made several rulings in favor” of the defense. I looked through the record, attempting to find the rulings to which Fuller is alluding, and I can’t find them. It is true that Fuller endorsed rulings that were made by the assigned magistrate-judge on some points, but a review of the record will show that Fuller was relentless in his support for the prosecution and his rejection of defense claims.

At the Edge of Judicial Ethics
The recusal motion points to the difficulties of a federal judge continuing to hold active business interests with entities that litigate before them. Usually, judges divest themselves of such interests and place their holdings in a blind trust. But the evidence offered here raises serious question as to the amount of distance Fuller has put between himself and the business interests that provide the bulk of his income. And in this case there has been at least one clear-cut breach. “Fuller’s designation of his judicial chambers as his address in connection with corporate registrations,” said Nan Aron of the Washington-based judicial oversight organization Alliance for Justice, “clearly runs afoul of the rules, as does his retention of any office, including as agent for service of process.”

Two more cases show a curious attitude towards recusal. First, notwithstanding his former membership in the Executive Committee of the Alabama Republican Party, Fuller participated in the resolution of a highly contentious litigation involving interests of the Executive Committee in a case entitled Gustafson v. Johns decided in May 2006.

Second, there is a case now pending in the Middle District that was initially assigned to Fuller, involving a government contract for the procurement and modification of two Russian helicopters. In the middle of the case sits Maverick Aviation, Inc., of Enterprise, Alabama—the same town from which Fuller hails and where his business operations, which would appear to be similar in scope to those of Maverick Aviation, are sited. From the facts described in several accounts, the company would appear to be a direct competitor with Doss Aviation. Fuller, however, handled this case for several months before his recusal was sought and obtained. The recusal order has been placed under seal, making it impossible to learn what conflicts the parties saw in the matter, nor why Judge Fuller felt free to handle the case for some time before withdrawing. It could be legitimate, or it could be a coverup, and there is no way to find out with the seal in place. 2

[Footnote] 2. Sean Reilly, “Bribery Case Involves Russian Copters, Classified Info,” Mobile Press Register, Mar. 7, 2007, p. 01A.

A judge has the responsibility to raise conflict issues on his own initiative—to disclose them to the parties appearing before him, and, when appropriate, to drop out of a case. Judge Fuller, on the other hand, as a committed senior Republican and part-owner of a large business that survives on government contracts, has presided over cases that relate to his personal interests. And that raises questions about the kind of justice he dispensed in the Siegelman case.

The Pork Barrel World of Judge Mark Fuller by Scott Horton, August 6, 2007.

Mr. Horton discussed whether Judge Fuller’s involvement in the Siegelman case was proper with legal ethicist Professor David Luban, the author of the author of Legal Ethics and Human Dignity:

1. Judge Fuller is a Republican, and before coming to the bench he worked on a number of Republican campaigns. He served as a member of the Alabama Republican Executive Committee at a time when Don Siegelman was a Democratic state office holder. Was it proper for Fuller to sit as a judge in the Siegelman prosecution?

There’s a well-accepted legal standard for when a judge should disqualify himself from a case: the judge should bow out when his impartiality can reasonably be questioned. That’s the standard in both the judicial code of ethics and in federal law. The point is to maintain confidence in the fairness and integrity of the legal system. Keeping that in mind, the bare fact that Judge Fuller is a Republican clearly isn’t enough to raise questions. Most judges belong to one party or the other, and a lot got their job on the bench because they were active party members. We expect that they can put mere party sympathy aside when they try cases. But on these facts, Judge Fuller was a lot more than just an active party member. He was a electoral strategist, an executive committee member, and an anti-Siegelman campaigner. How can a reasonable person fail to have doubts about his impartiality? If you’ve spent years organizing the “Beat the Yankees” Club, you should not be umpiring a Yankees game–even if you think you can call the game honestly.

2. In addition to his political engagement, a Siegelman appointee questioned some extraordinary payments Fuller made while he was a district attorney. There was a litigation in which Fuller testified, and the court ruled against him and for the state retirement agency. Fuller was quoted as stating that this was “politically motivated.” Does this raise any questions?

If Judge Fuller complained that it was “politically motivated,” it sounds like he might be blaming Siegelman for it. Without knowing the context it’s hard to tell whether the judge was complaining only about the appointee, or the governor as well. If the latter, it means that the judge had expressed a grudge against Siegelman and obviously should not be trying his case.

3. Judge Fuller appears to derive most of his income from a closely-held business in which he remains the controlling shareholder. The business is almost entirely involved with government contracts, with the Department of Defense and Department of Justice as contractors. What is your reaction when you look at the recusal motion, in which this was set out in some detail, the Justice Department’s response, and Judge Fuller’s ruling?

Generally, the standards for recusal motions are tough, to discourage parties from judge-shopping. I started reading these papers with that viewpoint—namely that the defendant had an almost impossible case to make. But the more I read the papers, the more I was persuaded that this actually was one of those rare cases where the burden was met. Remember: the legal standard is whether you can reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. If so, the law requires the judge to disqualify himself. This is not a run-of-the-mill criminal case where a judge’s commercial side-dealings with the government would not raise a question about pro-government bias. This one is a politically charged case involving a former governor in which political leaders in Washington, D.C., who ultimately exercise tremendous control over the process of military procurement contracts, are likely to take great interest. Given the amount of money Judge Fuller’s company gets from government contracts, any reasonable person would question how impartial he could be. He should not have taken this case, and with a recusal motion made, he had no option but to drop out.

What amazes me about these facts is that they combine past political activism against the governor, a possible grudge against the governor, and the judge’s company’s financial dependence on the government’s good graces. If they’re right (I don’t have any independent knowledge of that), any one by itself would raise reasonable questions about the judge’s ability to be impartial. Taken together, we have a perfect storm. Under these circumstances, impartiality would take superhuman self-control, and we don’t expect judges to be superhuman. The recusal standard is designed so that we don’t have to expect it.

4. You read the Justice Department’s papers, which were filed both by the U.S. Attorney’s office in Montgomery and by the Public Integrity Section at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C.

I was troubled by the papers filed by the Department of Justice. Half the argument is an ad hominem attack on their adversary’s attorneys for daring to question the government’s fairness. Without offering any evidence, it accuses them of bad faith, and it’s loaded with insulting adjectives. The motion makes it look like the government is blowing smoke to deflect attention away from the real issue.

But rhetorical overkill isn’t the main problem. The most troubling problem is that the Justice Department’s Professional Integrity Section joined this response. That was a real lapse of professional judgment. PIN (as it’s called) is in charge of policing public officials. That includes judges as well as elected officials. Under some circumstances, PIN could be called on to make an independent after-the-fact assessment of Judge Fuller’s conduct. By signing onto the Justice Department’s submission at this point, before there’s been a hearing on the recusal motion, the Public Integrity Section makes it virtually impossible for it to do its oversight job later, because it’s already staked out a position on the case before hearing all sides of the argument.

An Interview with Legal Ethicist David Luban Regarding Judge Mark Fuller by Scott Horton, August 7, 2007.

Mr. Horton details additional improper conduct of Judge Fuller:

Back in October 2002, Brown filed a FOIA request, Brown v. Ashcroft, to compel the Justice Department to release documents relating to the case. The case was bounced down to Montgomery and assigned to Mark Everett Fuller. Shortly after the suit was filed, Justice responded, releasing over 1,000 documents, and then seeking summary judgment on the grounds that the relief that Brown was seeking had been granted.

Two years later, Fuller disposed of this case acting sua sponte. He struck the names of Alice Martin and John Ashcroft from the caption and then dismissed the case for “failure to state a claim,” concluding that Brown’s letters of request had been too vague.

Fuller’s conduct is bizarre. There was nothing vague about the letters, and indeed, the Justice Department found them in order and processed the request. It appears to me that Fuller was spinning, trying to clean up the record in a way that would eliminate Alice Martin’s name from public visibility. He had become a far more engaged defender of the Gonzales Justice Department than the department was of its own interests. And that’s also the posture he adopted at the Siegelman trial. Is this the way an impartial federal judge handles a matter?

The Alice Martin Perjury Inquiry by Scott Horton, September 8, 2007.

And the allegations of unethical – as well as criminal – conduct by Judge Fuller are not limited to the Siegelman case. As reported by Mr. Horton:

I have received a copy of an affidavit (8.7Mb PDF) filed by a Missouri attorney in 2003 which details a number of charges of unethical and criminal conduct against Judge Mark Fuller. The attorney sought Fuller’s removal from a high-profile litigation which related to a prominent Republican who was close to both the current President Bush and his father.

The attorney, Paul Benton Weeks, had been involved as counsel for plaintiffs in a civil action called Murray v. Scott & Sevier, which had originally been filed in Kansas and was later transferred to Montgomery and assigned to Judge Fuller. Weeks, reached by telephone this morning, advised me that he did a routine background check to discover what kind of judge he was up before. “I was astonished by what I found,” Weeks said. Immediately after the papers were filed, Weeks said that Fuller was removed as the judge handling the case.

In the affidavit, Weeks accuses Fuller of engaging in criminal conduct both before and after he came on to the bench. The charges include perjury, criminal conspiracy, a criminal attempt to defraud the Retirement System of Alabama, misuse of office as a District Attorney, and an obstruction of his background check by the FBI in connection with the review of his appointment by President Bush to the bench. (I faxed a copy of the affidavit to Fuller’s office and also left a message asking for comment, but received no reply; if Fuller does reply I’ll update this post.)

Weeks’s allegations were transmitted to Noel Hillman, the head of the Public Integrity Section at the Department of Justice, among other recipients. Hillman’s office has responsibility to conduct investigations into allegations concerning wrongdoing by federal judges.

This means that at the time that Fuller was presiding over the prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don E. Siegelman, a prosecution brought by Noel Hillman’s Public Integrity Section, he was or should have been the subject of an investigation by the Public Integrity Section. [Italics in original] * * *

Weeks’s allegations are focused on Fuller’s conduct in connection with “salary spiking” involving two of his employees in the District Attorney’s office. Fuller’s testimony, which Weeks says was contradictory and which changed materially in the course of the matter, was disbelieved both by the RSA and by an Alabama court handling the matter. Weeks calls Fuller’s statements under oath perjured. * * *

Weeks’s affidavit reflects interviews with Fuller’s successor in the district attorney’s office and with senior officials at the RSA, who confirm the allegations against Fuller. “Judge McAliley then said that he had met with RSA officials and that every member on the RSA board believed Mark Fuller had lied and that Fuller had lied under oath.” [Italics in original.]

Weeks notes that after the affidavit was transmitted to the Justice Department, no individual from Noel Hillman’s group ever contacted him to follow up on any of the allegations or to request any of the documentation that was cited in the affidavit.

* * *

2003 Affidavit Raises More Serious Questions About Siegelman Judge, by Scott Horton, October 16, 2007.

Rules Violated:

  1. RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL
  2. RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL
  3. RULE 8.3 REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
  4. RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT

Text and comments of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct violated by Mr. Fuller