A plea for help.

I received this email from a blogger/acquaintance:

My dearest blogging friends,

I am trying to raise awareness for a friend who’s daughter has gone missing for over 3 years with no sign. If it is at all possible, I am trying to get this information cross-posted as many places as possible and I need your help. If you can, post it, if you can’t please pass it to someone that might.

http://buelahman.wordpress.com/2009/12/08/to-all-my-online-friends-a-desperate-plea-for-help-to-find-missing-kids/

I have never asked for such and may never again, but in this case, he is not getting help from the MSM or the law enforcement officials. If nothing else, Kristina needs to call home and tell them she is alive. If the news is the worse, they MUST know this. There is no rest for them.

My thanks to all who can help!

BuelahMan (aka Raymond)

ACTION ALERT: Support the Bar Ethics Grievance Filed Against Sen. Vitter

The Louisiana State Bar Association has finally received an ethics complaint regarding the allegations, many of which he has admitted, that Sen. David Vitter engaged in multiple instances of adulterous and criminal conduct.  Charlie Melancon, who is challenging Sen. Vitter in Louisiana’s 2010 U.S. Senate race, notes his frustration with the lack of accountability Sen. Vitter has faced to date for this conduct as well as the hope that the complaint will force at least a minimal level of accountability:

…[W]hat David Vitter confessed to wasn’t just a “serious sin,” it was likely a crime. And so far Vitter hasn’t been charged with anything. He’s still got his law license. He’s still a U.S. Senator.

A man’s sin is his own, and with this complaint Vitter may finally have to answer for his actions. Louisiana Politics: CREW, Vitter, Melancon, Jindal, Stephen Sabludowsky, September 30, 2009.

The complaint (with exhibits) was filed by Melanie Sloan, Executive Director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW), and charges that:

…Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b) provides it is professional conduct for a lawyer to “commit a criminal act especially one that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”  By his own admission, Sen. Vitter solicited for prostitution in the District of Columbia – apparently on numerous violations – and the evidence strongly suggests he had a pattern of committing the same violations in Louisiana.  Because soliciting prostitutes is a crime, Sen. Vitter clearly violated Rule 8.4(b).  Sen. Vitter’s conduct is all the more egregious because he is an elected official, who has sworn an oath to uphold the law of the United States.

In the CREW press release, Ms. Sloan notes the preferential treatment Sen. Vitter has received so far in response to his admission of multiple criminal acts, especially when compared to the prostitutes employed by the same ‘madam’ from whom Sen. Vitter solicited prostitutes:

13 former prostitutes were forced to testify at the trial of the DC Madam, who committed suicide shortly after her conviction. Sloan noted that one, a former Navy supply officer and Naval Academy instructor, lost her job because the Navy requires those who serve “to adhere to a standard of conduct that reflects the Navy’s values of honor, courage and commitment.” Sloan said, “It is a shame the Senate has no such standard of conduct. It will be interesting to see what sort of standard the Louisiana Disciplinary Board chooses to apply.” [Emphasis supplied.]

It will, indeed, be interesting to see what standards the Disciplinary Counsel will choose to apply to the investigation of this complaint.  In the meantime, it is interesting to review and understand the standards that the Disciplinary Counsel is mandated to apply:

The disciplinary counsel shall evaluate all information coming to his or her attention by complaint or from other sources alleging lawyer misconduct or incapacity. If the lawyer is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the matter shall be referred to the appropriate entity in any jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted. If the information, if true, would not constitute misconduct or incapacity, the matter shall be dismissed. If the lawyer is subject to the jurisdiction of the court and the information alleges facts which, if true, would constitute misconduct or incapacity, counsel shall conduct an investigation unless in the discretion of disciplinary counsel the matter qualifies for referral to the Practice Assistance and Improvement Program.  [Emphasis supplied.]  Section 11, Procedure for Disciplinary Proceedings, ¶A, Screening, Louisiana Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

It is also critical to understand that, in addition to any legal and fact-based defenses that may be available to him, Sen. Vitter will continue to argue – loudly – that this complaint is just another example of political gamesmanship and that it should be summarily dismissed as such.  Accordingly, this complaint is as likely, if not more likely, to be Roach Moteled – that is, it’s checked in to the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel but is never checked out – than it is to receive the proper attention and legitimate investigation it deserves.

Help this complaint get the attention it deserves by contacting the LADB, Office of Disciplinary Counsel and LSBA to respectfully demand that the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel fully comply with the Louisiana Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement:

The Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board
2800 Veterans Memorial Boulevard, Suite 310
Metairie, LA 70002
Tel: (504) 834-1488 or (800) 489-8411
Fax: (504) 834-1449
Email: ladb@ladb.org

Office of the Disciplinary Counsel
4000 S. Sherwood Forest Boulevard, Suite 607
Baton Rouge, LA 70816
Tel: (225) 293-3900 or (800) 326-8022
Fax: (225) 293-3300

The Louisiana State Bar Association
Kim H. Boyle, President
365 Canal Street, Suite 2000
New Orleans, LA 70130-6534
Tel: (504) 566-1311
Direct line: (504) 679-5790
Fax: (504) 568-9130
Email: boylek@phelps.com

In what (I hope) is an encouraging sign that this investigation is, in fact, being taken seriously, the Louisiana Supreme Court visited my posts regarding the status of Sen. Vitter’s membership in the Louisiana State Bar Association the day after the complaint was filed.

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Register by noon, 08-28-09 (tomorrow), for Congresswoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz’s 08-30-09 (Sunday) Telephone Town Hall

Congresswoman Wasserman Schultz, along with Nancy-Ann DeParle, counselor to President Obama and director of the White House Office of Health Reform, will host her second of five telephone town hall meetings this Sunday, August 30, 2009 from 7-8 p.m.

Per the Congresswoman’s press release, they:

… will be discussing health insurance reform that combines the quality Americans need with the choice and competition we want. This is your opportunity to ask me questions regarding this issue.

To participate in my telephone town hall meeting, I need to have your phone number by noon on Friday, August 28, 2009. There are two ways that you can provide me your phone number:

1. The easiest way is to subscribe to my electronic newsletter, which will insure you are alerted to this and future town hall meetings, both in person and via phone. Simply CLICK HERE and MAKE SURE TO INCLUDE YOUR PHONE NUMBER[,]

2. Another way is to e-mail your phone number, in the body of the e-mail, to the following address: fl20rsvp@mail.house.gov[.]

You can also sign up here.

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Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga) emails constituents: You’ll be ’safe and secure’ at my Town Hall meeting.

Atlanta-Area Action Alert: Rep. Hank Johnson, the Democratic Representative of Georgia’s Fourth Congressional District is holding a health care reform town hall meeting (Flyer – .pdf) Monday night, August 10, 2009. If you can attend this (or another) town hall meeting, here’s a list of ‘best practices’ to help you prepare.  After the event, you can report your experience and upload videos and photes of the event here.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The conduct displayed at recent town hall meetings (see here, here, here and here) has now unbelievably led to this: Members of the United States Congress must now send emails to their constituents to assure them that it will be ’safe and secure’ to meet with their Congressperson [my emphasis]:

We have a very important town hall on health insurance reform on Monday, Aug. 10 at Georgia Perimeter College’s Cole Auditorium in Clarkston at 7 p.m.

I just want to assure you that GPC and my office will provide a safe and secure environment in which to hold a respectful and candid dialogue on this critical issue.

Please do not allow news reports of “town halls gone wild” deter you from attending our meeting. I want to hear from my constituents who have real questions and concerns about health care insurance reform proposals being debated in Congress.

Our democracy doesn’t work unless we treat each other with respect and are willing to listen to diverse opinions. I’m here to listen to you, and I think we will all benefit from listening to our distinguished panel and to each other.

In the event that you are unable to attend, a video of the event will be available on my website for you to view by Thursday, Aug. 13.

So please join me Monday, Aug. 10 at 7 p.m. at Georgia Perimeter College. I look forward to a productive exchange of ideas.

Thank you.

Hank Johnson

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Texas Tech faculty members object to the hiring of ‘Professor’ Alberto Gonzales

Sarah Nightingale of the Avalanche-Journal reports that Texas Tech professors object to the hiring of Alberto Gonzales:

More than 40 Texas Tech professors have objected in a petition to Chancellor Kent Hance’s decision to hire former U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, according to the petition’s creator.

Petition creator Walter Schaller, a Tech philosophy professor since 1986, said Friday he decided to take action because “with the emphasis on ethics the university has adopted, a guy that misled Congress is not the kind of person we want to represent Texas Tech.”

[snip]

The petition cites two main reasons for opposing Gonzales’ hire: because the chancellor should not hire faculty and because Gonzales’ record is questionable.

[snip]

The document goes on to list Gonzales “ethical failings,” including: frequently misleading Congress and the American people; rejecting the Geneva Conventions; denying the Constitutional right of Habeas Corpus; and showing more loyalty to President George W. Bush than to the Constitution.

“I tried to document all of the charges against Gonzales,” Schaller said, citing a 2008 Department of Justice report and a 2009 Inspector Generals’ report investigating Gonzales’ surveillance programs as his information sources.

The petition is here (.pdf).

I sent the following email to the 38 original professors who signed the petition:

Professors:

I wish you luck with your petition in opposition to the employment of Mr. Gonzales by TTU.

Prof. Schaller was quoted saying:

I tried to document all of the charges against Gonzales,” Schaller said, citing a 2008 Department of Justice report and a 2009 Inspector Generals’ report investigating Gonzales’ surveillance programs as his information sources.

As a practicing attorney, I’ve grown very tired of attorneys – like Mr. Gonzales – whose unethical conduct makes them unfit to practice law and began drafting grievance applications to document their conduct, including this complaint against Mr. Gonzales.  My article is written in the form of a draft grievance application that is ready to be filed with the Texas Bar.  I would suggest it would be much harder for TTU to justify the continued employment of former-attorney Alberto Gonzales than the continued employment of former-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.

Please don’t hesitate to contact me if you – or someone from TTU law school – would like to discuss filing a grievance against Mr. Gonzales with the Texas Bar Association.

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Renewing Protests in Iran organized by internet, txt msg

After 11 days of quiet, protesters in Iran unveiled a new hit-and-run strategy this week, NBC News’ Chief Foreign Correspondent Richard Engel reported on the July 9, 2009, Rachel Maddow Show.  Engel explains that the relatively smaller and shorter (in time) protests replace the mass demonstrations because increased number of arrests and deaths and greater violence make the large protests unsustainable in the long term.  At 1:50 of the segment (here at MSNBC), Engel reports that the protesters are able to organize the protests because they are managing to communicate by internet, cell phones and txt msg.

The segment begins with a video of a dark Tehran night filled with defiant shouts of Allahu Akbar.  That video alone is worth a view.  Maddow points out that she is relying on the people in Iran for the news and images that she is broadcasting.

As I wrote earlier this week, the Electronic Frontier Foundation produces the Tor anonymizing software.  Tor allows the protesters to circumvent censorship systems and remain anonymous while reading, writing and sending video on the internet, thus avoiding retaliation by the Iranian government.  (Thankfully, we don’t have to worry about such things in this country.)   Adding your computer to the Tor network helps the protesters remain anonymous online by increasing the effectiveness of the network.  The Tor software can downloaded here.

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Help protesters in Iran remain anonymous online and circumvent internet censorship systems.

Though hardly a novel tactic, the Myanmar government systematically shut down access to the internet in order to prevent news and pictures of the brutal military crackdown of the 2007 Buddhist monk protests from reaching the outside world. Currently, both Iran and China are doing the same to prevent the publication of news and pictures of the Iranian government’s response to the election protests and the Chinese government’s response to the protests by Uighers, a Muslim ethnic group that periodically attempts to form an independent nation.

In addition to its work on issues like warrantless wiretapping, state secrets and abuse of national security letters, the Electronic Frontier Foundation produces the Tor anonymizing software, which I’ve been using, with (apparent) success, in order to blog anonymously.  As much as I appreciate the Tor software, EFF doesn’t produce it so an irritated attorney can write cathartic missives.  Richard Esguerra of EFF explains how Tor is helping the Iranian protesters:

As turmoil over the disputed election in Iran continues, many techs are trying to find ways to help Iranian citizens safely communicate and receive information despite the barriers being established by Iranian authorities. One tactic that even moderately tech-savvy Internet users can employ is to set up a Tor relay or a Tor bridge.

More sophisticated users can skip this paragraph, but for the rest, here’s the basic outline. Tor (an acronym of “The Onion Router”) is free and open source software that helps users remain anonymous on the Internet. Normally, when accessing websites, your computer asks for and receives a webpage out in the open, a process that exposes your IP address, the URL of the website, and the contents of the site, among other information to third parties. When accessing websites while using Tor, your computer essentially whispers its requests for a website, to another computer, which passes the request on to another computer, which passes it on to another computer, which passes it onto the computer where the website is hosted; the reply returns in the same, chain-message manner. The whispers are encrypted, so that neither outside authorities, nor the computers in the middle of the chain, can tell what is being said, and to whom. And the website itself does not have your IP address either.

Internet users in Iran are using Tor to both (a) circumvent censorship systems and (b) remain anonymous while reading and writing on the Internet. Both are critically important to the safety of protesters, many of whom fear retaliation from the government. Preliminary reports indicate that use of the Tor client in Iran has increased in the days after the contested election.

Mr. Esguerra then explains how you can help Tor help the protesters:

However, Tor’s design relies on a robust network of “volunteer computers” (a.k.a. relays) to pass messages back and forth. This means that the speed and quality of a Tor users’ browsing experience relies extensively on the number of volunteer computers there are to pass messages along. This is where volunteers can make a difference — setting up additional relays improves access for dissident Iranians and other users of the Tor network. The more people who help out, the better and more quickly the network runs. If you’re interested in helping out, find and follow instructions for configuring a Tor relay on the Tor website.

Those looking to help fight censorship should also consider providing a Tor bridge. Bridges come into play when an ISP decides to try blocking users’ access to the Tor network. (For now, there seems to only be anecdotal evidence of Iran attempting to block the use of Tor. However, Iran has recntly [sic] been practicing reactive and centralized blocking, which makes any effective block of Tor far more likely.) The Tor bridge configuration differs from a relay in that your computer does not appear in the public Tor network. Instead, users looking for access to the Internet through Tor can receive your Tor routing information through more private channels, then configure their Tor client to transmit requests through your computer. By not appearing in the public Tor network, your Tor routing information is less likely to end up on an ISP filter and can provide help for a longer period of time — but recognize that the network needs both relays and bridges.

The remainder of Mr. Esquerra’s post addresses some of the technical aspects of the Tor software, which can downloaded here.

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The DoJ Office of Professional Responsibility is a real Roach Motel

John Gibeaut reports at the ABA Journal that the role of the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility has descended to a level equivalent to that of a ‘Roach Motel’ and how, as a result, judges are beginning to take the discipline of unethical attorneys into their own hands.  In his lengthy article, Mr. Gibeaut details the ‘dismal history of intentional and inadvertent violations’ by federal prosecutors and the complaints to DoJ OPR made by Judge Mark L. Wolf, Chief Judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, that yielded woefully inadequate DoJ OPR investigations and slap-on-the-wrist ‘punishments.’  The article begins with the following summary:

The government’s evidence link­ing reputed mob figures Vincent “the Animal” Ferrara and Pasquale “Patsy” Barone to a 1985 murder was pretty thin—an accomplice who escaped prosecution in exchange for testimony against the pair.

But a little over a year after the 1990 racketeering indictments of Ferrara, Barone and six other members of New England’s Patriarca crime family, a federal prosecutor in Boston learned his putative star witness had recanted.

Yet the prosecutor never told defense about the recantation, which he and a detective recorded in writing. Indeed, the defendants didn’t learn of the memos until 2003, when the detective spilled the beans at a hearing on habeas corpus petitions they filed seeking their release from long prison sentences.

Ultimately both went free, Barone in 2003 from a life sentence and Fer­rara in ’05 from a 22-year term. Chief U.S. District Judge Mark L. Wolf, who had imposed both sentences, was forced to cut them short.

The prosecutor, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Auerhahn, was investigated by Massachusetts state bar authorities. Wolf dropped a dime on him after learning that Auerhahn’s boss had simply reprimanded him be­hind closed doors. That just wasn’t good enough for Wolf, considering he had to release two defendants re­garded as especially dangerous. Auerhahn still works at the U.S. attor­ney’s office in Boston, pros­ecuting terrorism cases.

But, going where few judges would, Wolf also penned an extraordi­nary series of letters—first to Attor­ney General Alberto R. Gonzales and then to his successor, Michael B. Mukasey—stating his case for stiffer punishment and voicing his frustration with the Justice Department’s secretive Office of Professional Re­spon­sibility, which is supposed to investigate complaints of mis­con­duct by prosecutors and law enforcement officials who work for the department.

“The department’s performance in the Auerhahn matter raises serious questions about whether judges should continue to rely upon the department to investigate and sanction misconduct by federal prosecutors,” Wolf wrote in a January 2008 letter to Mukasey.

Wolf, appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1985, warned Mukasey that more jurists would begin punishing prosecutors behaving badly if the OPR didn’t.

“I anticipate this will become much more common unless the department’s performance in disciplinary matters improves significantly,” the judge cautioned.

Wolf’s stinging rebuke came not only from a veteran jurist, but from someone who as a young prosecutor helped set in motion the department’s disciplinary machinery in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal.

“As one who took pride in assisting Attorney General Edward Levi in establishing OPR more than 30 years ago,” Wolf told Mukasey, “I sadly doubt it is now capable of serving its intended purpose.”

Critics historically have regarded the OPR as inept at policing its own. Wolf’s exchanges with the attorney general also come amid calls for more transparency.

“I used to call it the Roach Motel of the Justice Department,” says Fordham University law professor Bruce A. Green, a former federal prosecutor and ethics committee co-chair for the ABA Criminal Justice Section. “Cases check in, but they don’t check out.”

The entire article is well worth reading.

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Alberto Gonzales finally lands a job.

It took nearly two years, but Alberto Gonzales finally found a job teaching at Texas Tech:

Texas Tech Chancellor Kent Hance told the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal that Gonzales will start Aug. 1, and that his salary will be around $100,000.

“Anytime I can get a former cabinet member to work for the university, I will,” Hance said. “He can teach (students) about government, about goals, about diversity. Here’s a guy whose parents were migrant workers, and he went on to one of the highest offices in the land.”

Fortunately, Mr. Gonzales will be kept away from the Texas Tech School of Law since he’s only been hired to teach political science.

It took nearly two years, but Alberto Gonzales finally found a job teaching at Texas Tech:
Texas Tech Chancellor Kent Hance told the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal that Gonzales will start Aug. 1, and that his salary will be around $100,000.

“Anytime I can get a former cabinet member to work for the university, I will,” Hance said. “He can teach (students) about government, about goals, about diversity. Here’s a guy whose parents were migrant workers, and he went on to one of the highest offices in the land.”

Fortunately for Texas Tech’s law students, he’ll be teaching a political science course.

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Happy Fourth of July

I sent an email earlier today wishing a fun and safe Independence Day to various members of the blogging community who have given their time and encouragement to me since I started TGP.  Bob Bennett, whose firm sponsors Bad Prosecutors, replied with the following essay from his newsletter about the fate of the men who signed the Declaration of Independence.

Because, as John Adams wrote in a July 3, 1776, letter to his wife, the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence “ought to be solemnized with Pomp and Parade, with Shews, Games, Sports, Guns, Bells, Bonfires and Illuminations [i.e., fireworks] from one End of this Continent to the other from this Time forward forever more[,]” I added some amazing photographs of fireworks that I found here.  Though not exhaustive, search AmericanTowns’ list of local 2009 Fourth of July firework shows, events and parades to find a live event near you.

Have you ever wondered what happened to the 56 men who signed the Declaration of Independence?

Fireworks Celebration Over The Space Needle
(
Fireworks Celebration Over The Space Needle © Kevin N. McNeal)

Five signers were captured by the British as traitors, and tortured before they died.

Twelve had their homes ransacked and burned.

Two lost their sons serving in the Revolutionary Army; another had two sons captured.

Nine of the 56 fought and died from wounds or hardships of the Revolutionary War.

They signed and they pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor.

Fourth of July
(
Fourth of July © Josh Anon)

Happy 10th Anniversary BP
(Happy 10th Anniversary BP © KHAWLA Haddad)

What kind of men were they?

Twenty-four were lawyers and jurists. [This alone makes me proud to be a lawyer.] Eleven were merchants, nine were farmers and large plantation owners: men of means, well educated. But they signed the Declaration of Independence knowing full well that the penalty would be death if they were captured. [Emphasis mine.]

Carter Braxton of Virginia, a wealthy planter and trader saw his ships swept from the seas by the British Navy. He sold his home and properties to pay his debts and died in rags.

Forever free
(Forever free © Dale Gast)

Thomas McKeam was so hounded by the British that he was forced to move his family almost constantly. He served in the Congress without pay, and his family was kept in hiding. His possessions were taken from him, and poverty was his reward.

Flowers of Fire
(Flowers of Fire © The  Italian  Eye )

Vandals or soldiers looted the properties of Dillery Hall, Clymer, Walton, Gwinett, Heyward, Ruttledge, and Middleton. At the battle of Yorktown, Thomas Nelson, Jr. noted that the British General Cornwallis had taken over the Nelson home for his headquarters. He quietly urged General George Washington to open fire. The home was destroyed, and Nelson died bankrupt.

Hanabi
(Hanabi © Tracey Taylor)

Francis Lewis had his home and properties destroyed. The enemy jailed his wife, and she died within a few months. John Hart was driven from his wife’s bedside as she was dying. Their 13 children fled for their lives. His fields and his gristmill were laid to waste. For more than a year he lived in forests and caves, returning to find his wife dead and his children vanished. A few weeks later he died from exhaustion and a broken heart.

Norris and Livingston suffered similar fates.

MS-2503
(MS-2503 © Jim Zuckerman)

Such were the stories and sacrifices of the American Revolution. These were not wild-eyed, rabble-rousing ruffians. They were soft-spoken men of means and education. They had security, but they valued liberty more. Standing tall and straight, and unwavering, they pledged: “For the support of the declaration, with firm reliance on the protection of the divine providence, we mutually pledge to each other, our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor.”

They gave you and me a free and independent America. The history books told you a lot of what happened in the Revolutionary War. We didn’t fight just the British. We were British subjects at that time and we fought our own government!

Some of us take these liberties so much for granted, but we shouldn’t. So take a few minutes while enjoying your 4th of July holiday and silently thank these patriots. It’s not much to ask for the price they paid.

New Year at Seattle Center (#1)
(New Year at Seattle Center (#1) © Inge Johnsson)

Remember: Freedom is never free! It’s time we get the word out that Patriotism is NOT a sin, and the Fourth of July has more to it than beer, picnics, and baseball games.

~Author Unknown~
Contributed by: Harry Updegraff, Jr.

Tags: Independence Day, Fourth of July

Harriet Miers’ testimony in US Attorney firings spotlights again why she is unfit to practice law.

It took two (2) years and a judicial scolding by United States District Judge John D. Bates, but Harriet Miers’ has finally testified in the U.S. Attorney firing investigations:

In a low-key session on Capitol Hill, former White House Counsel Harriet Miers was deposed Monday by House Judiciary Committee staffers probing the alleged politicization of the Bush Justice Department.

Miers testified, behind closed doors, after months of wrangling between Congress and former members of the Bush administration.

But just as the thief is not absolved from the crime of theft even if he returns the stolen property, Harriet Miers is not absolved of her prior unethical conduct just because she has now testified.  To the contrary, her testimony this week serves to again expose her unethical conduct which demonstrates that she is unfit to practice law.

These excerpts from the Memorandum to the Members of the Committee on the Judiciary from Rep. John C. Conyers, Jr., Chairman, dated July 24, 2007, are just as true today as they were when I first wrote about Harriet Miers back in October of 2007:

Even more extraordinary than the executive privilege claims in this matter is the assertion that Ms. Miers, a former White House official not currently employed by the federal government, is absolutely immune from even appearing before the Subcommittee as directed by subpoena. The Supreme Court has specifically held that even a President, while serving in that capacity, can be subpoena by a court and can be required to participate in a civil lawsuit for damages by a private party. [FN 281] The Court’s holding in Jones flies in the face of the claim that a former White House official is somehow immune from even appearing in response to a Congressional subpoena. As with Sara Taylor, who received a subpoena similar to Ms. Miers’ but chose to appear and answer some questions before the Senate Judiciary Committee, no one can doubt that Ms. Miers would have been asked some questions that would not have fallen within even the broadest assertion of executive privilege, but Ms. Miers simply refused to attend her hearing altogether. Id.

[...]

[T]here is an additional reason that Ms. Miers’ claims concerning executive privilege were and should be rejected. When a private party like Ms. Miers is subject to a subpoena, it is improper for the subpoenaed person simply to refuse to … testify based on an assertion of privilege by a third party, in this case, the White House. … To the extent that the White House objected to the subpoena to Ms. Miers as a private citizen, therefore, its proper recourse – which would have been more than adequate to protect its own asserted rights – would have been to seek a court order, rather than unilaterally “directing” Ms. Miers to disobey a lawful subpoena herself. Id. at page 46.

[...]

[M]s. Miers was not being misled by a government entity into thinking she was acting lawfully, but instead she chose, with full knowledge of the possible consequences, to follow the White House’s flawed “directive.” As the entity which issued the subpoena to Ms. Miers, only the Committee was in a position to give her “reasonable reliance” that she could lawfully refuse to comply, but in fact the Committee did precisely the opposite and made clear that she was required to obey her subpoena. Id. at page 48. (emphasis in original)

[...]

As explained in the July 12 and July 19 rulings upheld by the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, the refusal … of Ms. Miers to testify or even appear pursuant to subpoena [has] no proper legal basis. Id. at page 52. FN 281 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703-06 (1997). As the Court noted in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323-331 (1950), “persons summoned as witnesses have certain minimum duties and obligations which as necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery. …We have often iterated the importance of this public duty, which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform when properly summoned.”

In the ensuing litigation, United States District Judge John D. Bates was was also not impressed with Harriet Miers’ excuses for defying lawful, Congressional subpoenas.  [I have adapted the following discussion of Judge Bates' Opinion from this post I wrote in July of 2008.]  In this Memorandum Opinion issued in COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. HARRIET MIERS, et al., Civil Action No. 08-0409 (JDB), Judge Bates introduced Ms. Miers’ legal position by stating that it was unprecedented, was without any support in the case law and was fallacious:

Indeed, the aspect of this lawsuit that is unprecedented is the notion that Ms. Miers is absolutely immune from compelled congressional process. The Supreme Court has reserved absolute immunity for very narrow circumstances, involving the President’s personal exposure to suits for money damages based on his official conduct or concerning matters of national security or foreign affairs. The Executive’s current claim of absolute immunity from compelled congressional process for senior presidential aides is without any support in the case law. The fallacy of that claim was presaged in United States v. Nixon itself (id. at 706):

neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial [or congressional] process under all circumstances.

Id. at p. 3.

Because Ms. Miers presented no legitimate claim for absolute immunity, Judge Bates ruled that Ms. Miers must, in fact, appear pursuant to the validly issued subpoenas of the United States House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary:

Clear precedent and persuasive policy reasons confirm that the Executive cannot be the judge of its own privilege and hence Ms. Miers is not entitled to absolute immunity from compelled congressional process. Ms. Miers is not excused from compliance with the Committee’s subpoena by virtue of a claim of executive privilege that may ultimately be  made.

Instead, she must appear before the Committee to provide testimony, and invoke executive privilege where appropriate. [Footnote] 38 [is not included herein] And as the Supreme Court has directed, the judiciary remains the ultimate arbiter of an executive privilege claim, since it is the duty of the courts to declare what the law is. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-05; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.

Id. at p. 91.

Judge Bates also addressed Ms. Miers’ claim of absolute immunity, which provided the basis for her refusal to even appear before the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary:

The Executive maintains that absolute immunity shields Ms. Miers from compelled testimony before Congress. Although the exact reach of this proposed doctrine is not clear, the Executive insists that it applies only to “a very small cadre of senior advisors.” See Tr. at 96. The argument starts with the assertion that the President himself is absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony. There is no case that stands for that exact proposition, but the Executive maintains that the conclusion flows logically from Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), where the Supreme Court held that the President “is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.” Id. at 749. “Any such [congressional] power of compulsion over the President,” the Executive asserts, “would obviously threaten his independence and autonomy from Congress in violation of separation of powers principles.” See Defs.’ Reply at 40. The Executive then contends that “[those] same principles apply just as clearly to the President’s closest advisers.” Id. Because senior White House advisers “have no operational authority over government agencies . . . [t]heir sole function is to advise and assist the President in the exercise of his duties.” Id. at 41. Therefore, they must be regarded as the President’s “alter ego.” In a similar context, the Supreme Court has extended Speech or Debate Clause immunity to legislative aides who work closely with Members of Congress. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972). Accordingly, forcing close presidential advisors to testify before Congress would be tantamount to compelling the President himself to do so, a plainly untenable result in the Executive’s view. Indeed, as the Executive would have it, “[w]ere the President’s closest advisers subject to compelled testimony there would be no end to the demands that effectively could be placed upon the President himself.” See Defs.’ Reply at 43.

Unfortunately for the Executive, this line of argument has been virtually foreclosed by the Supreme Court. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the plaintiff sued “senior White House aides” for civil damages arising out of the defendants’ official actions. Id. at 802. The defendants argued that they were “entitled to a blanket protection of absolute immunity as an incident of their offices as Presidential aides.” Id. at 808. The Supreme Court rejected that
position. Notwithstanding the absolute immunity extended to legislators, judges, prosecutors, and the President himself, the Court emphasized that “[f]or executive officials in general, however, our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm.” Id. at 807. Although there can be no doubt regarding “the importance to the President of loyal and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office, . . . these factors, alone, [are] insufficient to justify absolute immunity.” Id. at 808-09 (discussing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).

Id. at pp. 79-80.

Judge Bates continued to decimate Ms. Miers’ claim of absolute immunity:

There is nothing left to the Executive’s primary argument in light of Harlow. This case, of course, does not involve national security or foreign policy, and the Executive does not invoke that mantra. The derivative, “alter ego” immunity that the Executive requests here due to Ms. Miers’s and Mr. Bolten’s close proximity to and association with the President has been explicitly and definitively rejected, and there is no basis for reaching a different conclusion here. Indeed, the Executive asks this Court to recognize precisely the type of blanket derivative absolute immunity that the Supreme Court declined to acknowledge in Harlow.

Id. at pp. 81-82.

Judge Bates also expressly pointed out that there is NO judicial precedent for Ms. Miers’ claims:

Thus, it would hardly be unprecedented for Ms. Miers to appear before Congress to testify and assert executive privilege where appropriate. Still, it is noteworthy that in an environment where there is no judicial support whatsoever for the Executive’s claim of absolute immunity, the historical record also does not reflect the wholesale compulsion by Congress of testimony from senior presidential advisors that the Executive fears. [Emphasis in original.]

Id. at pp. 83-84.

And that Ms. Miers’ claims are based solely on two (2) legal opinions issued by the Executive Branch itself:

Tellingly, the only authority that the Executive can muster in support of its absolute immunity assertion are two OLC opinions authored by Attorney General Janet Reno and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury, respectively.

[...]

[T]he Court is not at all persuaded by the Reno and Bradbury opinions.

Id. at pp. 85-86.

As noted by both Chairman Conyers and Judge Bates, Ms. Miers’ failure to appear pursuant to validly issued subpoenas was not supported by any colorable basis in law.  Accordingly, her failure to appear is in violation of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct and her conduct calls into question her fitness to practice law.

H/t to Zachary Roth at TPMMuckraker for Miers Testifies in US Attorneys Probe — When Will Rove?

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

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John Yoo advises Senate on the ‘faithful application’ of the Constitution.

John Yoo interrupts his defense of torture and (presumably) himself, to weigh in on the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, concluding with this:

But conservatives should not be pleased simply because Sotomayor is not a threat to the conservative revolution in constitutional law begun under the Reagan administration. Conservatives should defend the Supreme Court as a place where cases are decided by a faithful application of the Constitution, not personal politics, backgrounds, and feelings. Republican senators will have to conduct thorough questioning in the confirmation hearings to make sure that she will not be a results-oriented voter, voting her emotions and politics rather than the law. One worrying sign is Sotomayor’s vote to uphold the affirmative action program in New Haven, CT, where the city threw out a written test for firefighter promotions when it did not pass the right number of blacks and Hispanics. Senators should ask her whether her vote in that case, which is under challenge right now in the Supreme Court (where I signed an amicus brief for the Claremont Center on Constitutional Jurisprudence), was the product of her “empathy” rather than the correct reading of the Constitution. [My emphasis.]

Since comments aren’t permitted on his post, I emailed Mr. Yoo this afternoon asking for a response to the following questions:

  • What are the criteria you use to determine if some is faithfully applying the Constitution?
  • What are the criteria you use to determine if someone is a “results-oriented voter?” Why do you use the term “vote” at all? Is this the term you normally use to refer to decisions rendered by appellate judges? Other than the case you cite, are there additional bases of which you’re aware to indicate that she will be a “results-oriented voter?”
  • When considering your advice, should Senators consider whether your authorship of the OLC ‘torture’ memoranda was the product of some emotion of yours rather than the correct reading of the Constitution? If so, which emotion of yours should they consider?

Don’t hold your breath but I’ll post any reply I receive from Mr. Yoo.

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

H/t Josh Marshall at TalkingPointsMemo.

Bar complaints filed against Yoo, Bybee, Addington, Ashcroft, Gonzales, Mukasey, 6 others

Justin Blum at Bloomberg (h/t Zachary Roth at TPMMuckraker) reports that state bar complaints have been filed against twelve Bush administration lawyers involved in the authorization and sanctioning of torture by the United States of America, including two attorneys, Alberto Gonzales and John Yoo, whose disbarments I have long been advocating. [A complete list of the grieved attorneys - with links to the complaints - is included at the end of this post]. See also these reports by UPI, CNN and Scott Shane at NYT. Upon signing and filing the complaints on behalf of VotersForPeace (donate here ) and a coalition of organizations led by Velvet Revolution, attorney Kevin Zeese, Executive Director of VotersForPeace, stated in part:

Today, we filed complaints with the District of Columbia Bar and with four other states seeking the disbarment of 12 Bush-Cheney torture lawyers. These lawyers misused their license to practice law to provide legal cover for the war crime of torture. This misuse of their license requires the bar association to disbar them or the bar will become complicit in torture.

Complaints have been filed against: John Yoo, Judge Jay Bybee, and Stephen Bradbury who authored the torture memoranda. As well as attorneys who advised, counseled, consulted and supported those memoranda including Alberto Gonzales, John Ashcroft, Michael Chertoff, Alice Fisher, William Haynes II, Douglas Feith, Michael Mukasey, Timothy Flanigan, and David Addington. These detailed complaints, with over 500 pages of supporting exhibits, have been filed with the state bars in the District of Columbia, New York, California, Texas and Pennsylvania, and they seek disciplinary action and disbarment. …

This cadre of torture lawyers colluded to facilitate the abuse and torture of prisoners (detainee) that included, evidence suggests, deaths at overseas U.S. military facilities. Human Rights Watch reports 98 deaths of people in custody of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Making torture even worse in this case is that it was used to try and get information to tie Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda – a relationship that did not exist – as well as information about non-existent weapons of mass destruction in order to justify the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq.

We have asked the respective state bars to revoke the licenses of these attorneys for moral turpitude. They failed to show “respect for and obedience to the law, and respect for the rights of others,” and intentionally or recklessly failed to act competently, all in violation of legal Rules of Professional Conduct. Several attorneys failed to adequately supervise the work of subordinate attorneys and forwarded shoddy legal memoranda regarding the definition of torture to the White House and Department of Defense. These lawyers further acted incompetently by advising superiors to approve interrogation techniques that were in violation of U.S. and international law. They failed to support or uphold the U.S. Constitution, and the laws of the United States, and to maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers, all in violation state bar rules.

Torture is illegal under United States and international law. It is illegal under the U.S. Constitution, domestic law and international treaties to which the United States is a party.

* * *

The torture memoranda did not provide objective legal advice to government decision-makers, but instead twisted the state of the law so that it was unrecognizable. They were so inaccurate that these memoranda are more justifications about what the authors and the intended recipients wanted the law to be, rather than assessments of what the law actually is.

* * *

We decided to take action today because the federal government seems unable and unwilling to act. The Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility has taken nearly five years to complete its report, as some of the memoranda at issue became public in June 2004. Further, this OPR investigation is focused only on two lawyers, John Yoo and Jay Bybee rather than all those involved. This inexcusable delay is unfair to the public because the consequences of any wrongdoing are diminished. The delay has already benefited the two men under investigation, John Yoo now has tenure at Berkeley law school and Jay Bybee now has a lifetime appointment as a federal court of appeals judge. If OPR had completed its duties in a timely manner it is unlikely that either appointment would have been made.

In addition to inaction by OPR, the Congress where select Members were briefed 40 times by the CIA, seems unable to take action because of fear of its own complicity being exposed. And, Attorney General Eric Holder, has now testified that he approved renditions – which results in prisoners being tortured by other countries at the behest of the United States – during the Clinton administration. And, sadly, the President of the United States has now decided to hide evidence of war crimes by refusing to release photographic and video evidence despite a court order to do so. Finally, the administration is appointing General McChrystal to be the head of operations in Afghanistan despite being responsible for commanding Fort Nama in Iraq as well as special forces involved in torture[.]

* * *

Therefore, the people must act to face up to this issue and restore morality and Rule of Law to the United States. In addition to filing these complaints we are starting a campaign for disbarment, public torture hearings and for the appointment of an Independent Prosecutor. People who want to get involved are urged to go to DisbarTortureLawyers.com and VotersForPeace.us.

Only by taking torture out of politics and allowing an independent prosecutor to pursue the facts and apply the law will the United States recover from these war crimes. Application of the rule of law, beginning with disbarment, is a necessary part of the process of healing the nation.

The Velvet Revolution statement regarding the filing of the complaints adds, in part, that:

The individually tailored complaints allege that the named attorneys violated the rules of professional responsibility by advocating torture. The memos written and supported by these attorneys advocating torture have now been repudiated by the Department of Justice, the White House, the Department of Defense and other experts in the field. The recently released Senate and Red Cross reports on detainee treatment provide uncontroverted evidence that the torture techniques advocated by the attorneys were used on human beings over an extended period of time. We have also sent a letter to House Judiciary Chairman John Conyers, asking that he initiate impeachment proceeding against Jay Bybee, who is now a sitting federal judge. The evidence is clear that, during his confirmation hearings, Mr. Bybee misused the classified status of his torture memos to portray a false picture of his legal history. Several Senators have stated publicly that Mr. Bybee would not have been confirmed if they had been aware of his torture memos. The bar complaints have been signed by our board attorney, Kevin Zeese, who also directs the Campaign for Fresh Air and Clean Politics, and Voters for Peace.

We ask other organizations to sign on to this campaign by sending an email to DisbarTortureLawyers@velvetrevolution.us. Individuals can sign on using the form below. This campaign will include a broad public relations push so we urge everyone to spread the word and for the press to contact us for comment and interviews.

You can make targeted donations to this campaign at with an earmark comment in the box at http://www.velvetrevolution.us/donate.php.

The complaints were filed against the following attorneys:

Links to the complaints can also be found at Velvet Revolution here, where you will find a Sign On Form to add your name to the campaign as well as links to the exhibits attached to the complaints, the released torture memos and other information.

Updated 05-19-09 to correctly identify William James Haynes II (instead of Michael Haynes) as one of the dirty dozen torture lawyers.  (h/t earlofhuntingdon)

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Update (03-30-09) re: Sen. Vitter’s missing law license

04-24-09:  IMPORTANT UPDATES AT END OF POST: Senator Vitter is an inactive member of the LSBA although the timing is suspicious:

Wow, that’s very interesting. Here’s an interesting “coincidence” including November, 1999:

A former New Orleans prostitute said she had an affair with Senator David Vitter in 1999 when he was a newly elected House member. The woman, Wendy Ellis, said she saw Mr. Vitter, Republican of Louisiana, two to three times a week from July to November 1999.

Isn’t it also interesting that she tells you how to get information on disciplinary action? I wonder what you will find when you call the Disciplinary Counsel?

So far, no response.  But, importantly, inactive members of the bar must follow the rules of professional conduct so Mr. Vitter isn’t off the hook yet.

1. Still no information regarding Senator Vitter’s membership in the LSBA:

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board Supreme Court Cases :

  • Louisiana Supreme Court Opinions: No opinion regarding Vitter, David.
  • Louisiana Supreme Court Opinions (Before 2000): No opinion regarding Vitter, David.
  • Disciplinary Board Recommendations: No recommendation regarding Vitter, David.
  • Reports of the Hearing Committees: No reports regarding Vitter, David.

Who’s Who in ADR 2008: No listing for David Vitter.

LegalDirectories.com:

  • State of License: LA
    Last Name: vitter
    Results sorted by: Attorney Last Name
    No Results Found

FindLaw Search by Name:

2. Today, I sent the following webmail request to Maryja Serigny, the Member Records Secretary of the Louisiana State Bar Association, with a copy to Senator David Vitter :

Maryja Serigny
Member Records Secretary
Louisiana State Bar Association.

Ms. Serigny,

Although David B. Vitter received his juris doctorate from Tulane University Law School, was admitted to the Louisiana State Bar Association, practiced law in Louisiana and was an adjunct professor of law at Tulane, he is not listed in the Louisiana State Bar Association Membership Directory Active Member Search, Martindale.com or anywhere else as currently being licensed to practice law in Louisiana or any other state. It appears that Mr. Vitter is no longer admitted to practice law in Louisiana but I have been unable to confirm whether Mr. Vitter has ever been admitted to the LSBA and, if so, why he is no longer listed as an active member of the LSBA. Your response to the following questions would help clarify this matter:

  1. Is there an online search available for inactive members of the LSBA? Is, so, please respond with a link.
  2. Has Mr. Vitter ever been admitted to the LSBA?
  3. Is Mr. Vitter currently admitted to the LSBA and, if so, what is his date of admission and current status?
  4. Is Mr. Vitter an inactive member of the LSBA? If so, when did he become inactive?
  5. If Mr. Vitter was previously admitted but resigned from the LSBA, was it in lieu of discipline or were any disciplinary hearings threatened or pending at the time of his resignation? If so, what was he accused of doing that was a violation of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct?
  6. If Mr. Vitter was previously admitted but had his license revoked by the LSBA, please describe his conduct that violated the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct .

Thank you for attention to this matter.

E.M./The Grievance Project

http://grievanceproject.wordpress.com

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

Update on 03-30-09:

I received the following response from Ms. Serigny:

Attorney David B Vitter is an inactive member of the Louisiana State Bar Association. You can find only eligible members on our online member directory. If you need to find someone other than an eligible member you would have to either call or email anyone in the membership dept for that information. Mr. Vitter was admitted to the Louisiana State Bar Association 10/07/1988. He became inactive on 11/19/1999. If you need information regarding disciplinary action, you would need to contact the Disciplinary Counsel, (800) 326-8022. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me, my information is below.

Thank You,

Maryja

I knew from my first post on this subject that there was a chance that a non-controversial explanation existed for why Sen. Vitter didn’t appear in the LSBA search.  However, whether he was active or inactive, Sen. Vitter remained subject to the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, just like Senator Ted Stevens did.  So, though this settles the matter of Sen. Vitter’s admission to the LSBA, it does not address the matter of Sen. Vitter’s admitted criminal transgressions. I’ll try to have more on that soon.What remains weird is that Sen. Vitter fails to even acknowledge his degree and former profession in any of his literature. How many attorneys, active or inactive, keep it a secret that they’re lawyers? What reason would anyone have for trying to eliminate such a significant achievement from their resume’?

Update 2 on 03-30-09:

Ms. Serigny provided a contact at the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board.  Here’s my email to Ms. Swanson:

Barbara Swanson, LADB
Ms. Swanson,

Maryja Serigny, Member Records Secretary, Louisiana State Bar Association, referred me to you for assistance regarding questions related to attorney discipline in Louisiana.  Ms. Serigny informed me that Mr. David B. Vitter is an inactive member of the Louisiana State Bar Association.

  1. Do inactive members of the LSBA remain subject to discipline pursuant to the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct?
  2. Are there any provisions in the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct which permit an attorney to become inactive in lieu of discipline or to avoid any pending or threatened disciplinary proceedings?
  3. Has Mr. Vitter ever been the subject of disciplinary proceedings for violations of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct?  If so, please describe his conduct that was the subject for review.

Thank you for attention to this matter.

E.M./The Grievance Project

Update 3 on 04-30-09:

Welcome back, Senator Vitter:

156.33.35.53 (U.S. Senate Sergeant At Arms)District Of Columbia, Washington, United States, 0 returning visit

Date Time WebPage
April 2nd 2009 04:20:36 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/sen-vitter-why-did-you-lose-your-license-to-practice-law/
156.33.35.98 (U.S. Senate Sergeant At Arms)District Of Columbia, Washington, United States, 0 returning visit

Date Time WebPage
April 2nd 2009 04:01:41 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/
April 2nd 2009 04:01:58 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/about/
April 2nd 2009 04:02:53 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/
April 2nd 2009 04:06:44 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/
April 2nd 2009 04:06:55 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/sen-vitter-why-did-you-lose-your-license-to-practice-law/
156.33.35.47 (U.S. Senate Sergeant At Arms)District Of Columbia, Washington, United States, 0 returning visit

Date Time WebPage
April 2nd 2009 03:58:44 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/
April 2nd 2009 03:58:51 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/
April 2nd 2009 04:00:24 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/about/

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Sen. Vitter, why DID you lose your license to practice law?

Update on 03-30-09: Senator Vitter is an inactive member of the LSBA.

As I wrote last week, I began researching whether Senator David Vitter’s adulterous and criminal conduct violated the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. A check of the Louisiana State Bar Association Membership Directory Active Member Search and Martindale.com, however, yielded no results for Senator David Bruce Vitter. I was able to confirm, from publicly-available sources, that Sen. Vitter had received his law degree from Tulane University, had been admitted to the Louisiana State Bar Association and had actually practiced law. Additional research by Oxdown Gazette readers dmac and cinnamonape yielded nothing regarding how Senator Vitter lost his license to practice law although cinnamonape found this 2001 press release from Southeastern Louisiana University which confirms that “[w]hile serving in the state legislature, Vitter was a business attorney as well as an adjunct law professor at Tulane and Loyola Universities. He is a graduate of the Tulane University School of Law….” [my emphasis]

I also requested information from Senator Vitter – via his webmail service – confirming whether he is “licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction and whether [he is] a member of any bar association.” Although someone from Senator Vitter’s office has visited The Grievance Project several times since I sent my webmail:

156.33.35.41 (U.S. Senate Sergeant At Arms)
District Of Columbia, Washington, United States
March 17th 2009 03:45:33 PM
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2009/03/17/is-sen-david-vitter-licensed-to-practice-law/

156.33.35.50 (U.S. Senate Sergeant At Arms)
District Of Columbia, Washington, United States
March 17th 2009 03:43:04 PM
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2009/03/17/is-sen-david-vitter-licensed-to-practice-law/

156.33.35.86 (U.S. Senate Sergeant At Arms)
District Of Columbia, Washington, United States
March 17th 2009 03:30:09 PM
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2009/03/17/is-sen-david-vitter-licensed-to-practice-law/

156.33.35.45 (U.S. Senate Sergeant At Arms)
District Of Columbia, Washington, United States
March 17th 2009 03:17:51 PM
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2009/03/17/is-sen-david-vitter-licensed-to-practice-law/
March 17th 2009 03:18:10 PM
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2009/03/17/is-sen-david-vitter-licensed-to-practice-law/

156.33.35.28 (U.S. Senate Sergeant At Arms)
District Of Columbia, Washington, United States
March 18th 2009 04:52:51 PM
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2009/03/17/is-sen-david-vitter-licensed-to-practice-law/

I have yet to receive a response to my initial inquiry. Accordingly, I have sent this followup webmail to Senator Vitter:

Senator Vitter,

Because I could find no bar association in which you are admitted, I requested last week – via your webmail service – that you identify each bar association in which you are admitted to practice law. To date, I have not received a reply to my request.

It is now clear that you graduated with a law degree from Tulane University, that you were admitted to the Louisiana bar association and that you then practiced law in Louisiana. [1] It is also clear that you are no longer licensed to practice law in nearly every state, including Louisiana. [2] Additional research conducted both by myself and other readers of my post has failed both to provide any evidence to confirm that you are currently admitted to practice law as well as to yield any information that explains why you are no longer licensed to practice law. As a result, what is not clear is why you are no longer admitted to the Louisiana State Bar Association .

Accordingly, I am sending this second correspondence to again request you to identify each bar association to which you have ever been admitted. Please also include both the date(s) on which you were admitted as well as the date(s) on which any license to practice law was lost or revoked. Please also identify the conduct in which you engaged (or were alleged to have engaged) that resulted in the loss or revocation of any license(s) to practice law that you have previously held. In short, please explain why you are no longer admitted to practice law and the circumstances that led to the loss of your license(s) to practice law.

I look forward to your reply.

E.M.

[1] According to SourceWatch , Senator Vitter “was born May 3, 1961 in New Orleans, … educated at Harvard University, Oxford University (and was a Rhodes Scholar), and Tulane University, and was a lawyer and member of the Louisiana House of Representatives before entering the House.” [my emphasis] See: http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=David_Vitter .

According to Wikipedia, you were “a lawyer and a member of the Louisiana House of Representatives from 1992 to 1999, when [you] entered the U.S. House.” [my emphasis] See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Vitter

From this press release from Southeastern Louisiana University announcing then-U.S. Representative Vitter as the keynote speaker at SLU’s 2001 commencement program: “While serving in the state legislature, Vitter was a business attorney as well as an adjunct law professor at Tulane and Loyola Universities. He is a graduate of the Tulane University School of Law and Harvard University and earned a history and economics degree with highest honors from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar. [my emphasis] See: http://www2.selu.edu/NewsEvents/PublicInfoOffice/vitter-sp01commencement.htm

According to the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Senator Vitter received his law degree from Tulane University School of Law in 1988. See: http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=V000127

[2] See: http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=V000127

and

http://vitter.senate.gov/

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

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Is Sen. David Vitter licensed to practice law?

Update on 03-30-09: Senator Vitter is an inactive member of the LSBA.

Because Senator David Vitter (R-LA) keeps showing up like a bad penny, I decided to research whether his various criminal activities violated any professional conduct rules of any bar associations to which he might be admitted. I first checked the Louisiana State Bar Association Membership Directory Active Member Search but the search yielded the following result: No matches have been found! I then searched Martindale.com for Sen. Vitter and, again, the search provided no result.

I thought at this point that Senator Vitter may not be an attorney, but according to SourceWatch [emphasis supplied]:

[Sen. Vitter] was born May 3, 1961 in New Orleans, was educated at Harvard University, Oxford University (and was a Rhodes Scholar), and Tulane University, and was a lawyer and member of the Louisiana House of Representatives before entering the House.

Sen. Vitter’s Wikipedia entry also states that he “was a lawyer and a member of the Louisiana House of Representatives from 1992 to 1999, when he entered the U.S. House.” [emphasis supplied.] However, Sen. Vitter’s Senate website biography page does not mention his Tulane University law degree or any prior work experience as an attorney. Further research has failed to confirm the Senator’s admission to any bar association in the United States.*

Via his webmail service, I have asked Sen. Vitter to confirm which, if any, bar associations he is now, or has ever been, a member:

Sen. Vitter,

I have read in several places that you went to Tulane law school and worked as an attorney. However, I have been unable to confirm that you are licensed to practice law or that you are admitted to any state or the DC bars. Please advise if you are licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction and whether you’re a member of any bar association.

Thank you,
E.M.

I’ll update this post if I receive a response from Sen. Vitter. In the meantime, if you have any information about whether Sen. Vitter is licensed to practice law and, if he is, the jurisdiction(s) in which he is admitted to practice, please contact me at:

  • grievanceproject AT gmail DOT com.

Thanks,

E.M./The Grievance Project

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

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*I searched Martindale.com for Sen. Vitter but the search provided no result for the Senator.

I also searched the online directories for the following states plus Washington, D.C. (I have compiled the links to these online member directories – as well as all links for the state bar home pages and attorney grievance information, rules of professional conduct and grievance forms – for the 50 states and DC here.) Interestingly, instead of clicking a button to Search, Start Search or Find A Lawyer, I had to click the word ‘Execute’ to run an online attorney search in North Dakota. Following are the results returned for the searches I conducted:

Alabama Membership Directory: Your search found 0 matches.

Alaska Bar Association Membership Directory: [No result.]

State Bar of Arizona – Find a Lawyer: No Records Found
State Bar of Arizona – Member Finder: Search Results: 0 Attorney Found

Arkansas Licensed Attorney Search: 0 record(s)

California Attorney/Member Search: Your search for vitter returned no results.

Colorado Attorney Status and Disciplinary History: No matches found!
Colorado Attorney Disciplinary (only) History: No matches found!

Connecticut Attorney/Firm Inquiry: No Records Found for Attorney*/Firm Name: vitter

Delaware: No online search available.

Florida Find a Lawyer: Your search yielded no results. Please try again.

State Bar of Georgia Member Directory Search: 0 record(s)

Hawai’i: Authorized to Practice Law: [No result.]
Hawai’i: Not Authorized to Practice Law: [No result.]
Hawai’i: Not Authorized to Practice Law Except Pro Bono Cases: [No result.]
Hawai’i: Pro Hac Vice: [No result.]
Hawai’i: HSBA Member Directory: [No result.]

Idaho Attorney Roster Search: No records returned.

Illinois Lawyer Search: [No result.]

Indiana Supreme Court Roll of Attorneys: No Records Found

Iowa Judicial Branch Search for Lawyers Licensed in Iowa: No Records Exist

Kansas: No online search available.

Kentucky Lawyer Locator: Sorry, no records matched your criteria.

Louisiana State Bar Association Membership Directory Active Member Search: No matches have been found!

Maine Attorney Information Search: No records selected

Maryland Judiciary Attorney Listing: NO RECORDS MATCHED THE SEARCH CRITERIA

Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers Attorney Search by Name or City: [No result.]

State Bar of Michigan Member Directory: No members found.

Minnesota Lawyer Public Discipline Search: [No result.]
Minnesota Judicial Branch Lawyer Search: No records found…

Mississippi Attorney Directory: No results found.

Official Missouri Directory of Lawyers: No results found.

Montana: No online search available.

Nebraska Lawyer Search: Your search returned 0 results.

Nevada Find-A-Lawyer: No records returned.

New Hampshire Member Directory for HHBA members – Requires password: No search conducted.
New Hampshire Member Directory for the Public – Under construction: No search conducted.

New Jersey: No general member directory available
New Jersey: Disciplinary Histories from 1990 through last calendar year: [No result.]

State Bar of New Mexico Attorney/Firm_Finder: Your search has returned no results.

New York Attorney Search: Your search returned no results.

North Carolina State Bar Member Directory: Your search came back empty

North Dakota Lawyers Directory: No documents matched the query

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Chickens come home to roost as employers shun toxic Bush lawyers

Noting that Alberto Gonzales hasn’t been able to find a job since his 2007 resignation, Charlie Savage and Scott Shane reported on March 8, 2009, that David Addington has joined the pool of unemployable Bush administration attorneys. From their article Terror-War Fallout Lingers Over Bush Lawyers:

For some of Mr. Bush’s lawyers, the most likely consequence may be wariness from potential employers. The former White House counsel and attorney general, Alberto R. Gonzales, for example, has not found a job since resigning in 2007 amid accusations that he misled Congress about surveillance without warrants and the firing of United States attorneys.

He recently told The Wall Street Journal that the controversy surrounding him had made law firms “skittish” about hiring him, calling himself “one of the many casualties of the war on terror.” Mr. Gonzales’s lawyer, George J. Terwilliger III, said in a statement that “Judge Gonzales looks forward to the day when reason prevails over partisan politics and he can get on with his professional life.”

David S. Addington, a top aide to Vice President Dick Cheney who was a forceful voice in internal legal debates, is also said to still be looking for work. The former Pentagon general counsel William Haynes II had been nominated by Mr. Bush for an appeals court judgeship, but was blocked because of his role in detention policies.

He then searched for a job for about a year, according to Pentagon officials, before landing a position at Chevron in 2008. [Emphasis supplied.]

h/t Zachary Roth, Report: Addington, Like Gonzo, Said To Still Be Looking For Work, March 9, 2009

Back on December 3, 2008, Carrie Johnson provided this update on D. Kyle Sampson:

D. Kyle Sampson, [broken link] who served as the chief of staff to Gonzales until his March 2007 resignation, recently took a leave from his job as a partner at the law firm Hunton & Williams while the investigation [by prosecutor Nora R. Dannehy who is investigating the dismissals of nine U.S. attorneys] proceeds. A spokeswoman for the law firm said he is on leave “pending admission to the D.C. bar.” [Ed. note - As of this date, Mr. Sampson has not been admitted to the D.C. bar. Updated March 17, 2009 to add the word 'not' to the previous sentence in this Ed. note]

The report by Inspector General Glenn A. Fine singled out Sampson for offering testimony that was “not credible” and “unpersuasive.” The authorities also concluded that Sampson had committed “misconduct.”

An attorney for Sampson previously said that Sampson had gone out of his way to help investigators and that he had offered “his best, most honest and complete recollection of these events.”

It’s shameful that these men are still licensed to practice law but, for whatever the reason and however temporary, they’re not practicing law. This doesn’t take the place of proper investigation by their respective bar associations and imposition of appropriate sanctions, but Messrs. Gonzales, Addington and Sampson are being judged quite harshly by their peers. For now.

* * * * * * * * * *

I sent the following email to Hunton & Williams requesting a response to some questions I had regarding the firm’s employment of Mr. Sampson:

Eleanor Kerlow
Senior Public Relations Manager, Hunton & Williams
(202) 955-1883
ekerlow@hunton.com

Ms. Kerlow,

I write The Grievance Project at which I have been following the career of D. Kyle Sampson. I am writing requesting Hunton & Williams’ response to the following questions related to Mr. D. Kyle Sampson.

  • Was the leave taken at the firm’s request?
  • Has the firm been contacted by Nora R. Dannehy regarding Mr. Sampson?
  • Has any other attorney at Hunton & Williams taken a leave from the firm due to Ms. Dannehy’s investigation?
  • Was a press release issued relating to Mr. Sampson’s leave? If so, please forward a copy to my attention.
  • Is it typical or policy for partners in Hunton’s D.C. office to take a leave from the firm while applying for admission to the D.C. bar?
  • Is Mr. Sampson welcome back to Hunton upon his admission to the D.C. bar?

Thank you for your attention to these questions.

I will update this post with any reply I receive.

Updated on March 11, 2009: Emptywheel and Scott Horton provide much more analysis on this issue here and here, respectively.

Updated on March 17, 2009: I haven’t received a reply from Ms. Kerlow or other official response from Hunton & Williams, so I resent the above email to Ms. Kerlow again asking for a response to my questions.   I also asked Ms. Kerlow whether she or someone else from Hunton & Williams stopped by TGP the other day:

From Statcounter :

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March 14th 2009 03:42:18 PM No referring link
grievanceproject.wordpress.com/2009/03/10/chickens-come-home-to-roost-as-employers-shun-toxic-bush-lawyers/

From Sitemeter:

Domain Name (Unknown)
IP Address 148.170.16.# (Hunton & Williams)
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City : New York
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Cross-posted at the Oxdown Gazette, Firedoglake’s diary blog.

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UCBerkeley Professor DeLong calls for John Yoo’s job

In this letter, UC Berkeley Professor Brad DeLong calls for UC Berkeley to fire his UC Berkeley colleague, John Yoo, concluding:

I am not an international law professor.  I am not a moral philosophy professor.  I am just an economics professor.  I am aware that my conclusions [as supported in his letter] may be wrong.  It is the fact that my conclusions may be wrong [that] has led me to dither about this matter up till [sic] now.

But with the OPR[*] report I see no choice; so I ask you, out of a concern for justice, a concern for humanity, and a concern for our reputation as a university, to dismiss Professor John Yoo from membership in our university.

I encourage Prof. DeLong to continue this effort to remove Mr. Yoo from the Berkeley staff but note that his argument would be strengthened if Mr. Yoo were first disbarred as a practicing attorney.

* The OPR report Prof. DeLong refers to is discussed here.

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President of Alabama State Bar replies to charges of misconduct by Bar member US Attorney Leura Canary: I’m not interested so stop contacting me.

J. Mark White, President of the Alabama State Bar, responded to my e-mails regarding the unethical conduct of Leura Garrett Canary, who is herself a member of the Alabama State Bar. Here is his e-mail, quoted in full, and my response to him.

E-mail from J. Mark White, Esq., President of the Alabama State Bar:

J. Mark White <mwhite@waadlaw.com>
[other e-mail addresses deleted]
date Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 7:42 PM
subject RE: Alberto Gonzales and Leura Canary named to Top Ten Prosecutors list for 2008
mailed-by waadlaw.com

Please do not send additional emails to me. If you have a complaint file it with the Alabama State Bar. The process and forms are on the web site. If you feel so strongly about this matter please exhibit the courage to file a formal complaint. I assure you complaints are handled in a professional manner. Emails to a mass of people accomplish nothing. Take me off your email list.
Mark White

Mr. White,

Thank you for replying to my e-mail. At your request, I’ve removed your name from my general e-mail list.

Responding to allegations of unethical conduct by affirmatively requesting to receive no further information does nothing to advance the credibility of your claim that complaints of attorney misconduct in Alabama are handled professionally. Consider also this e-mail I received from Roger Shuler:

About three years ago, I filed a bar complaint against Bill Swatek, the lawyer who filed the bogus lawsuit that started all of my legal headaches. The Alabama State Bar didn’t even investigate it. Swatek has a 30-year history of ethical problems with the bar, including a suspension of his license.

Under bar rules, an attorney with that kind of history is supposed to be scrutinized even more heavily when new complaints arrive. Also, the fact Swatek was opposing counsel (not my attorney) is supposed to irrelevant under bar rules. He still owes a duty to the opposing side to conduct himself in an ethical manner.

When I questioned the bar about their failure to act on my Swatek complaint, one of McLain’s staff people at the time admitted that they get so many complaints that they usually don’t do anything with the ones involving opposing counsel.

Not exactly an awe-inspiring example of professionalism. He has a more at his blog.

Mr. White, I specifically copied you on only two (2) e-mails. I first copied you on the e-mail I sent to Tony McClain, the General Counsel of the Alabama State Bar, because he has the authority to initiate a disciplinary investigation on his his own motion based on information he receives or acquires from any source. This e-mail regarded the unethical conduct of Leura Garrett Canary, a member of the Bar of which you are the elected President. I then also copied you on an e-mail announcing that Leura Garrett Canary had been named one of this country’s Worst Prosecutors for the year 2008.

However, someone of your professional and personal accomplishment should realize that I didn’t just add your name to ‘a mass of people [who can] accomplish nothing.’ Check again the first e-mail you received from me. Note that I copied you on these e-mails in your professional capacity as President of the Alabama State Bar Association. I did this to establish that you have – at a minimum – constructive knowledge of Ms. Canary’s conduct.

Your reply, however, also – rather amateurishly – confirmed that you actually received both of my e-mails, including the first e-mail in which I tediously detailed for you Ms. Canary’s unethical conduct as well as the specific Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct that her conduct violated. You, therefore, also confirmed that you are “[a] lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule 8.4” by Ms. Canary, pursuant to Rule 8.3, Reporting Professional Misconduct of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires that you “shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.” [My emphasis] As explained in the Comments to Rule 8.3 , your “failure to report a violation would itself be a professional offense.”

When you were elected President of the Alabama State Bar Association, it was reported that your theme ‘might be “justice for all.”‘ Your press release from the Alabama State Bar states that “the goals of [your] administration would be[] ‘to remove barriers to justice for Alabama’s poor, to embark on an immediate course to change the nature of state judicial elections, and to champion efforts that increase the public’s confidence in our system of justice…’[, and that key] projects will include … [a]ssisting the bench and bar in improving civility and professionalism . [My emphasis] My hope was that you would receive my e-mail and live up to your words. However, your reply establishes your words are without the substance of conviction.

And none of this is changed because I publish anonymously. There are many reasons, as you know, to publish under a pseudonym not the least of which is sound tactics. It wasn’t cowardice when Thomas Paine wrote Common Sense under the pseudonym Publius. Since publishing his work was an act of treason punishable by death, it was self-preservation. Thanks to men and women like Thomas Paine, the words I publish are not treason. But even though I won’t face prosecution for treason, don’t believe that I face no threats because I choose to publish as I do. And it’s not paranoia if they ARE out to get you . The ounce of prevention anonymity provides me – hopefully – is just a pound of cure but it does not make me a coward. Anyway, I don’t think that you even believe your charge of cowardice.

But it especially surprised me that a self-proclaimed champion of the integrity of the justice system who wants ‘justice for all’ would resort to calling me a coward especially while displaying true champion’s courage by asking me to leave him alone. Although you claim to seek justice for all, you have failed to actually do anything when the cause of justice demands action. In short, Mr. White, the question must be directed to you: where’s the courage demanded by your own words?

Please also note that I have removed you from my general e-mail list, but I will continue to send e-mails to you in your official capacity as President of the Alabama State Bar. If you do not wish to receive these e-mails, your computer department can show you how to digitally stick your head in the sand (just ask them how to block my e-mails). Alternatively, you could resign as President of the Alabama State Bar Association since you don’t want to fulfill your obligations to the Alabama State Bar and the public you swore to serve.

E.M.

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

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Alberto Gonzales and Leura Canary named to Top Ten Prosecutors list for 2008

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

Update 08-12-09: The link to the Bad Prosecutors 2008 annual list of the ten worst prosecutors has been corrected.

Update 05-20-09: I was updating links that had gone bad, including the link for the 2008 annual list of the ten worst prosecutors included in this post below.  For reasons unknown to me, it appears that post has been deleted from Bad Prosecutor.  I have asked Mr. Bennett for an explanation.

Bad Prosecutors, published by the Bennett Law Firm, of Houston, Texas, has compiled its annual list[bad link - post removed from site - 05-20-09] – of the ten worst prosecutors – who will each receive a Certificate of Under Achievment [sic]. This year marks Mrs. Canary’s debut to the List, but Mr. Gonzales is now a deserving 2-time honoree:

Image

See all the Certificates here.

In its press release, the Bennett Law Firm explained that the release of the list was delayed due to the election so the firm “would not be accused of being “political[,]” adding that “[w]e plan not to wait as long to release the Top 10 nominees coming in 2009. Therefore, continue to send in your nominations to bbennett@bennettlawfirm.com.” (My emphasis) (Thanks to SH for this link.)

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E-mail to Alabama State Bar Office of Legal Counsel regarding unethical conduct of US Attorney Leura Garrett Canary

Tony McLain, General Counsel, Alabama State Bar
tony.mclain@alabar.org

Copies to:

Mr. Alex Lafayette Holtsford, Jr., President, Montgomery Bar Association
aholtsford@nixholtsford.com

Sam Partridge, Assistant General Counsel, Alabama State Bar
sam.partridge@alabar.org

Robert E. Lusk, Jr., Assistant General Counsel, Alabama State Bar
robert.lusk@alabar.org

Jeremy W. McIntire, Assistant General Counsel, Alabama State Bar
jeremy.mcintire@alabar.org

John Mark White, President, Alabama State Bar
mwhite@whitearnolddowd.com

Thomas James Methvin, President-Elect, Alabama State Bar
tom.methvin@beasleyallen.com

Pamela Harnest Bucy, Vice President, Alabama State Bar
pbucy@law.ua.edu

Keith Byrne Norman, Secretary, Alabama State Bar
keith.norman@alabar.org

Samuel Neil Crosby, Past President, Alabama State Bar
snc@sgclaw.com

Walter Edgar McGowan, Executive Council, Alabama State Bar
wem@glsmgn.com

Maibeth Jernigan Porter, Executive Council, Alabama State Bar
mporter@maynardcooper.com

Richard J. R. Raleigh, Jr., Executive Council, Alabama State Bar
rraleigh@wilmerlee.com

Hon. Leura Garrett Canary, United States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama
leura.canary@usdoj.gov

Dear Mr. McLain,

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of the conduct of these attorneys that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, Lisa Murkowski, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Marie Goodling, Thomas W. Hartmann, Michael J. Elston, Patrick J. Rogers and, now, United States Attorney Leura Garrett Canary. Her claimed recusal from the prosecution of former Gov. Don Siegelman was and remains a sham and violates several of the rules of professional conduct of Alabama. These actions raise a substantial question as to her honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

Mrs. Canary’s unethical conduct tarnishes the reputation of each member of the Alabama State Bar, including – if not especially – your own. Only a good faith investigation of Mrs. Canary by the Alabama State Bar Office of General Counsel and referral, if and when appropriate, to the Alabama State Bar Disciplinary Committee to answer for her violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct will undo the damage she has done to the legal profession in Alabama. If the reputations of the Department of Justice and the Alabama State Bar are ever to be salvaged, Mrs. Canary must be investigated by the Alabama State Bar Office of Legal Counsel and referred to the Alabama State Bar Disciplinary Committee to answer for her violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct.

Although not a formal complaint, the documentation of Ms. Canary’s conduct that I have prepared and included below* (and posted here at The Grievance Project and here at Firedoglake’s Oxdown Gazette) establish prima facie violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. Pursuant to Rule 3(c) of the Alabama Rules of Disciplinary Procedure which permits you, as General Counsel, to initiate a disciplinary investigation or proceeding upon your “own motion in light of information received or acquired from any source[,]” it is incumbent on you to exercise your authority.

E.M./The Grievance Project

*I did not include the documentation in this post that I sent in the e-mail. It is posted here .

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Leura Garrett Canary

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

Personal Information: Leura Garrett Canary

  • Name: Hon. Leura Garrett Canary
  • Employment: United States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama
  • Address: P. O. Box 197, Montgomery, AL 36101-0197
  • Phone: (334) 223-7280
  • Date Admitted: September 25, 1981
  • Law School: University of Alabama

Leura Garrett Canary was nominated by Pres. George W. Bush to be the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama. Since assuming this position in September 2001, Mrs. Canary has failed to adhere to even the most basic tenets of professional conduct required of her by her membership in the Alabama State Bar, beginning with the Preamble to the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct which states, in part, that

A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process. [Emphasis supplied.]

The following analysis establishes that Mrs. Canary has violated her obligations under the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct by her continued participation in the prosecution of Gov. Don Siegelman after her supposed recusal from the matter and that her conduct raises a substantial question as to her honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law. Specifically, Leura Garrett Canary violated the following Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct:

  1. RULE 1.16 DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION
  2. RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
  3. RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL
  4. RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL
  5. RULE 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY
  6. RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
  7. RULE 4.1 THRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS
  8. RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY LAWYER
  9. RULE 5.4 PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER
  10. RULE 8.3 REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
  11. RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT

Statement of Facts

On November 7, 2008, Rep. John Conyers, as Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, and Rep. Linda Sanchez, as Chair of the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, sent a letter to Attorney General Michael Mukasey in which they succinctly set forth the facts under which Mrs. Canary – allegedly – recused herself from the prosecution of Gov. Don Siegelman:

Department of Justice records show that United States Attorney Leura Canary recused herself from the Siegelman case on May 16, 2002. According to the Acting United States Attorney responsible for the case, “In May 2002, very early in the investigation, and before any significant decisions in the case were made, U.S. Attorney Leura Canary completely recused herself from the Siegelman matter, in response to unfounded accusations that her husband’s Republican ties created a conflict of interest.” [Footnote] 15 Mr. Franklin further explained that “Ms. Canary had no involvement in the case, directly or indirectly, and made no decisions in regards to the investigation or prosecution after her recusal. Immediately following Ms. Canary’s recusal, appropriate steps were taken to ensure the integrity of the recusal, including establishing a ‘firewall’ and moving all documents relating to the investigation to an off-site location. [Footnote] 16 On October 5, 2007, Mr. Franklin stated again “[Leura Canary's] recusal was scrupulously honored by me.” [Footnote] 17 These statements have been repeated many times and have been relied on by defenders of the Department’s handling of this politically-sensitive matter.

[Footnote] 15 July 18, 2007, Statement of Acting United States Attorney Louis Franklin, available at http://blog.al.com/bn/20007/07/middle_district_of_alabamas_re.html

[Footnote] 16 July 18, 2007, Statement of Acting United States Attorney Louis Franklin, available at http://blog.al.com/bn/20007/07/middle_district_of_alabamas_re.html

[Footnote] 17 October 5, 2007, Statement of Acting United States Attorney Louis Franklin, available at http://www.wsfa.com/global/story.asp?s+7176844&ClientType=Printable

On May 16, 2002, Mrs. Canary clearly and unequivocally declared that she had recused herself from the prosecution of Gov. Siegelman stating in this press release that:

As to any matters pertaining to any current investigation of state officials or matters of state government which may or may not be underway, the Department of Justice has advised me that no actual conflicts of interest exist. However, out of an abundance of caution, I have requested that I be recused to avoid any question about my impartiality.

It is of the utmost importance to me, as a United States Attorney, that the people in the Middle District of Alabama and throughout the State have confidence in the manner in which matters are handled by me and by the office I serve and that no one has a basis under which to question the integrity of any investigation undertaken by my office. To that end, the Department has assigned responsibility for the supervision of any investigation regarding state officials or matters of state government to First Assistant United States Attorney Charles R. Niven.

Scott Horton, a contributor to Harper’s Magazine and author of the weblog No Comment for Harper’s website, has been following the prosecution of Don Siegleman and has written extensively on the subject. In his article September 14, 2007 article The Remarkable ‘Recusal’ of Leura Canary, Prof. Horton identified two material misstatements that raise the question of Mrs. Canary’s honesty regarding her recusal from the case:

I question the honesty of Leura Canary’s statement. First, it makes the claim–continuously repeated–that Mrs. Canary took this step on her own initiative. In fact she took it because of the request that attorney Johnson filed with the Justice Department, which launched an independent look at the matter.

Second, Mrs. Canary says that the Justice Department told her that she was okay from a conflicts perspective. I put the question to two prominent legal ethicists: would the facts I presented require Mrs. Canary’s recusal from the investigation of Governor Siegelman? Answer: “this is not a borderline or close case. Under the facts you outline, Mrs. Canary violated the canons of ethics by undertaking and handling the investigation of Governor Siegelman for the period up to her recusal.” Do you believe that a Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility officer would have advised Mrs. Canary that there was “no actual conflict.” Answer: “The standard that applies is whether there would be an ‘appearance of impartiality,’ not ‘actual conflict,’ so the Canary statement misstates the rule. Nonetheless, here the situation passes far beyond ‘appearance of impartiality’ and reaches an actual conflict. The advice she suggests could not have been competently rendered. It would be very interesting to know who at Justice gave such advice.” …

As far back as September 2007 when he published his article, Prof. Horton questioned whether Mrs. Canary had recused herself in fact and not just in word, noting that Mrs. Canary’s statement that she recused herself is only the beginning of the discussion:

And third, the press statement says she recused herself. But did she?

The question then became follow-through. Career senior Justice Department officials tell me that when a U.S. Attorney recuses him- or herself, there is a standard procedure followed: a conflict of interest certification is prepared and submitted in the matter; a certificate of divestiture is prepared and submitted; “502 determinations” are prepared; there is also other ordinary documentation such as a formal appointment of an acting U.S. attorney to handle the matter, transmittal documentation and the like. The normal process, as I am told, is that a neighboring U.S. Attorney is appointed to handle the matter, usually with support of career professionals who would otherwise report to the recused U.S. Attorney.

I can find no evidence that any of these standard procedures were followed. Instead, according to public statements, a member of Mrs. Canary’s staff was appointed to handle the matter. In fact the person she designated was her principal prosecutor; that is, someone whose career and advancement was dependent directly upon her evaluations, not those of an intermediate staffer. When I reviewed this with a career senior Justice Department official I was told: “That’s very odd, and it violates the basic recusal rules. If the recused U.S. Attorney has appointed one of her staffers, without the supervision of another U.S. Attorney, then she has not really recused herself at all. The staffer operates in her office, under her apparent supervision, subject to her performance evaluations, and receiving her paychecks. The idea that the U.S. Attorney is recused and that the staffer is running the show would be a difficult sale to anyone with eyes and possessed of a brain.” Precisely. The ploy only works when the local media report it and don’t ask any questions or use their analytical faculties.

In September of 2007, the evidence that Mrs. Canary had not recused herself in fact from the prosecution that was available to Prof. Horton was limited to Mrs. Canary’s involvement in several press opportunities:

When charges were announced against Siegelman at a press conference convened in Montgomery, Noel Hillman traveled down to Montgomery to deliver the message (stating, ironically as it turns out, “Public Integrity does not do politics”), and there with him stood Leura Canary. Similarly, as the case proceeded, Leura Canary did not keep any distance from it. She gave interviews to the Los Angeles Times and to the Montgomery Advertiser about the case. Not the conduct of a ‘recused’ U.S. Attorney. [As of November, 17, 2008, linking to the Montgomery Advertiser from the link in Prof. Horton's article returns a page that states that 'The article requested can not be found!']

However, as Rep. Conyers and Rep. Sanchez explain in their letter to Attorney General Michael Mukasey, documents – obtained by both Prof. Horton and Adam Zagorin – have surfaced that establish that Mrs. Canary did not, as a matter of fact, recuse herself from the prosecution of Gov. Siegelman:

Ms. [Tamarah] Grimes[, an employee of the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama,] has provided several emails[*] casting serious doubts on these assertions, however. The most significant of these emails is a September 19, 2005, email from Ms. Canary to Acting United States Attorney Franklin, Assistant United States Attorneys Feaga and Perrine, First Assistant United States Attorney Patricia Watson (whose last name was Snyder at this time), and criminal legal assistant Debbie Shaw. This email was sent at a critical time in the Siegelman/Scrushy case – Mr. Siegelman had been indicted, although that fact had not been revealed to his attorneys, and the Government was preparing a superceding indictment that would be publicly revealed the following month.

In this email, Ms. Canary forwards an article regarding the Siegelman case and writes: “Ya’ll need to read because he refers to a ’survey’ which allegedly shows that 67% of Alabamians believe the investigation of him to be politically motivated. (Perhaps grounds not to let him discuss court activities in the media?) He also admits to making ‘bad hires’ in his last administration.” [Footnote] 18

This email raises obvious questions about the degree to which Ms. Canary honored her recusal from this case. A recused United States Attorney should not be providing factual information such as relevant news clipping containing a defendant’s statements to the team working on the case under recusal. And this email does not just show Ms. Canary forwarding and article – it reflects her analyzing the article and highlighting certain facts. And most troubling of all it contains a litigation strategy recommendation – that the prosecution should seek to bar Mr. Siegelman from speaking to the media. We note too that it was sent only to members of the Siegelman/Scrushy prosecution team – it was not an office wide email that inadvertently reached people working on the case.

[Footnote] 18 September 19, 2005, email from Leura Canary to JB Perrine, Steve Feaga, Louis Franklin, Debbie Shaw and Patricia Snyder.

[*Portions of the images of the e-mails released by Ms. Grimes are printed below.]

Regarding Mrs. Canary’s advice that the prosecution seek a gag order against Gov. Siegelman, Adam Zagorin reported on November 14, 2007 at Time.com that the prosecution team did just that:

Prosecutors in the case seem to have followed Canary’s advice. A few months later they petitioned the court to prevent Siegelman from arguing that politics had any bearing on the case against him. After trial, they persuaded the judge to use Siegelman’s public statements about political bias — like the one Canary had flagged in her e-mail — as grounds for increasing his prison sentence. The judge’s action is now one target of next month’s appeal.

Writing at the Daily Beast, Prof. Horton characterized Mrs. Canary’s conduct in this manner:

Canary, attaching a Siegelman campaign missive to one email, noted that Siegelman claimed that the prosecution is politically motivated and that 67 percent of Alabamans agree with him. Canary suggested that her subordinates obtain a gag order against Siegelman to bar him from making any references to the political nature of the charges brought against him. The communication suggested that Canary’s motivation is, just as Siegelman alleges, political in nature. More significantly, it demonstrates that Canary continued to drive the case notwithstanding her “recusal.”

In fact, the prosecutors sought a gag order against Siegelman and persuaded the judge, a former member of the Executive Committee of the Alabama G.O.P., to ratchet Siegelman’s sentence upwards because he claimed he was a victim of a political prosecution led by Republicans. (Recent polling suggests that Alabamans believe by overwhelming margins that Siegelman was a victim of a political prosecution, and newspaper editorial boards across the state called for his release.)

In another email, Canary’s first assistant referred to Canary making staffing decisions surrounding the prosecution of the Siegelman case long after her “recusal.” These allegations are backed up by the fact that Canary repeatedly appeared at news conferences concerning the Siegelman prosecution and granted at least three press interviews to discuss it—all after she said she had removed herself from the case.

In their letter to Attorney General Michael Mukasey, Rep. Conyers and Rep. Sanchez continue to document Mrs. Canary’s unethical conduct:

Ms. Grimes has provided other documents to the Committee that bear on this issue. In one email, Ms. Canary forwards another another article to essentially the same group of recipients. [Footnote] 19 This too appears improper and again raises the question why a recused United States Attorney would be providing such information to the active prosecution team. Another email notes that Ms. Canary was consulted about the decision to add Ms. Grimes to the Siegelman/Scrushy team – referred to as the “big case” – and states that “Leura and Louis both liked the concept["] and further reports that “Leura asked me to pass this information [regarding Ms. Grimes' role on the case] on …[.]” [Footnote] 20 We appreciate that a United States Attorney who is recused from a particular matter will continue to play a role in the overall administration of the office, but question whether participating in detailed discussions about the staffing of the matter from which she has been recused is appropriate and whether messages or information from the recused United States Attorneys should be passed on to new members of the team.

In her July 2007 report to OPR, Ms. Grimes elaborated on this subject, stating that “Leura Canary kept up with every detail of the case through Debbie Shaw and Patricia Watson.” [Footnote] 21 Once again, if this statement is accurate, it raises serious concerns. It is difficult to imagine the reason for a recused United States Attorney to remain so involved in the day to day progress of the matter under recusal.

[Footnote] 19 September 27, 2005, email from Leura Canary to Steve Feaga, Louis Franklin, JB Perrine, and Patricia Snyder.

[Footnote] 20 April 6, 2005, email from Patricia Snyder to Steve Doyle

[Footnote] 21 July 30, 2007 Letter to H. Marshall Jarrett from Tamarah Grimes.

On November 21, 2008, Adam Nossiter at the New York Times reported that:

Yet in her complaint, the Justice Department employee, Tamarah T. Grimes, cited several instances suggesting Ms. Canary maintained a close watch on the case. Ms. Grimes said a legal aide in the office reported on Mr. Siegelman’s trial to Ms. Canary or her top deputy “every day, sometimes several times per day by telephone.” Once, she observed Ms. Canary “frantically pacing in the executive suite” after a courtroom blowup, “pleading with someone” to get on the phone to “tell Louis he has to control his temper.”

Ms. Grimes also disclosed an e-mail message written by Ms. Canary commenting on legal strategy in the case and suggesting to aides that Mr. Siegelman not be allowed to “comment on court activities in the media.” Ms. Grimes, who is also in a dispute with the department related to her accusations that the Siegelman prosecution team had harassed her, cited the affidavit of a former legal aide in the Montgomery office, Elizabeth Jane Crooks, who wrote that “the morning that the trial started, the U.S. attorney herself carried food and beverage over to the courthouse to support the ‘Trial Team.’ ”

Mr. Siegelman’s lawyers have reacted with anger to these contentions, saying they demonstrate that Ms. Canary never really took herself out of the case. “She was supposed to be recused precisely because her involvement would reek of political conflict of interest, yet she remained involved,” they wrote in a filing to the 11th Circuit court this week.

Mrs. Canary has denied any wrongdoing both personally and through her subordinates. In reviewing Mrs. Canary’s conduct, neither her nor Mr. Franklin’s statements that Mrs. Canary recused herself need not – and indeed must not – be accepted at face value. To the contrary, her denials of improper motives or conduct must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. As provided in the adopted Terminology of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, for Mrs. Canary to believe that her conduct was proper, she must have “actually supposed the fact in question to be true” (which belief “may be inferred from circumstances”) and for that belief to be reasonable requires “that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.”

For example, in her May 16, 2002 press release, Mrs. Canary admitted that “it would not be appropriate for me to discuss any investigations that may or may not be under review in my office.” However, as Prof. Horton notes in his article The Remarkable ‘Recusal’ of Leura Canary, Mrs. Canary made this statement to the Los Angeles Times:

Leura Canary said that suggesting she exerted political influence over the case was “a ridiculous assertion” because it was handled by a career prosecutor, Franklin, in conjunction with the public integrity section of the Justice Department in Washington.

As noted above, Prof. Horton reported on several interactions between Mrs. Canary and the press regarding the prosecution of Gov. Siegelman after her alleged recusal:

When charges were announced against Siegelman at a press conference convened in Montgomery, Noel Hillman traveled down to Montgomery to deliver the message (stating, ironically as it turns out, “Public Integrity does not do politics”), and there with him stood Leura Canary. Similarly, as the case proceeded, Leura Canary did not keep any distance from it. She gave interviews to the Los Angeles Times and to the Montgomery Advertiser about the case. Not the conduct of a ‘recused’ U.S. Attorney. [As of November, 17, 2008, linking to the Montgomery Advertiser from the link in Prof. Horton's article returns a page that states that 'The article requested can not be found!']

Mrs. Canary’s denials were echoed by Louis V. Franklin, Sr., Acting U.S. Attorney in the Siegelman/Scrushy Prosecution:

When the investigation first began, Leura Canary was not the U.S. Attorney for the MDAL. Initially, the investigation was brought to the attention of the Interim U.S. Attorney, Charles Niven, a career prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Niven had almost 25 years of experience as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the office prior to his appointment as Interim U.S. Attorney upon U.S. Attorney Redding Pitt’s (currently attorney of record for Defendant Siegelman in this case) departure.

Ms. Canary became U.S. Attorney in September 2001. In May 2002, very early in the investigation, and before any significant decisions in the case were made, U.S. Attorney Leura Canary completely recused herself from the Siegelman matter, in response to unfounded accusations that her husband’s Republican ties created a conflict of interest. Although Department of Justice officials reviewed the matter and opined that no conflict, actual or apparent, existed, Canary recused herself anyway to avoid even an appearance of impropriety. I, Louis V. Franklin, Sr., was appointed Acting U.S. Attorney in the case after Charles Niven retired in January 2003. I have made all decisions on behalf of this office in the case since my appointment as Acting U.S. Attorney. U.S. Attorney Canary has had no involvement in the case, directly or indirectly, and has made no decisions in regards to the investigation or prosecution since her recusal. Immediately following Canary’s recusal, appropriate steps were taken to ensure that she had no involvement in the case. Specifically, a firewall was established and all documents relating to the investigation were moved to an off-site location. The off-site became the nerve center for most, if not all, work done on this case, including but not limited to the receipt, review, and discussion of evidence gathered during the investigation.

* * *

Armed with cooperation agreements from Bailey, Young and Kirsch, the investigation continued. In June 2004, a special grand jury was convened to further assist in the investigation. An indictment was returned under seal against Mr. Siegelman and ex-HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy on May 17, 2005. The first superseding indictment was filed and made public on October 26, 2005, charging Siegelman, Scrushy, Siegelman’s former Chief of Staff Paul Hamrick, and Siegelman’s Transportation Director Gary Mack Roberts. …

However, as specifically noted by Rep. Conyers and Rep. Sanchez in their letter to Attorney General Michael Mukasey, it was during this exact time frame specified by Acting U.S. Attorney Franklin in which Mrs. Canary clearly was not recused in fact from the prosecution of Gov. Siegelman:

The most significant of these emails is a September 19, 2005, email from Ms. Canary to Acting United States Attorney Franklin, Assistant United States Attorneys Feaga and Perrine, First Assistant United States Attorney Patricia Watson (whose last name was Snyder at this time), and criminal legal assistant Debbie Shaw. This email was sent at a critical time in the Siegelman/Scrushy case – Mr. Siegelman had been indicted, although that fact had not been revealed to his attorneys, and the Government was preparing a superceding indictment that would be publicly revealed the following month.

In this email, Ms. Canary forwards an article regarding the Siegelman case and writes: “Ya’ll need to read because he refers to a ’survey’ which allegedly shows that 67% of Alabamians believe the investigation of him to be politically motivated. (Perhaps grounds not to let him discuss court activities in the media?) He also admits to making ‘bad hires’ in his last administration.” [Footnote] 18

This email raises obvious questions about the degree to which Ms. Canary honored her recusal from this case. A recused United States Attorney should not be providing factual information such as relevant news clipping containing a defendant’s statements to the team working on the case under recusal. And this email does not just show Ms. Canary forwarding and article – it reflects her analyzing the article and highlighting certain facts. And most troubling of all it contains a litigation strategy recommendation – that the prosecution should seek to bar Mr. Siegelman from speaking to the media. We note too that it was sent only to members of the Siegelman/Scrushy prosecution team – it was not an office wide email that inadvertently reached people working on the case.

In light of the evidence presented by Ms. Grimes and the contradictions between her actions and her contradictory, self-serving statements, Mrs. Canary’s denials are simply not believable. In short, “a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question” to be improper, and, therefore, Mrs. Canary should have known that her conduct was improper even if she actually (and, in that case, quite incompetently) did not know her conduct was improper.

If the reputations of the Department of Justice and the Alabama State Bar are ever to be salvaged, Mrs. Canary must be investigated by the Alabama State Bar Office of Legal Counsel and referred to the Alabama State Bar Disciplinary Committee to answer for her violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. Although the Alabama State Bar Office of Legal Counsel has the authority to begin an investigation on its own volition, a state bar system will not normally begin a formal investigation until it receives a formal complaint. A formal grievance complaint can’t be filed online, but anyone – whether a resident of Alabama or not or otherwise involved in this matter – can easily file a grievance against Mrs. Canary with the Alabama State Bar in just three simple steps:

  1. Print, complete and sign the official Alabama Complaint Against a Lawyer;
  2. Print and attach this page to the Complaint Form as the factual basis for the claim; and
  3. Mail the complaint to the address noted on the Complaint Form.

Rules Violated by Leura Garrett Canary:

  1. RULE 1.16 DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION
  2. RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL
  3. RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL
  4. RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL
  5. RULE 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY
  6. RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
  7. RULE 4.1 THRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS
  8. RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY LAWYER
  9. RULE 5.4 PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER
  10. RULE 8.3 REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
  11. RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT

*Portions of the images of the e-mails released by Ms. Grimes. The complete images of the e-mails can be found here.

September 19, 2005 e-mail from Leura Garrett Canary:

Image

September 25, 2005 e-mail from Leura Garrett Canary:

Image

April 6, 2005 e-mail from Patricia Snyder to Stephen Doyle:

Image

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h/ts: Legal Schnauzer, WriteChic Press, at-Largely and capt.

Thanks are also due to Scott Horton for all his contributions to reporting on the Siegelman prosecution.

Text of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct violated by Mrs. Canary

It’s Election Eve and I’m going to have to take (the generic equivalent of) Benadryl to be able to sleep tonight.

And I’ll be using (the Mountain Dew equivalent of) caffeine tomorrow night to be able to stay up to watch the polls close and to wait for the election results.

Anyone else too excited to sleep?

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Why does it take 7 felony convictions for the Alaska Bar to suspend Sen. Stevens’ bar license?

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

As twolf1 noted earlier at Oxdown Gazette, Sen. Ted Stevens will be facing ethics proceedings in the Senate in spite of his ridiculous claim that he wasn’t convicted. I must admit, however, that I will be at mildly surprised if Sen. Reid follows through on this. In addition to any Senate investigation, Sen. Stevens now also faces suspension of his Alaska Bar Association license to practice law. (H/t WriteChic).

But with all the unethical conduct engaged in both by attorneys representing the Republican Party and also by those serving in the Legislative, Judicial and Executive Branches over the last 7 1/2 years, the various state Bar Associations have independently initiated grievance proceedings against only two of them: I. Lewis Libby (Disbarred by the D.C. Bar – use “I ” as the First Name search criteria and Suspended by Pennsylvania) and Sen. Theodore F. Stevens (Suspended by the Alaska State Bar – Alaska State Bar’s websearch not updated as of 11-03-08). Even after they were convicted by a jury of their peers, and actually sentenced in Libby’s case, both the Alaska and Pennsylvania Bar Associations merely suspended these attorneys’ licenses.

According to Tom Kizzia of the Alaska Daily News, the Alaska State Bar proceeded similarly after a plea of guilty by Jim Clark:

There’s no deadline by which the Supreme Court has to decide such a license challenge, said chief deputy court clerk Lori Wade. Stevens has a right to file legal memoranda in his defense.

In the recent case of Jim Clark, the former chief of staff to Gov. Frank Murkowski, interim suspension of his bar license was imposed last May after two months of legal argument. Clark, who pleaded guilty to a felony conspiracy charge related to illegal campaign help from Veco, still awaits sentencing. A final resolution of Clark’s bar license will be made after a full disciplinary hearing following the sentencing.

But unless an attorney is convicted of a crime, the state bar associations will not investigate any unethical conduct by their member attorneys unless and until a formal grievance is filed against the attorney.

A couple of watch groups and some private attorneys have filed several grievances. Texas Watch has filed grievances against Texas Supreme Court Justices Nathan Hecht and David Medina for unethical activity taking place at the state level in Texas. At the federal level, CREW has filed grievances against Michael J. Elston and Esther Slater McDonald for their part in the politicized hiring practices taking place at the DoJ, although CREW’s complaint against Mr. Elston failed to include any allegations of Mr. Elston’s unethical conduct relating to the U.S. Attorney firing scandal which I document here. My favorite, though, is the complaint filed by private attorney, William Wilder, against Monica Marie Goodling for her numerous examples of unethical conduct, as I have documented here.

Unfortunately, these responses by the state Bar associations, watch groups and private attorneys have been far too limited to be of any real effect. These limitations led to The Grievance Project, which is my attempt to educate people, encourage them to educate others and try to convince an one or more people to file a complaint against these attorneys and many others – I stopped adding to my list when it passed 95 names.

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Senator-for-now Stevens’ good news, bad news and Lisa Murkowski.

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

The good news: Sen. Stevens won’t lose his right to vote until he’s sentenced, so he’ll be able to vote for himself.

The bad news: It may not be enough.

And Lisa Murkowski: Although Alaska’s junior Senator has been keeping a fairly low profile since getting caught in an improper land deal that she failed to properly disclose on her Senate disclosure forms, Sen. Murkowski made an appearance with the freshly-convicted felon Senator-for-now at his ‘Welcome Home’ party. Instead of asking him to resign, though, Sen. Murkowski implored his supporters to keep working hard to re-elect Senator-for-now. They even danced a jig together.

Birds of a feather. Which is probably why one of my first posts at The Grievance Project detailed Sen. Murkowski’s purchase of prime Kenai River-front property from a lobbyist at a price far below its fair market value and failure to report the purchase on her Senate disclosure forms. Her conduct in both the purchase and filing of the disclosure forms involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and reflect adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer. Accordingly, her conduct violates the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, and even though an inactive member of the Alaska Bar Association, Ms. Murkowski remains subject to the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct which subject her to sanctions for her unethical conduct.

The state bar system will not begin a formal investigation until it receives a formal complaint, but anyone can file a grievance against Ms. Murkowski. You don’t need to be a resident of Alaska or otherwise involved in this matter. Since a grievance can’t be filed online, I’ve written the complaint so anyone can easily file a grievance against Ms. Murkowski with the Alaska Bar Association in three simple steps:

  1. Print, complete and sign the official Attorney Grievance Form – Alaska Bar Association (.pdf);
  2. Print and attach this page to the Complaint Form as the factual basis for the claim; and
  3. Mail the complaint to the address noted on the Complaint Form.

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Patrick J. Rogers – predictably and unbelievably – denies charges of Vote-Suppression

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

Patrick J. Rogers is the New Mexico attorney who represents and advises the Republican Party of New Mexico on its voter suppression efforts. In this prior post , I documented how Mr. Rogers’ conduct in this matter violates the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct. Mr. Rogers “was too busy working on the election” to reply to a request for a statement from TPMMuckraker, so it’s no surprise he didn’t respond to my e-mail requesting a response to my allegations since I’m just an anonymous blogger. Notably, though, Mr. Rogers – or someone from his firm – did have time to stop by The Grievance Project:

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But, as Heather Clark reported on October 29, 2008, Mr. Rogers did reply to the Associated Press:

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.—An Albuquerque attorney who has been accused in a federal lawsuit of intimidating two voters in an attempt to interfere with their right to vote said Wednesday he has not violated any law.

Pat Rogers, who advises the state Republican Party, is accused of helping disseminate private information about two voters and hiring a private investigator, Al Romero, who allegedly went to their homes and confronted them about their eligibility to vote, the lawsuit said.

Rogers and Romero are named as defendants in the lawsuit, which was filed in U.S. District Court in Albuquerque on Monday by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, or MALDEF.

“I have not violated any law and Mr. Romero has not violated any law,” Rogers told The Associated Press.

* * *

“The lawsuit contains serious accusations that have no basis in law or fact. The suit is filed and advertised before the upcoming election for obvious purposes,” Rogers said, declining to elaborate.

I, too, would proclaim my innocence if I was being investigated by the Department of Justice – even a Michael Mukasey-led DoJ – and that conduct resulted in my being named as a defendant in a federal lawsuit. Every day, criminal defendants – both guilty and innocent alike – make countless similar proclamations of innocence in criminal courts all over the globe. Like many of these defendants, Mr. Rogers’ denial of wrong-doing is simply not believable. If you agree, you can easily file a grievance against Mr. Rogers with the State Bar of New Mexico in three simple steps:

  1. Print, complete and sign the official Form for Complaint against a Lawyer in New Mexico;
  2. Print and attach this page to the Complaint Form as the factual basis for the claim; and
  3. Mail the complaint to the address noted on the Complaint Form.

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Web-mail to Sen. Theodore F. Stevens

Sen. Theodore F. Stevens
United States Senate
Contact via webmail

Sen. Stevens,

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys such as yourself, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of the conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility. Previously, I have written about the conduct of Alberto Gonzales, Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, Lisa Murkowski, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Marie Goodling, Thomas W. Hartmann, Michael J. Elston and Patrick J. Rogers. I now add your name to this illustrious list. See my post here. I also crossposted at Firedoglake’s Oxdown Gazette . Your conviction of seven (7) counts of felony making of a false statement raises a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law.

My readers and I are interested in your response that your conduct violates your ethical obligations as a member of the Alaska Bar Association .

E.M./The Grievance Project

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Theodore F. Stevens

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

Theodore F. Stevens, the United States Senator from Alaska was convicted of seven (7) felonies on October 27, 2008. His conviction violates the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct. Although an inactive member of the Alaska Bar Association, Mr. Stevens remains subject to the obligations imposed by the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct.

Although the state bar system requires that a formal complaint be filed to begin a formal investigation, anyone can file a grievance against Mr. Stevens. You don’t need to be a resident of Alaska or otherwise involved in this matter to file a grievance. Since a grievance can’t be filed online, I’ve simplified the process as much as possible so you can easily file a grievance against Mr. Stevens with the Alaska Bar Association in three simple steps:

  1. Print, complete and sign the official Attorney Grievance Form – Alaska Bar Association (.pdf);
  2. Print and attach this page to the Complaint Form as the factual basis for the claim; and
  3. Mail the complaint to the address noted on the Complaint Form.

Personal Information:

Name: Theodore F. Stevens
Bar: Alaska
ID No:
Status: Inactive

Grievance Information: Alaska

Allegation: Theodore F. Stevens has been convicted of seven (7) felonies.

On October 27, 2008, a jury of his peers unanimously entered a verdict finding Theodore F. Stevens guilty of was convicted of seven (7) counts of felony making false statements. Accordingly, Mr. Stevens is in violation of Rule 8.4. Misconduct , which provides that:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

(d) state or imply an ability to improperly influence a government agency or official; or,

(e) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law. (SCO 1123 effective July 15, 1993)

ALASKA COMMENT

Paragraph (d) of the ABA Rules was omitted because it is too vague. See the ABA Legal Background Section. All improper conduct is already regulated under the other rules.

COMMENT

Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving “moral turpitude.” That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.

A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.

Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of attorney. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.

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E-mail to Patrick J. Rogers (Updated)

Patrick J. Rogers, Esq.
Modrall Sperling
PO Box 2168
Albuquerque, NM 87103-2168
Telephone: (505) 848-1800
Fax: (505) 848-1891
Email: pjr@modrall.com and patrogers@modrall.com

cc: contact@modrall.com

Mr. Rogers,

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys such as yourself, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of the conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility. Previously, I have written about the conduct of Alberto Gonzales, Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, Lisa Murkowski, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Marie Goodling, Thomas W. Hartmann and Michael J. Elston. I now add your name to this illustrious list. See my post here . I also crossposted at Firedoglake’s Oxdown Gazette . Your retention and supervision of Mr. Alfredo Romero to intimidate and harass citizens of New Mexico from lawfully exercising their right to vote by continuing to ‘investigate’ these United States citizens raises a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law.

My readers and I are interested in your response to the allegations that your baseless-in-fact allegations of ‘voter fraud’ and your continuing investigation of these voters is intimidation and harassment of voters in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and that your conduct, therefore, violates your ethical obligations as a member of the New Mexico Bar Association.

I expect better behavior from one of The Best Lawyers in America®.

E.M./The Grievance Project

Update: Someone from Modrall Sperling stopped by this morning. I’d call this at least a partial response.

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Patrick J. Rogers

Crossposted at Oxdown Gazette.

Patrick J. Rogers is the New Mexico attorney who represents and advises the Republican Party of New Mexico on its voter suppression efforts. I have documented from the public record Mr. Rogers’ conduct that violates the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct. Unfortunately, the state bar system requires that a formal complaint be filed to begin a formal investigation, but you don’t need to be a resident of the state or even involved in the matter to file a grievance. Anyone can file one, but a grievance can’t be filed online, so I’ve simplified the process as much as possible. If you agree, you can easily file a grievance against Mr. Rogers with the State Bar of New Mexico in three simple steps:

  1. Print, complete and sign the official Form for Complaint against a Lawyer in New Mexico;
  2. Print and attach this page to the Complaint Form as the factual basis for the claim; and
  3. Mail the complaint to the address noted on the Complaint Form.

Personal Information:

  • Name: Patrick J. Rogers, Shareholder, Modrall Sperling
  • PO Box 2168, Albuquerque, NM 87103-2168
  • Telephone: (505) 848-1800
  • Fax: (505) 848-1891

Grievance Information: New Mexico

Introduction

Along with the privilege to practice law, each member of the State Bar of New Mexico, including Patrick J. Rogers, must also comply with the special duties and responsibilities that arise from that privilege. As described in the Preamble to the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct:

A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.

* * *

A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers, and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.

* * *

The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves. (Emphasis supplied.)

On October 17, 2008, Melanie Dabovich of the Associated Press reported that the “Republican Party of New Mexico alleges 28 people voted fraudulently in one Albuquerque state House district in the June Democratic primary.” After releasing the registration cards for “10 of the suspect voters[,]” Mr. Rogers, “an attorney who advises the state GOP, says the party plans to turn the suspect registration cards over to [state Attorney General Gary] King’s and [District Attorney Kari] Brandenburg’s offices.” ACORN investigated these claims and, as a result, “confirmed with the Bernalillo County Clerk that the voters in question were all legitimate” and that the voters identified by Mr. Rogers and his client were not engaged in the criminal conduct of ‘voter fraud’ but were, to the contrary, victims of false allegations of voting fraud.

Although his client, the Republican Party of New Mexico, officially distanced itself from making further allegations of voter fraud, Mr. Rogers continued to press the matter. Under the guise of conducting additional investigation of the baseless voter fraud allegations, Mr. Rogers retained a private investigator to conduct further ‘review’ of the voter fraud charges and supervised this investigator’s review of the voters he and his client had previously identified, even though each voter had been cleared of any wrongdoing.

Considering this conduct and the circumstances surrounding his conduct, as detailed more specifically below, Patrick J. Rogers has violated the following New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct:

16-102. Scope of representation.
16-116. Declining or terminating representation.
16-401. Truthfulness in statements to others.
16-403. Dealing with unrepresented person.
16-404. Respect for rights of third persons.
16-503. Responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants.
16-802. Judicial and legal officials.
16-804. Misconduct.

Allegation: Patrick J. Rogers engaged in conduct designed to intimidate and harass New Mexican voters by retaining and supervising a private investigator to ‘investigate’ baseless allegations of voter fraud in violation of federal laws that prohibit voter intimidation.

On October 17, 2008, Melanie Dabovich of the Associated Press reported the activities of Patrick J. Rogers and his client, the Republican Party of New Mexico:

ALBUQUERQUE — The Republican Party of New Mexico alleges 28 people voted fraudulently in one Albuquerque state House district in the June Democratic primary.

Party representatives said at a news conference Thursday they found the suspect voters in a review of 92 newly registered voters in House District 13.

“We really have a bombshell — evidence of voter fraud in the 2008 primary in Albuquerque,” said State Rep. Justine Fox-Young, an Albuquerque Republican. “We are presenting undeniable proof that there was voter fraud in the June election.”

* * *

The Republicans released voter registration cards for 10 of the suspect voters, saying they showed missing or inaccurate Social Security numbers or birth dates.

In some cases, more than one voter was registered using the same Social Security number. In others, people who the Republicans said had no Social Security number on public record were registered.

* * *

Pat Rogers, an attorney who advises the state GOP, says the party plans to turn the suspect registration cards over to King’s and Brandenburg’s offices.

In response, Project Vote properly characterized these allegations as spurious:

ACORN and Project Vote launched back in a news conference call on October 10. “This is the third election cycle in a row where we’ve seen partisan interests take the same issue—which is canvassers trying to defraud ACORN by not doing their work and instead fabricating applications—and trying to exaggerate that and turn it into an argument that there is ‘widespread fraudulent voting’ going on,” said Project Vote executive director Michael Slater. “These allegations have been debunked now in several election cycles, and we’ll find by the end of this election cycle they’ll be debunked as well.”

The next day, October 18, 2008, the Associated Press again reported these baseless allegations:

ALBUQUERQUE —The community activist group ACORN fired back Saturday at New Mexico Republicans and their claims of voter fraud in June’s Democratic primary.

ACORN organizers said that since the vote-fraud charges were leveled by GOP leaders on Thursday, they have contacted four or five of the 28 allegedly “suspect” Albuquerque voters.

They said those voters confirmed that the allegations, including problems on voter registration forms like inaccurate Social Security numbers or birth dates, were simply wrong.

But State Republican Party representatives said only two voters out of 16 named in their investigation have come forward to deny the charges, and they stand by their assertion that voter fraud remains a problem in New Mexico. “The bottom line is that two out of 16 is not a good batting average,” said Pat Rogers, an attorney who advises the GOP.

* * *

Rogers said a private investigator hired by the state Republican Party found [Brittany] Rivera and others like her have Social Security numbers on their voter registration forms that are being used by other people. They may be legitimate voters and could be victims of identity theft.

* * *

However, the voters accused of the crime of voter fraud by Mr. Rogers and his client, the Republican Party of New Mexico, were, in fact, innocent of these charges. With the assistance of ACORN, these voters were able to prove their innocence of the charge of voter fraud. After “ACORN confirmed with the Bernalillo County Clerk that the voters in question were all legitimate,” the New Mexico Republican Party backed off their allegations of voter fraud. In spite of the fact that the voters identified by Mr. Rogers and his client were absolutely cleared of any impropriety by the Bernalillo County Clerk, Mr. Rogers and his private investigator continued to press the matter. Under the apparent guise of conducting additional investigation of the voter fraud allegations, and even though the named voters were cleared of any wrongdoing, Mr. Rogers continued to retain and supervise the services of Mr. Alfredo Romero to conduct additional ‘review’ of the voter fraud charges:

Among those who said she was blindsided and angered by the Republicans’ allegations was 18-year-old Brittany Rivera. At a news conference, she said she was at first scared to learn she’d been labeled as a “suspect” voter and her name and personal information had been forwarded to law enforcement. “You guys are trying to scare us new voters,” Rivera said of the GOP. “I think it’s wrong.”

According to Rivera and her mother, she accurately filled in and mailed her registration form on time after her mother picked up the paperwork for her at the nursing home where she works.

She said being targeted as a bogus voter is “crazy,” and she is now “more determined” to vote in the future. She said she planned to vote Saturday, when early voting began in New Mexico.

Group slams GOP ‘hacks’ over voting charges, Associated Press, October 18, 2008.

Several days later, on October 23, 2008, Gwyneth Doland reported in the New Mexico Independent that Mr. Rogers suddenly refused to either confirm or deny that he had hired an investigator in this matter:

ALBUQUERQUE – Republican Party attorney Pat Rogers refused to say Thursday if a private detective who visited the addresses of two of the 10 Albuquerque voters cited at a news conference last week about voter fraud was working for the GOP.

* * *

When asked by the New Mexico Independent if the private investigator worked for Rogers’ law firm, Rogers said, “I have no interest in responding to ACORN’s accusation.”

Reminded that the accusations came from the voters themselves, Rogers said, “You need not to accept what ACORN says.”

When asked the question again, Rogers said, ”I am not responding to any questions. I am not being quoted. This is off the record.”

However, the New Mexico Independent’s Gwyneth Doland confirmed that Mr. Rogers’ investigator had indeed continued to visit voters, including [name redacted] and Emily Garcia:

Guadalupe Bojorquez said a man who identified himself as a private investigator by the name of Al Romero visited the home of her 67-year-old mother on Wednesday.

“She calls me and she’s panicked because there is this man outside and he’s telling her he’s an investigator and he wants to come in to the house,” Bojorquez told NMI. She said her mother then put the man on the phone.

“I asked him, but he wouldn’t tell me who he worked for. He just said he wanted to verify that she was a legitimate voter and he wanted to see her documents. I told him ‘No,’ and we argued for a little bit.

“He said ‘You have to realize we’re just trying to protect the people, we just want to make sure that she’s a legitimate voter and if she votes and she’s not supposed to, then it’s illegal.’

“He was pressuring me so much that I told him that she’s not going to do anything until she speaks to her attorney.”

Bojorquez said she asked the man several times whom he worked for. Eventually, she said, “He told me he worked for Pat Rogers.”

Rogers is the Republican attorney who also made claims of voter fraud in 2004 and 2006. He was cited in the federal Department of Justice report about the firing of U.S. attorneys as one of the New Mexico GOP activists who complained to the Department of Justice about then-U.S. Attorney David Iglesias.

By law, private investigators are licensed by the state Regulation and Licensing Department. According to the department’s Web site, there is an Alfredo Romero who has a current private investigator license. In addition, three men named Albert or Alberto Romero have current security guard licenses.

Jenais Griego told NMI that she too had been visited by a private investigator on Wednesday. Her grandmother, Emily Garcia, was one of the people whom Republicans described last week as an ineligible voter.

“I asked him if he had a badge and he pulled out a white and blue laminate card with his name on it,” Griego. “It wasn’t even a badge, but it said ‘Al Romero, private investigator.’ He came in and he started asking me about my grandmother and I was trying to tell him that she didn’t live here. He’s like ‘OK, so let me just write some stuff down.’”

Griego said that Romero asked her questions about her grandmother’s voter registration card; her grandmother lives in a trailer down the street, but receives her mail at the house, she said.

“It freaked me out when he got upset, when I did tell him that, regardless of what happens, my grandmother is voting and it’s OK for her to vote.”

“He tried to tell me to tell her to be careful when she’s voting. He was trying to tell me stuff to scare her from voting.”

Bojorquez also said her mother felt wary about the visit.

“My mom is confused because she doesn’t understand why she’s being put through this because she voted. She doesn’t trust anybody anymore,” Bojorquez said, requesting that her mother’s name not be published again.

These visits by Mr. Rogers’ investigator were also confirmed by Zachary Roth at TPMMuckraker:

Minority voters in New Mexico report to TPMMuckraker that a private investigator working with Republican party lawyer Pat Rogers has appeared in person at the homes of their family members, intimidating and confusing them about their right to vote in the general election.

* * *

The visits to minority voters by the P.I. appear to be connected to last week’s effort.

* * *

Guadalupe Bojorquez, who works in law enforcement in Albuquerque, told TPMmuckraker today that her mother, [name redacted], was one of the ten voters whose names were released by the GOP. After this happened, said Bojorquez, her mother had been contacted by the voter registration group ACORN. Bojorquez, with ACORN’s help, confirmed with the county clerk that her mother, who does not speak English, is indeed eligible to vote, and had been when she voted in June.

Nonetheless, Bojorquez said that her mother yesterday received a visit from a man who asked for her personal information, including an ID, in reference to her eligibility to vote. Bojorquez told TPMmuckraker that according to her mother, at one point the man asked what she would do if immigration authorities contacted her.

After Bojorquez’s mother, frightened, refused to let him in the door, the man waited outside her house. Eventually, Bojorquez’s brother arrived at the house, emboldening Bojorquez’s mother to go outside, call Bojorquez, and put her on the phone with the man.

Bojorquez said the man told her he wanted to make sure her mother knew that she shouldn’t be voting, and continued to ask for her mother’s personal information. When Bojorquez said that no information would be handed over unless the man revealed who he was employed by, he said he was a private investigator hired by Pat Rogers. He told Bojorquez his name was Al Romero, and left a number at which Bojorquez could contact him.

Bojorquez added that in fact, her mother has already voted in the general election, by absentee ballot — which she is eligible for because she has trouble walking — so Romero’s efforts on that front were in vain.

Another Albuquerque woman had a similar experience.

Jenais Griego told TPMmuckraker that yesterday, as she arrived home with her kids, a man in a beige Chevy Silverado pulled up, removed a notebook from his pocket, and said he was looking for Emily Garcia. Garcia is Griego’s grandmother — Griego said Garcia, who works as a home care-giver, lists Griego’s address for her mail — and, like [name redacted], was one of the voters named by the GOP last week as having voted fraudulently in June.

Griego said she allowed the man in, and when she asked him for identification, he pulled out a card that gave his name as Al Romero. She said the man had a redacted copy of Garcia’s voter registration form, and asked whether Garcia intended to vote. He said if she intended to do so, she needed to make sure she was properly registered.

As with Bojorquez and [name redacted], Griego said that Garcia had already confirmed after the GOP press conference that she was indeed a valid voter. An ACORN worker had come to her house to explain that the GOP had questioned her registration, and, along with Griego, they had contacted the county clerk to ensure that she could legitimately vote, and had done so in June.

So when Romero asked Griego whether Garcia intended to vote, Griego replied that she did. At that point, said Griego, Romero became “angry” and “upset,” and left abruptly.

Rogers did not return several calls from TPMmuckraker seeking comment. But last week he said that the state party had hired a private investigator in connection with vote fraud*. And asked yesterday by the New Mexico Independent about the confrontations with voters, he replied: “I have no interest in responding to ACORN’s accusation.”

Reached by TPMmuckraker at the phone number he provided to Bojorquez, Romero said he didn’t have time to talk about the matter. He did not respond to repeated follow-up calls.

*This sentence has been corrected from an earlier version.

In response, Project Vote has requested that New Mexico U.S. Attorney Gregory Fouratt begin investigating these allegations of voter intimidation and vote suppression, including the intimidation of Ms. Rivera, Ms. [name redacted], Ms. Garcia and Mr. “Francisco Martinez, 19, who registered to vote for the first time when volunteers came to his high school in May. Mr. Martinez said Monday that he felt like he was being bullied and intimidated out of his rights as an American. ‘This is my first time voting, and it’s important to me to be part of history,’ Mr. Martinez said.” In his October 23, 2008, letter to U.S. Attorney Fouratt requesting the investigation, Project Vote Election Counsel Donald Wine II wrote:

We here at Project Vote, on behalf of several voters of the State of New Mexico write to request an investigation into increased efforts to intimidate voters and suppress minority voters by representatives of the New Mexico Republican Party.

Members of the New Mexico Republican Party called a press conference last week where they named 10 Albuquerque residents as frauds who they allege voted illegally in the New Mexico primaries. ACORN made contact with 8 of the 10 voters on that list distributed by the New Mexico Republican Party. All of the voters identify as Democratic, all are minorities (9 of the 10 are Latino), and most of them are 18 or 19 years old. One of the voters is a new citizen who was naturalized in 2007 and was voting for the first time. ACORN found that all of the voters they contacted are legitimate voters that were eligible to vote and had no problems with their registrations.

Now that the Republicans have found that the people they alleged were frauds were in fact legitimate voters, they have begun to intimidate these voters. Already, 2 of the 10 voters have been visited by a private investigator in an effort to keep these voters silent. Also, the fact that all 10 of the voters that were named on this list were minority voters, 9 of which are Latino, as well as mostly younger voters, indicates a concerted effort to suppress the vote of a particular class of voters.

This form of intimidation and suppression is in direct violation of Section 12 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well as Section 2. We feel that the right of all Americans to vote is of the utmost importance, and if there is credible evidence of voter intimidation and suppression of a particular class of voters, it should be addressed and promptly prosecuted. We request that you conduct an immediate investigation into the attempts by the Republican Party of New Mexico to intimidate minority, first-time voters into not exercising their right to vote. To the extent that your investigation uncovers that any federal laws have also been violated, we ask that your office refer the matter to the proper federal authorities.

In addition to Mr. Wine’s allegations that Mr. Rogers’ and his investigator’s conduct violated federal law, Zachary Roth at TPMMuckraker also reports that Mr. Rogers’ and Mr. Romero’s conduct likely violates federal law:

Four separate experts on voting rights have confirmed to TPMmuckraker that the behavior of a private investigator apparently hired by a New Mexico Republican party lawyer, that we reported this morning, potentially violates federal voting laws.

Gerry Hebert, a former acting head of the voting rights section of the Department of Justice, told TPMmuckraker that the P.I.’s actions appear to violate the criminal section of the federal Voting Rights Act, which makes it a crime to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with a person attempting to vote. Hebert added that a separate statute makes it a crime to conspire to intimidate someone in exercising their right to vote — a provision that could apply to GOP lawyer Pat Rogers or others in the state party who may have been involved in the scheme.

“A matter like that ought to be reported to the DOJ immediately,” said Hebert, adding that he planned to do so.

Jon Greenbaum of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights agreed, and added that the activities detailed in TPMmuckraker’s report could violate both criminal and civil voting rights statutes. Greenbaum pointed to a civil provision of the Voting Rights Act which says that it violates the law to intimidate, threaten or coerce someone from voting or not voting.

Greenbaum too said he planned to pass on to the Department of Justice the claims made in our report.

Rick Hasen, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles and a noted expert on election law, also said that the behavior potentially violated the Voting Rights Act or other federal civil-rights statutes.

And Wendy Weiser, a voting-rights expert at the Brennan Center for Justice, further confirmed that take.

An Albuquerque woman told TPMmuckraker yesterday that a man identifying himself as a private investigator hired by Rogers came to her mother’s house Wednesday asking her mother for personal information and warning her not to vote if she wasn’t properly registered. A second woman in the same city provided a similar report to TPMmuckraker. The voters’ names had been publicly released last week by Rogers and others affiliated with the state party, who claimed that 28 mostly Hispanic people had voted fraudulently in June. It was later determined that many of the people whose names had been released were valid voters.

In spite of the evidence to the contrary, Mr. Rogers may claim that he has fulfilled his special responsibility for the quality of justice and may deny that he engaged in improper conduct or harbored improper motives. However, any such claims or denials are not determinative of whether or not he violated the law and the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct by using the law’s procedures to harass or intimidate others. Instead, whether he “actually supposed the fact in question to be true” or not, i.e., whether Mr. Rogers actually believes any denial of improper conduct, “may be inferred from circumstances” in which the alleged misconduct occurred. See Terminology, New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct. Even if Mr. Rogers actually believed his actions were proper, that belief would only be reasonable if “the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.” However, because “a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would [have] ascertain[ed]” that Mr. Rogers’ conduct was improper, Mr. Rogers should have known he was acting unethically.

Specifically, the circumstances existing nationally quash any inference that Mr. Rogers may believe that his conduct was appropriate:

It’s worth noting, in response to the news that the FBI has launched an investigation into whether ACORN was involved in a nationwide voter-registration fraud scheme, that the launch of the probe comes at a time national Republicans at several different levels have sought to make an issue out of ACORN — in some cases calling for just such an investigation.

Last week, John McCain told a Florida crowd:

“There are serious allegations of voter fraud in the battleground states across America. They must be investigated.” The GOP standard-bearer has continued to sound the alarm over ACORN since then, and brought it up at last night’s debate.

GOP House leader John Boehner last week called in a statement for ACORN to be de-funded — it is currently eligible for federal housing funds — and charged that over the years, ACORN “has committed fraud on our system of elections, making American voters question the fairness and accuracy of the exercise of their most fundamental right under the Constitution.”

Last week the RNC held at least five separate conference calls with reporters to stoke fears of voter fraud connected to ACORN.

And numerous state- and local-level Republicans have also in the last few weeks called publicly for authorities to look into ACORN.

What’s Behind the Feds’ ACORN Probe?, Zachary Roth, TPMMuckraker, October 16, 2008.

Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Rogers’ effort to suppress the vote in New Mexico in 2008 are nothing new. To the contrary, they are part of a multi-year, ongoing effort to challenge the voting rights of New Mexicans, as confirmed by Rep. John Conyers in his letter to United States Attorney General Michael Mukasey:

Mr. Rogers, however, appears repeatedly in the report on the U.S. Attorney firings, prepared by the Department’s Office of the Inspector General and Professional Responsibility, which documented his actions making flawed claims of voter fraud and bringing unwarranted pressure to bear on law enforcement officials, including Mr. Iglesias, in 2006.

On October 24, 2008, Zachary Roth at TPMMuckraker reported further on the circumstances surrounding Mr. Rogers’ conduct:

… Rogers’ role in pressing [fired U.S. Attorney David] Iglesias to pursue voter fraud prosecutions was extensive. According to the OIG report on the firings, Rogers set up a lunch meeting with Iglesias, and met with an FBI agent — among many other activities — to push the issue.

Perhaps most damagingly, the report contains a September 2004 email sent to Iglesias and several staffers for New Mexico’s GOP congressional delegation, in which Rogers admitted that he was interested in the issue in large part for its potential to help the GOP:

I believe the [voter] ID issue should be used (now) at all levels – federal, state legislative races and Heather [Wilson]’s race … You are not going to find a better wedge issue … I’ve got to believe the [voter] ID issue would do Heather more good than another ad talking about how much federal taxpayer money she has put into the (state) education system and social security … This is the single best wedge issue, ever in NM. We will not have this opportunity again … Today, we expect to file a new Public Records lawsuit, by 3 Republican legislators, demanding the Bernalillo county clerk locate and produce (before Oct 15) ALL of the registrations signed by the ACORN employee.

But Rogers is no mere local player on the Republican voter fraud team. He was on the board of the American Center for Voting Rights (ACVR), a fake think-tank which was little more than an effort by GOP operatives to offer an intellectual gloss to politically motivated claims of voter fraud — and which abruptly closed down operations in 2007.

ACVR was run by Mark “Thor” Hearne, who served as national election counsel to President Bush’s 2004 reelection campaign. Jim Dyke — who was the communications director of the Republican National Committee during the 2004 election, and went on to work for both the White House and for Vice President Cheney — was also involved.

Writing in Slate last year, election-law expert Rick Hasen described ACVR’s modus operandi:

Consisting of little more than a post-office box and some staffers who wrote reports and gave helpful quotes about the pervasive problems of voter fraud to the press, the group identified Democratic cities as hot spots for voter fraud, then pushed the line that “election integrity” required making it harder for people to vote. The group issued reports (PDF) on areas in the country of special concern, areas that coincidentally tended to be presidential battleground states. In many of these places, it now appears the White House was pressuring U.S. attorneys to bring more voter-fraud prosecutions.

Here’s Rogers, on behalf of ACVR, telling CNN back in 2004 about the need for “safeguards to make sure that citizens only are voting.”

And now this is the guy who’s involved in pushing voter fraud claims in connection with an investigation in which the FBI is already involved.

Clearly, the background and circumstances in this matter, however, do not permit the inference that Mr. Rogers believed his conduct was appropriate. Accordingly, Mr. Rogers has engaged in conduct that violates the following New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct:

16-102. Scope of representation.

* * *

D. Course of conduct. A lawyer shall not engage, or counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent or which misleads the court, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

* * *

16-116. Declining or terminating representation.

A. Mandatory disqualification. Except as stated in Paragraph C, a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:

(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

* * *

16-401. Truthfulness in statements to others.

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:

A. make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or

B. fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 16-106.

16-403. Dealing with unrepresented person.

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.

16-404. Respect for rights of third persons.

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.

16-503. Responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants.

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:

A. a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;

B. a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

C. a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved ; or

* * *

16-804. Misconduct.

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

A. violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

B. commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

C. engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

D. engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

* * *

H. engage in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

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Full Text of the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct violated by Mr. Rogers

E-mail to Matthew Garrett Davis

Crossposted here at Oxdown Gazette.

Matthew Garrett Davis
Witte Law Offices
119 E Kalamazoo St.
Lansing, MI 48933
Phone: (517) 281-9374
Fax: (517) 485-0187
foster5701@hotmail.com

Mr. Davis,

Please accept this e-mail as an offer to reply to criticisms leveled against you as a result of the complaint you filed on behalf James Carabelli against the Center for Independent Media, the Michigan Messenger, Eartha J. Melzer, Jefferson Morley and David S. Bennahum. As I’m sure you knew it would, the litigation you filed has generated a fair share of publicity.

On September 17, 2008, Rachel Breitman reported in The AmLaw Daily that the Obama campaign filed class action litigation on behalf of “three county residents whose homes are undergoing foreclosure” against the Macomb County Republican Party. Ms. Breitman also reported that: response to this class action you:

Matthew Davis of Witte Law Offices in Lansing responded to the Obama suit Wednesday by releasing a letter addressed to the Center for Independent Media on behalf of [Macomb County Republican Party Chairman James] Carabelli and the state party threatening a countersuit if the Messenger’s story is not retracted within seven days.

“Mr. Carabelli has said that the quote attributed to him was fabricated by the reporter who interviewed him,” Bill Nowling, communications director for the Michigan Republican Party, told The Am Law Daily. “This is a page right out of the Democrats’ playbook of tricks.”

But the Center for Independent Media was nonplussed by the threatened libel action, saying that this was only a tactic to distract from the Obama campaign’s claim.

“We still have received no letter from the Michigan Party Republicans at this point, but we stand by our story,” said David Bennahum, the center’s chief executive officer. The publication is represented by John Pomeranz, a partner at Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg in Washington. “No threatened suit can change the facts.” [Emphasis supplied.]

Because the Center for Independent Media did not retract the story, you followed through with the intentions stated in your demand letter and filed Mr. Carabelli’s lawsuit claiming both negligent and malicious defamation. Kate Klonick, Who’s Paying the Lawyer for the Michigan GOP Official?, TPMMuckraker, October 3, 2008.

In reviewing the news of this matter, Marcy Wheeler at emptywheel alleges the litigation you filed is a SLAPP* suit:

By all appearances (particularly given the confidence MM has in their story), this is a SLAPP suit designed to either cow MM, or the larger CIM organization, which has outlets in key swing states: Minnesota, Colorado, Iowa, New Mexico, and Washington (and employes [sic] Spencer Ackerman in their DC Independent site).

According to Professors George W. Pring and Penelope Canan of the University of Denver, SLAPP suits generally have four (4) criteria:

“[SLAPPs] (1) involve communications made to influence a government action or outcome, (2) which result in civil lawsuits (complaints, counterclaims, or cross-claims), (3) filed against non-governmental individuals or groups (4) on a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance.”

Under the circumstances as I understand them, I tend to agree with Ms. Wheeler. Please note, however, that I’ve been unable to find a copy of the complaint online, including at the Macomb County Clerk website. Accordingly, I haven’t had a chance to review the specific allegations contained in the complaint. With that caveat, however, it does appear that the litigation you filed on behalf of Mr. Carabelli is, in fact, a SLAPP suit:

  1. The subject of the specific reporting by Ms. Melzer is the stated intentions of the Macomb County Republican Party to challenge any Macomb County voter whose home is in foreclosure and to influence the Macomb County Supervisor of Elections into accepting these challenges as legitimate; s/counts any challenge(s) to any Macomb County voter whose home is in foreclosure; – as well as the Michigan Messenger, generally -
  2. The reporting has resulted in civil litigation;
  3. The litigation is filed against non-governmental individuals and groups: the Center for Independent Media, the Michigan Messenger, Eartha J. Melzer, Jefferson Morley and David S. Bennahum; and
  4. The subject of the litigation – the voting rights of Macomb County residents – is clearly a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance.

First, I would appreciate a copy of your demand letter to the Center for Independent Media, any reply you received to that letter and a copy of the complaint so I can better understand and evaluate this matter.

Second, the accusation that this lawsuit is a SLAPP suit necessarily infers that you are in violation of Rule 3.1, Meritorious Claims and Contentions, Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that:

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous. A lawyer may offer a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established. [Emphasis supplied.]

Comments to Rule 3.1 state, in part, that:

The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person. Likewise, the action is frivolous if the lawyer is unable either to make a good-faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. [Emphasis supplied.]

Did you consider Rule 3.1 and the comments before filing this suit? If so, how did you conclude that the litigation was not filed primarily for the purpose of delay? What is the reason, if not for the primary benefit of harassing the defendants, that you advised your client to litigate against media publications, reporters and other individuals instead of intervening in the Obama campaign class action lawsuit when both lawsuits are based on the same statements allegedly made by Mr. Carabelli? What actionable damages has Mr. Carabelli suffered as a result of the publication of Ms. Melzer’s article. When was the last time you read Rule 3.1 and the comments to the rule?

Third, in determining the standard to apply in determining whether a lawsuit is frivolous or not pursuant to MRPC 3.1, Michigan Ethics Opinion R-009 (October 26, 1990) considered, inter alia, the Michigan statute which taxes costs for frivolous claims, MCR 2.625(A)(2), which defines frivolous:

“(a) ‘Frivolous’ means that at least 1 of the following conditions is met:

“(i) The party’s primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the defense was to harass, embarass, or injure the prevailing party.

“(ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party’s legal position were in fact true.

“(iii) The party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit.” [Emphasis supplied.]

Michigan Ethics Opinion R-009 further states:

Two standards have developed over the years regarding frivolous claims: one is a subjective test which asks whether this lawyer knew that the client’s case was without merit; and, the other is an objective test which asks whether a reasonable lawyer would have known that the case was without merit.

Although MRPC 3.1 does not specifically identify the nature of the investigation the lawyer should undertake or which of the two tests it adopts, this Committee has held in previous opinions that the objective test of a “disinterested lawyer” should be used.

* * *

The objective standard requires the lawyer to inquire into all facts presented by the client which are, for instance, contradicted by readily available evidence. Refutable or contradictory evidence must be investigated by the lawyer to ascertain the validity of the client’s claim.

Were you aware of Michigan Ethics Opinion R-009 and the comments before filing this suit? If not, why didn’t you conduct any research into your ethical obligations regarding this matter? If you were aware of the opinion, and considering that there is evidence contradictory to your client’s claims, what investigation of these claims did you conduct prior to filing this suit, as required by Michigan Ethics Opinion R-009?

Fourth, have you represented any other plaintiff or defendant in any other litigation or matter in which you have been accused of engaging in SLAPP tactics?

Thank you for your attention to this matter. I look forward to your response.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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Employment of Kyle D. Sampson reflects poorly on Hunton & Williams, LLP, No.3

Updated March 10, 2009 to reflect Mr. Sampson’s leave of absence from Hunton & Williams.

Cross-posted at the Oxdown Gazette, Firedoglake’s new diary blog.

My third e-mail to Ms. Field:

Andrea Bear Field
DC Office Managing Partner
Hunton & Williams

cc: Kyle D. Sampson , Partner
Hunton & Williams

Dear Ms. Field,

On behalf of The Grievance Project, I would appreciate Hunton & Williams’s response to the following items:

1. The most recent United States Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility and Office of the Inspector General report, An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006, which describes* additional allegations of unethical conduct by Hunton & Williams partner Kyle D. Sampson.

Professor Marty Lederman succinctly summarizes this matter at Balkinization:

The basic thrust of the Report, as I understand it, is that Kyle Sampson was acting in cahoots with the White House Counsel’s Office to fire disfavored U.S. Attorneys — at least some for possibly impermissible reasons — and that AG Gonzales and others at DOJ therefore left the entire project up to Sampson, stepping in merely to rubberstamp whatever decisions he reached in accord with the Counsel’s Office.

Is this type of conduct typical at Hunton & Williams? If not, why does Hunton & Williams continue to condone and encourage this type of conduct through its partnership with Mr. Sampson?

2. The appointment of Nora Dannehy as Special Prosecutor to review this matter, including your partner’s apparently central involvement in this scandal.

Update: The Wall Street Journal’s Dan Slater has published a profile of Ms. Dannehy. (h/t emptywheel)

3. Like the previous report, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General, this most recent report again confirms my opinion that Mr. Sampson committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of both Utah and D.C that raise a substantial question as to his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law. Has Hunton & Williams reviewed whether Mr. Sampson’s conduct violated the Utah and D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct? If so, what was the conclusion of that review? If not, why not?

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

E.M./The Grievance Project

*Section C of the DOJ OPR/OIG report:

As discussed above, Sampson was the person most responsible for creating the removal plan, selecting the U.S. Attorneys to be removed, and implementing the plan. Yet, after the controversy over the removals erupted, Sampson attempted to downplay his role, describing himself as the “aggregator” and denying responsibility for placing several of the U.S. Attorneys on the list.

We concluded that from start to finish Sampson mishandled the removal process. And, as discussed above, he inappropriately advocated bypassing the Senate confirmation process for replacing U.S. Attorneys through a strategy of “gum[ming] this to death” and “run[ning] out the clock” while appearing to act in good faith.

We were also troubled by Sampson’s claims that he did not recall the reasons for many of the removals or who had recommended that certain U.S. Attorneys be removed. For example, while Sampson said he did not place Iglesias on the list at the request of the White House, his recollection on this issue was varying and vague. We question why Sampson could not recall the precise reason why he placed Iglesias on the removal list, given the relatively short passage of time since the incident, and the fact that Iglesias’s name alone was added, for the first time, to the November 2006 list. Moreover, other misleading after-the-fact explanations for why Iglesias was placed on the list caused us to further doubt the candor of Sampson’s explanations. In the end, we question whether Sampson provided us the full story about Iglesias’s placement on the list, as well as the reasons for other U.S. Attorney removals.

As discussed in the sections that follow, we also concluded that Sampson made various misleading statements about the U.S. Attorney removals to the White House, Congress, and other Department officials.

1. Misleading Statements to the White House

Sampson’s misleading statements about the U.S. Attorney removals began as the selection process was unfolding. He misrepresented to the White House how the selections occurred. In an e-mail to Harriet Miers in January 2006 forwarding a list of names to the White House, Sampson wrote, “I list
these folks based on my review” of the EARS evaluations, and “my interviews with officials in the Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, and the Criminal Division.” Sampson thus created the general impression that the EARS evaluations and his “interviews” of senior Department officials, including officials in the Criminal Division, formed the basis of his identification of specific U.S. Attorneys for removal.

However, Sampson admitted to us that he did not remember speaking to anyone in the Criminal Division about the performance of U.S. Attorneys, except “only in the most general terms.” He also acknowledged that he never reviewed any EARS evaluations. He told us that it would have been better if he had stated in the e-mail to Miers that it was based on his understanding of somebody else’s understanding of the reviews of the offices. [Footnote] 202[.] We believe that Sampson’s misleading statements to Miers gave the impression that the Department had engaged in a far more systematic and structured evaluation process to determine which U.S. Attorneys should be removed.

2. Misleading Statements to Congress

Sampson similarly misled congressional staff in his January 12, 2007, briefing that the removals were based on EARS evaluations. At this meeting, Sampson and Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legislative Affairs Richard Hertling briefed staff for Senators Patrick Leahy and Dianne Feinstein about the removals. Sampson told the Senators’ staffs that the Department had been engaged in a process to identify underperforming U.S. Attorneys and that the process included a review of the EARS evaluations. The two staff members for the Senators told us that Sampson initially explained that the terminations were based on the EARS evaluations, but backtracked when Feinstein’s counsel pressed him for copies. According to both staff members, Sampson then explained that some of the removals were based on EARS evaluations, and some on other factors such as caseloads and responsiveness to Department policy initiatives.

According to Hertling, who said he knew little about the controversy at the time, Sampson attempted to impress upon the congressional staff that the removals were the result of a process the Department undertook to identify U.S. Attorneys who were the “weakest performers,” and that the process included a review of EARS evaluations. Hertling told us that one of the things that stuck in his mind was Sampson’s “specific reference” to EARS evaluations as a basis for identifying these particular U.S. Attorneys for termination.

However, Sampson claimed to us that he mentioned the EARS evaluations only in connection with Ryan’s removal. He said that he doubted he would have suggested that the other removals were based on the EARS evaluations because “that wouldn’t have been accurate.” Yet, based upon the recollection of the other witnesses at the briefing, including Hertling, we believe that Sampson misled the congressional staff that EARS evaluations played a more significant role in the Department’s decision-making process than they actually did.

Second, Sampson included misleading statements in the Department’s response to a February 8, 2007, letter from several Senators asking for information about the circumstances of Cummins’s resignation and Griffin’s appointment. Sampson, who drafted the response and circulated it in the Department and the White House for comment, had the final sign-off on the language in the response.

The response, which was sent on February 23, 2007, contained three misleading statements. The first was the statement that “it was well-known, as early as December 2004, that Mr. Cummins intended to leave . . . .” As we noted in Chapter Five, we found evidence that in drafting the response Sampson discovered a small news item in a free weekly Arkansas tabloid reporting that Cummins might begin exploring career options before the expiration of President Bush’s second term. However, Cummins told us he did not intend to resign at that time and was not looking for other employment. We also found no evidence that anyone at the Department was aware of the article until February 2007.

The second misleading statement in the Department’s response was that “the decision to have Mr. Griffin replace Mr. Cummins was first contemplated in spring or summer of 2006 [and] the final decision to appoint Mr. Griffin . . . was made on or about December 15 . . .” This statement is directly contradicted by the January 9, 2006, e-mail Sampson sent to Miers in which Griffin is listed as a replacement for Cummins. The second part of the statement, that the final decision to appoint Griffin was made around December 15, is also misleading. As noted in Chapter Five, Sampson informed Goodling on August 18, 2006, that the Attorney General would appoint Griffin Interim U.S. Attorney following Griffin’s return to the Department.

The third misleading statement in the Department’s response was that “The Department is not aware of Karl Rove playing any role in the decision to appoint Mr. Griffin.” This statement is contradicted by Sampson’s e-mail on December 19, 2006, to Associate White House Counsel Christopher Oprison in which Sampson wrote, “I’m not 100 percent sure that Tim was the guy on which to test drive this authority, but know that getting him appointed was important to Harriet, Karl, etc.” While Sampson later explained this e-mail by stating that he “assumed” but did not know that Rove was involved in the decision to appoint Griffin, we found this explanation unpersuasive and belied by the evidence.

3. Misleading Department Officials

Sampson also misled Department officials and allowed them to mislead others about several aspects of the U.S. Attorney removals.

First, in mid-December 2006 after media reports began questioning the circumstances of Griffin’s appointment, Sampson drafted talking points for the Department’s Office of Public Affairs to use to respond to media inquiries. In these talking points, Sampson wrote that “Griffin was appointed Interim U.S. Attorney because of the timing of Cummins’s resignation.”

In fact, as Sampson knew, Cummins had been removed so that Griffin could take his place. The Department’s talking points left the misleading impression that Griffin was appointed as Interim U.S. Attorney because of the unexpected timing of Cummins’s resignation, when in fact Cummins was told to resign to create a position for Griffin.

Second and more important, Sampson’s failure to disclose what he knew about the White House’s involvement in the removals caused McNulty and Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General William Moschella to provide inaccurate testimony to Congress. Both McNulty and Moschella testified that based on what they knew at the time, the White House was not involved in the removals until October 2006 and at that point became involved only to sign off on the process.

Sampson was present at staff preparation sessions before both McNulty’s and Moschella’s congressional testimony where the group discussed what they should say in their testimony. Several other participants told us that the question about the White House’s involvement was raised during at least one of McNulty’s preparation sessions, and McNulty indicated that he would tell Congress that the White House was involved to sign off on the process because U.S. Attorneys are Presidential appointments. This was a misleading statement about the extent and timing of the White House’s role, which Sampson knew. However, Sampson did not correct McNulty’s mistaken belief or inform him of the full extent of the White House’s involvement.

Consequently, in a closed briefing session on February 14, 2007, McNulty told members of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the U.S. Attorney removal process began within the Department in September or October of 2006, and that the Department sent a list to the White House Counsel’s office in October and asked if they objected to the names. Similarly, Moschella testified incorrectly before a House Judiciary Subcommittee on March 6, 2007, based on what he had learned during the preparation sessions and from McNulty’s testimony, that the process to remove the U.S. Attorneys began in early October 2006 and that the White House eventually became involved in the removals, but only to sign off on the proposal because the U.S. Attorneys were Presidential appointees.

When we interviewed Sampson, he rationalized his not correcting the misimpression left at the preparation sessions by arguing that there were two separate phases of the process – the earlier “thinking” phase and the later “action” phase, and he said he was focused on the later action phase during the preparation sessions. We found Sampson’s testimony on this point not credible. Sampson sent three separate lists of U.S. Attorneys for removal to the White House for consideration before the fall of 2006. We believe that Sampson should have been more forthcoming at the preparation sessions about the White House’s involvement to ensure that McNulty and Moschella were aware of the facts and did not mislead Congress. Sampson’s failure to do so resulted in inaccurate and misleading testimony about a critical aspect of the controversy.

We concluded that Sampson engaged in misconduct by making misleading statements and failing to disclose important information to the White House, members of Congress, congressional staff, and Department officials concerning the reasons for the removals of the U.S. Attorneys and the extent of White House involvement in the removal process.

[Footnote] 202[:] However, even that would have been inaccurate because, as we noted in each of the U.S. Attorney chapters, with the exception of Ryan’s March 2006 EARS evaluation (which had not yet taken place), each of the EARS evaluations of the removed U.S. Attorneys was largely positive.

Report, pp. 346-351.

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E-mail to Robert H. Bork, Jr.

Robert H. Bork, Jr.
gonzalesfacts@gmail.com

Mr. Bork,

As the media contact for GonzalesFacts.com, I would request a response on the record to these allegations that Alberto Gonzales has engaged in conduct that calls into question his fitness to practice law. I have also previously requested a response from George J. Terwilliger III via this e-mail:

George J. Terwilliger III
White & Case LLP
701 13th Street NW
Washington, District of Columbia 20005
Telephone: 202-626-3628
Fax: 202-639-9355
gterwilliger@whitecase.com

Dear Mr. Terwilliger:

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys who, in the service of the government of the United States, have engaged in conduct that violates the rules of professional conduct with which each attorney must comply. I have prepared factual allegations of the conduct of various attorneys, including your client Alberto Gonzales, that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility. (I have also prepared complaints for Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, Lisa Murkowski, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Marie Goodling, Thomas W. Hartmann and Michael J. Elston.) The conduct of your client has violated several of the rules of professional conduct of the Texas Bar. His actions raise a substantial question as to his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

The purpose of this e-mail is to offer your client, or you on his behalf, the opportunity to respond to these allegations. I look forward to your response.

I look forward to your reply.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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George J. Terwilliger III replies to my e-mail. Sort of.

In my e-mail to George J. Terwilliger III, I offered Mr. Gonzales and Mr. Terwilliger the opportunity to respond to my allegations that Mr. Gonzales has engaged in conduct which brings into question his fitness to practice law. Mr. Terwilliger has taken the opportunity to reply to my post:*

WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ — “The report confirms that Judge Gonzales provided Congress with a truthful account of his knowledge of and involvement in the dismissal of US attorneys.

“The report makes clear that Judge Gonzales engaged in no wrongful or improper conduct while recognizing, as he has acknowledged many times, that the process for evaluating US attorney performance in this instance was flawed,” Terwilliger said.

“In our submission to the Department on this matter, we noted that the OIG is without jurisdiction to second guess presidential personnel decisions. Unfortunately, the report spends hundreds of pages doing just that, but nonetheless reports no evidence of an improper motivation or action in removing these US attorneys. It seems rather odd, then, that rather than bring the investigation to a close, the Department would escalate the matter to the attention of a prosecutor when its own policies require preliminary evidence of a criminal violation before initiating a criminal investigation.”

“My family and I are glad to have the investigation of my conduct in this matter behind us and we look forward to moving on to new challenges,” Judge Gonzales said.

Related links: http://www.GonzalesFacts.com

SOURCE George J. Terwilliger, III

Take a few moments to read Mr. Terwilliger’s submission to the Department. This is a good example of how to defend a client against allegations of illegal conduct when that client is, in fact, demonstrably guilty of those allegations. After 41 pages of smoke, mirrors and legal sleight of hand in his submission to the Department, Mr. Terwilliger is only able to reach these conclusions:

The Department’s flawed response to public criticism of the removal of certain U.S. Attorneys tended to obscure the unassailable conclusion that all U.S. Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President and, accordingly, may be removed by the President for any reason, or no reason at all. Because this controversy has offered ample evidence of the efficacy of the available political checks on U.S. Attorney removals perceived to be improper, and because there is no evidence of “improper reasons” for any of the recommended removals, there is no basis to conclude that it is necessary to alter the current balance of political power whereby U.S. Attorneys are nominated by the President, confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate, and subject to removal by the President at any time.

The established balance of political power renders immaterial the underlying reasons for the removal of individual U.S. Attorneys, absent credible evidence of removal to improperly influence the conduct of a case. Instead, the OIG and OPR review could, we respectfully submit, provide the most benefit to the Department by examining the manner in which the Department responded to public criticism of the firings, specifically: (1) the manner in which information was shared within the Department; (2) the protocols for the drafting and submitting of Department statements to members of Congress, congressional committees, and the media; and (3) the manner in which senior Department officials were prepared for sworn testimony. Failures in all of these areas severely handicapped the Department’s ability to rebut allegations of politicization, and besmirched not only the reputations of political employees, but also the reputations of the many extraordinary career employees that continue to be the mainstay of the Department’s effectiveness in discharging the Department’s considerable responsibilities to the American people.

Most importantly, the OIG and OPR review provides an opportunity to reassure Congress and the public that there is no evidence that the U.S. Attorneys in question were removed in order to improperly allow partisan political considerations to compromise the independence of U.S. Attorneys in the execution of their responsibility to secure the fair administration of justice on matters within their purview.

(Footnotes omitted.)

According to Mr. Terwilliger, there is no evidence that Mr. Gonzales committed any improper act. Therefore, the OPR and OIG investigations should have, “examin[ed] the manner in which the Department responded to public criticism of the firings” which “could, [h]e respectfully submit

the parameter id is missing

, provide the most benefit to the Department.” Mr. Terwilliger’s argument distills down to this: “There’s nothing to see here. Go review internal DoJ office procedures instead. Then you can publicly announce that there’s nothing to see here.”

The link to GonzalesFacts.com that Mr. Terwilliger provides in his statement is also worth reading. In addition to his most recent statement, the What’s New page contains numerous other posts and statements. Interestingly, the media contact for GonzalesFacts.com is Robert H. Bork, Jr. You can also make a donation to Mr. Gonzales’ legal defense here – but please don’t.

*Well, sort of. Mr. Terwilliger’s response is via a link that is added to my post by a WordPress feature that automatically generates and embeds links that are ‘possibly related’ to the original post.

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E-mail to George J. Terwilliger III, counsel to Alberto Gonzales

George J. Terwilliger III
White & Case LLP
701 13th Street NW
Washington, District of Columbia 20005
Telephone: 202-626-3628
Fax: 202-639-9355
gterwilliger@whitecase.com

Dear Mr. Terwilliger:

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys who, in the service of the government of the United States, have engaged in conduct that violates the rules of professional conduct with which each attorney must comply. I have prepared factual allegations of the conduct of various attorneys, including your client Alberto Gonzales, that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility. (I have also prepared complaints for Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, Lisa Murkowski, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Marie Goodling, Thomas W. Hartmann and Michael J. Elston.) The conduct of your client has violated several of the rules of professional conduct of the Texas Bar. His actions raise a substantial question as to his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

The purpose of this e-mail is to offer your client, or you on his behalf, the opportunity to respond to these allegations. I look forward to your response.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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Virginia lawyers file grievance against Monica Marie Goodling

As reported by Frank Green in the Richmond Times Dispatch (h/t Debra Cassens Weiss at the ABA Journal via Matt Berman at TPMMuckaker ) on September 16, 2008, attorney William R. Wilder prepared a grievance complaint against Monica Marie Goodling and he and several other attorneys filed the complaint with the Virginia Bar:

Monica Goodling resigned as the department’s liaison to the White House last year. A Justice Department investigation recently concluded that she violated civil-service law and department policy by considering political affiliations in hiring decisions.

Lawyer William R. Wilder, who drafted the complaint signed by a dozen other lawyers, said yesterday he was concerned about Goodling’s conduct and that she has apparently not been charged with a crime or disciplined elsewhere.

The Sept. 8 letter to the state bar alleges that Goodling violated at least two rules of professional conduct and asks that the state bar start a disciplinary investigation.

I sent this e-mail to Mr. Wilder thanking him for preparing and filing the complaint, advising him of the complaints I prepared against Ms. Goodling as well as Michael J. Elston, a fellow member of the Virginia Bar and requesting to discuss these matters with him. I also copied Ms. Goodling’s attorney, John M. Dowd , Esq.

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E-mail to William R. Wilder

William R. Wilder, Esq.
Baptiste & Wilder, P.C.

Mr. Wilder,

Thank you for preparing the complaint against Monica Marie Goodling and filing it with the Virginia Bar. Legal ‘professionals’ of the likes of Ms. Goodling have severely damaged the reputation and effectiveness of our legal system. I believe that the rehabilitation of the standing of our profession will require that attorneys like yourself file complaints regarding these unethical actions with the appropriate bar associations.

To encourage the filing of complaints like yours, I started The Grievance Project on October 1, 2007, nearly one (1) year ago, to provide both the resources any person needs to file a grievance against any attorney in any state as well as to prepare and encourage the filing of grievance complaints against deserving attorneys in the service of the federal government. For example, I prepared this complaint against Ms. Goodling last month. I would encourage you to review the complaint and, if you wish, to use it to supplement the complaint you filed.

Additionally, I have prepared a complaint against Michael J. Elston who is also a member of the Virginia Bar to supplement the complaint that CREW has filed against Mr. Elston because their complaint did not include allegations of his involvement in the US Attorney firing scandal. I would also encourage you to review and consider filing my complaint against Mr. Elston to supplement the CREW complaint. If you are interested, I would like to further discuss these matters with you.


E.M.

cc: John M. Dowd, Esq., attorney for Monica Marie Goodling, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
clerk@vsb.org

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E-mail to Michael J. Elston

Michael J. Elston
McGuire Woods, LLP
Washington Square, 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1200
Washington, District of Columbia 20036-5317
Telephone: 202-857-1700
Fax: 202-857-1737
melston@mcguirewoods.com

Dear Mr. Elston,

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, Lisa Murkowski, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Marie Goodling, Thomas W. Hartmann and, now, yourself. In addition to the allegations in the complaint recently filed against you in Virginia by CREW, your conduct in the firing of the United States Attorneys also violated several of the rules of professional conduct of the Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia Bars. These actions also raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct in your handling of both the firing of the United States Attorneys and hiring practices at DoJ violated your ethical obligations as a member of the Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia Bars.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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Michael J. Elston

On July 7, 2008, CREW filed a complaint against Michael J. Elston with the Virginia Bar for his role in the illegal politicization of hiring practices at the Department of Justice. However, CREW did not file a complaint with the Illinois, Kansas or Missouri Bars, jurisdictions in which Mr. Elston is also admitted, as explained here, but only sent these associations a copy of the Virginia complaint. More importantly, because the CREW complaint addressed only the illegal politicization of hiring practices at the Department of Justice, CREW notably failed to address Mr. Elston’s role in the politicized firing of several sitting United States Attorneys. As set forth below, Mr. Elston is also in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia regarding his role in the United States Attorney firings.

Personal Information:

  • Name: Michael J. Elston, Partner, McGuireWoods LLP
  • Washington Square, 1050 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Suite 1200
    Washington, District of Columbia 20036-5317
  • Telephone: 202-857-1700, Fax: 202-857-1737

Bar Information: Illinois

  • ID No.: N/A
  • Date of Admission as Lawyer by Illinois Supreme Court: November 10, 1994
  • Registered Business Address: Mcguirewoods LLP
    1750 Tysons Blvd, Suite 1800
    McLean, VA 22102-4231
  • Registered Business Phone: (703) 712-5366
  • Illinois Registration Status: Active and authorized to practice law
  • Last Registered Year: 2008
  • Malpractice Insurance: (Current as of date of registration; consult attorney for further information) In annual registration, attorney reported that he/she has malpractice coverage.
  • Public Record of Discipline and Pending Proceedings: None

Grievance Information: Illinois

Bar Information: Kansas

  • ID No.: N/A
  • Status: Unknown
  • On July 2, 2008, Amanda Provorse, Attorney Registration, responded to my e-mail request for Mr. Elston’s status with the Kansas Bar that “Mr. Elston is currently active and in good standing. He was admitted 9/29/1998.”

Grievance Information: Kansas

Bar Information: Missouri

Grievance Information: Missouri

Bar Information: Virginia

  • ID No.: N/A
  • Status: Active
  • Registered Address: 1750 Tysons Boulevard, Suite 1800, McLean, VA 22102-4215
  • Registered Phone: 703-712-5366 and Fax: 703-712-5215
  • Member class: Active

Grievance Information: Virginia

While reviewing this matter, it is important to keep in mind that the privilege to practice law imposes duties and responsibilities on each attorney who accepts a license to practice law. These obligations are described in the Preamble to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct :

The practice of law is a public trust. Lawyers are the trustees of the system by which citizens resolve disputes among themselves, punish and deter crime, and determine their relative rights and responsibilities toward each other and their government. Lawyers therefore are responsible for the character, competence and integrity of the persons whom they assist in joining their profession; for assuring access to that system through the availability of competent legal counsel; for maintaining public confidence in the system of justice by acting competently and with loyalty to the best interests of their clients; by working to improve that system to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing society; and by defending the integrity of the judicial system against those who would corrupt, abuse or defraud it.

To achieve these ends the practice of law is regulated by the following rules. Violation of these rules is grounds for discipline.

* * *

The quality of the legal profession can be no better than that of its members. Lawyers must exercise good judgment and candor in supporting applicants for membership in the bar.

Lawyers also must assist in the policing of lawyer misconduct. The vigilance of the bar in preventing and, where required, reporting misconduct can be a formidable deterrent to such misconduct, and a key to maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the profession as a whole in the face of the egregious misconduct of a few.

These obligations are also expressly stated in the Preamble to the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, the Preamble to the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct and the Preamble to the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, which provide, in part, that

A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges,
other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.

* * *

The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or selfinterested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.

It is also important to bear in mind that although Mr. Elston denies improper motives or conduct, his denials and protestation must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. As noted in the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, for Mr. Elston to believe that his conduct was proper, he must have “actually supposed the fact in question to be true” (which belief “may be inferred from circumstances”) and for that belief to be reasonable requires “that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.” Additionally, because “a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question” to be improper, Mr. Elston reasonably should have known that his conduct was improper.

As detailed more specifically below, Mr. Elston’s conduct violated the following the following rules of professional conduct:

Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct:

Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct

Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct

Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct

File a grievance against Mr. Elston

  1. Print, complete and sign the official Complaint Form for Illinois, Kansas, Missouri (or .pdf) and/or Virginia (or .pdf );
  2. Print and attach this page to the Complaint Form; and
  3. Mail the complaint to the address noted on the Complaint Form.

Allegation: Michael J. Elston engaged in conduct that was a violation of federal laws that prohibit the obstruction of justice when he threatened four (4) recently-resigned United States Attorneys.

Michael J. Elston’s participation in the scheme to fire multiple United States Attorneys is at least unethical, if not actually criminal. As set out in greater detail below, Mr. Elston’s role in the firing of numerous United States Attorneys included placing telephone calls to several of these U.S. Attorneys in which he conveyed the threat that the Department of Justice would publicly attack the U.S. Attorneys if they chose to testify to the United States House and Senate. As reported by Paul Kiel at TPMMuckraker on May 2, 2007,

U.S. Attorney for Arizona Paul Charlton told Congress that Michael Elston, the chief of staff to Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, called him and warned him to remain silent. “I believe that Elston was offering me a quid pro quo agreement: my silence in exchange for the Attorney General’s,” Charlton wrote in answer to questions from the House Judiciary Committee.

Charlton did not expound on the conversation in his answer, only saying that the call occurred after the firing on December 7th, but before the attorney general testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 18th of this year.

It’s not the first time that Elston has been accused by one of the fired U.S. attorneys of trying to intimidate them into silence. Two others have said the same thing.

U.S. Attorney for Little Rock Bud Cummins testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that Elston had made a similar call to him in mid-February. Cummins produced an email written the day of the call that clearly laid out the threatening undercurrent to Elston’s message.

And U.S. Attorney for Seattle John McKay has said that he got a call from Elston in December. Newsweek reported that McKay says “he also got a phone call from a ‘clearly nervous’ Elston asking if he intended to go public: ‘He was offering me a deal: you stay silent and the attorney general won’t say anything bad about you.’” (Emphasis supplied.)

Prior to this article, Mr. Kiel had reported on the contents of Mr. Cummins’ e-mail on March 7, 2007:

In a February 19th article in The Washington Post, Cummins was quoted on the firings:

“They’re [the Justice Department] entitled to make these changes for any reason or no reason or even for an idiotic reason,… But if they are trying to suggest that people have inferior performance to hide whatever their true agenda is, that is wrong. They should retract those statements.”

The next day, Cummins got a call from Elston. And very unfortunately for the Justice Department, Cummins sent out an email no more than an hour after the call to the other fired prosecutors (you can see it here):

The essence of his message was that they feel like they are taking unnecessary flak to avoid trashing each of us specifically or further, but if they feel like any of us intend to continue to offer quotes to the press, or organize behind the scenes congressional pressure, then they would feel forced to somehow pull their gloves off and offer public criticisms to defend their actions more fully…. I was tempted to challenge him and say something movie-like such as “are you threatening ME???”, but instead I kind of shrugged it off…

Cummins, a lifelong Republican, continues in the email to refer to Elston’s “threat of retaliation” and the “threatening undercurrent in the call.” So it was abundantly clear to him that he was being threatened.

The most inflammatory part of the email is Cummins’ description of Elston’s reaction to the idea of the fired prosecutors testifying before Congress:

“He reacted quite a bit to the idea of anyone voluntarily testifying and it seemed clear that they would see that as a major escalation of the conflict meriting some kind of unspecified form of retaliation.”

Mr. Kiel also reported on these comments from fired U.S. Attorney John McKay:

Now another prosecutor, Seattle’s John McKay, says he got a similar call much earlier, before the firings had even been reported. From Newsweek:

After McKay was fired in December, he says he also got a phone call from a “clearly nervous” Elston asking if he intended to go public: “He was offering me a deal: you stay silent and the attorney general won’t say anything bad about you.”

Murray Waas of the National Journal reported on May 3, 2007 these details regarding Mr. Elston’s conduct:

The U.S. attorneys have said that Elston, in effect, told them that if they kept quiet about their dismissals, the Justice Department would not suggest that they had been forced to resign because of poor performance.

* * *

McKay, who was the first of the prosecutors whom Elston called, described Elston’s message to him: “The attorney general was not going to disclose that I or the other U.S. attorneys were fired or forced to resign.… ‘We have no intention of naming people.’”

McKay said that Elston never specifically suggested an explicit quid pro quo whereby Justice officials would not say that McKay had been fired for cause or poor performance if McKay did not talk to the media or Congress about his firing. However, McKay said, “a reasonable person would have felt both offended and threatened” by Elston’s call.

McKay said that the message he took away from the conversation was, “If you remain silent, we will not out you as someone who was forced to resign.”

McKay said that he made contemporaneous notes of his conversation with Elston, and dated them — something, he said, that was not his ordinary practice. He did so because of his concerns about what Elston was telling him, according to McKay.

Charlton said he got a similar phone call from Elston on the same day. In formal response to written questions posed to him by the House Judiciary Committee, Charlton said, “I believe that Elston was offering me a quid pro quo agreement: my silence in exchange for the attorney general’s.”

Cummins testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 6, at which time a contemporaneous e-mail he wrote within an hour of his phone call with Elston was released. In the e-mail, which he sent to five of his fellow prosecutors, Cummins said that the “essence of [Elston's] message” was that if any of the fired U.S. attorneys had pressed their case in the media or before Congress, senior aides to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales might “feel forced to somehow pull their gloves off” and accuse the prosecutors of ineptitude or poor management.

Cummins also wrote in his e-mail that Elston had called him because he was upset about comments Cummins had made in the press about his firing. “[Justice officials] feel like they are taking unnecessary flak to avoid trashing each of us,” Cummins said in the e-mail to his fellow prosecutors. “I also made it a point to tell him that all of us have turned down multiple invitations to testify. He reacted quite a bit to the idea of anyone voluntarily testifying, and it seemed clear that they would see this as a major escalation of the conflict meriting some kind of unspecified form of retaliation.”

McKay, one of the prosecutors who got the e-mail, said: “[Cummins] wanted to send a message to all of us. We got that message, loud and clear: If you talk to the press or go to Congress, the Department of Justice will not consider you a friend. I considered it an act of intimidation.”

* * *

At the March 6 Senate Judiciary hearing, Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I., asked Cummins and three others U.S. attorneys what they would have done in their capacity as federal prosecutors had they learned that an interested party in one of their investigations had tried to discourage a witness from providing information or testifying. All four said that they would have investigated the matter to determine a possible obstruction of justice.

“Mr. Cummins, let me ask you first. I’d like to ask you to put your U.S. attorney hat back on,” Whitehouse said. “You’re still in office, and think of a significant grand jury investigation that you led as United States attorney in your district. And consider that a significant witness in that grand jury investigation has just come into your office to relate to you that prior to his grand jury testimony he was approached about his testimony and [told]… essentially exactly the words that Mr. Elston approached you. What would your next step be as United States attorney?”

Cummins responded: “We take intimidation of witnesses very seriously in the Department of Justice and the U.S. attorney’s office, so we would be very proactive in that situation.”

Attempting to moderate his statement, he added: “I would qualify that by saying that at the time this discussion was had, we weren’t under a subpoena; the idea of testifying was just kind of a theoretical idea out there. And I would say … to the extent we talked about testimony at all, it was the idea that running out and volunteering to be part of this would not be viewed charitably by the people that it would affect.”

Whitehouse pressed Cummins: “But if that sort of approach had been made to a witness in an active proceeding that you were leading, and you were extremely proactive about it, that would lead you where?”

“Well, we’d certainly investigate it and see if a crime had occurred.”

“And the crime would be?”

Cummins responded: “Obstruction of justice. I think there are several statutes that might be implicated — but obstruction of justice.”

Whitehouse posed the same question to John McKay, the fired U.S. attorney from Washington state.

McKay responded: “I would be discussing it with the assigned prosecutor and federal agents.”

“With regard to?”

“With regard to possible obstruction of justice.”

Whitehouse next put the question to David Iglesias, the fired U.S. attorney from New Mexico:

Iglesias replied: “Same answer, sir. I would contact the career [assistant U.S. attorney] and probably the FBI and talk about what’s the evidence we have to maybe move forward on an obstruction investigation.

Finally, Whitehouse looked toward Carol Lam, the fired U.S. attorney from San Diego.

She answered without hesitation: “Fundamentally the same answer: witness intimidation.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Lara Jakes Jordan adds in this article on June 16, 2007:

“I believe that Elston was offering me a quid pro quo agreement: my silence in exchange for the attorney general’s,” wrote Paul Charlton, the former U.S. attorney in Nevada.

John McKay, former top prosecutor in Seattle, said he perceived a threat from Elston during his call. And Carol Lam, who was U.S. attorney in San Diego, said that “during one phone call, Michael Elston erroneously accused me of ‘leaking’ my dismissal to the press, and criticized me for talking to other dismissed U.S. attorneys.”

A fourth former U.S. attorney, Bud Cummins in Little Rock, Ark., had made a similar accusation in an e-mail released in March. At the time, Elston said he was “shocked and baffled” that his Feb. 20 conversation with Cummins could be interpreted as threatening.

Finally, Dan Eggen and Amy Goldstein report in the Washington Post on June 16, 2007:

Former U.S. attorney John McKay of Seattle told Congress that on Jan. 17 — before McKay stepped down — he received a call from Elston that he “greatly resented.” He said Elston attempted to “buy my silence by promising that the attorney general would not demean me in his Senate testimony.”

“My handwritten and dated notes of this call,” McKay told Congress, “reflect that I believed Mr. Elston’s tone was sinister and that he was prepared to threaten me further if he concluded I did not intend to continue to remain silent about my dismissal.”

Paul K. Charlton, who was the U.S. attorney in Phoenix, said that he, too, received a call that day in which Elston offered “a quid pro quo agreement: my silence in exchange for the attorney general’s.” Another former prosecutor, Carol C. Lam of San Diego, said Elston accused her of “leaking” word of her dismissal to the press “and criticized me for talking to other dismissed U.S. attorneys.”

Former U.S. attorney Bud Cummins of Little Rock also recounted a Feb. 20 conversation with Elston that Cummins said contained a “threatening undercurrent” warning that Justice Department officials would retaliate if he or his colleagues spoke to journalists or volunteered to testify in Congress.

As described by fired United States Attorneys John McKay, Bud Cummins, Paul Charlton and Carol Lam and as reported in the public record as noted above, the conduct of Mr. Elston clearly establishes that he committed criminal or deliberately wrongful acts that reflects adversely on the his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness to practice law. Additionally, Mr. Elston clearly engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Allegation 2:

Michael J. Elston engaged in conduct that was a violation of federal laws that prohibit politicization of hiring within the Department of Justice when he selected candidates for employment based on political criteria.

As described in thisletter to Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, and The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives from A Group of Concerned Department of Justice Employees, dated April 9, 2007, Mr. Elston engaged in conduct that was a violation of federal hiring laws:

Needless to say, many people were upset and confused. Why had so many potential interviewees been removed from the list? [Italics in original] Top supervisors requested answers, and on December 5 a meeting was held with Michael Ellston [sic], Chief of Staff to Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty. Many division attorneys and staff were present, and Mr. Ellston [sic] was offensive to the point of insulting. Claiming that the entire group had not “done their jobs” in reviewing applicants, he said that he had a “screening panel” go over the list and research these candidates on the Internet; he refused to give the names of those on his “panel.” Mr. Ellston [sic] said that people were struck from the list for three reasons:grades, spelling errors on applications, and inappropriate information about them on the Internet, When the meeting attendees protested that these interviewees had excellent grades, Mr. Ellston [sic]replied that a Harvard graduate in the bottom half of the class was more desirable than the top students at a second-tier law schools. Although Mr. Ellston [sic] stated that he would entertain appeals to his decisions, few of these appeals were granted.

When division personnel staff later compared the remaining interviewees with the candidates struck from the list, one common denominator appeared repeatedly: most of those struck from the list had interned for a Hill Democrat, clerked for a Democratic judge, worked for a “liberal” cause, or otherwise appeared to have “liberal” leanings. Summa cum laude graduates of both Yale and Harvard were rejected for interviews. There are also reports that officials at Harvard’s Career Placement Office called DOJ personnel to ask why their students were not getting interviews and also to ask why decisions had not yet been made about the Summer Law Intern Program.

These allegations were confirmed by the United States Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility and Office of the Inspector Generals in their report,An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring in the Department of Justice Honors Program and Summer Law Intern Program, which provided the following details regarding Mr. Elston’s conduct:

…. However, we believe the most significant misconduct was committed by ELSTON, the head of the Screening Committee. ELSTON failed to take appropriate action when he learned that McDonald was routinely deselecting candidates on the basis of what she perceived to be the candidates’ liberal affiliations. We also concluded that ELSTON deselected some candidates – and allowed the deselection of others – based on impermissible considerations.

* * *

As explained below, we concluded that ELSTON violated federal law and Department policy by deselecting candidates based on their liberal affiliations. First, the data analysis indicates that highly qualified candidates with liberal or Democratic Party affiliations were deselected at a much higher rate than highly qualified candidates with conservative or Republican Party affiliations. Second, ELSTON admitted that he may have deselected candidates in a few instances due to their affiliations with certain liberal causes. ELSTON also was unable in specific cases to give a credible reason as to why highly qualified candidates with liberal or Democratic Party affiliations were deselected.

While ELSTON generally denied that he considered political or ideological affiliations in evaluating candidates, he admitted when questioned about certain candidates that he considered aspects of those candidates’ ideological affiliations in his evaluation. ….

In addition, ELSTON consistently was unable to provide credible explanations as to why he denied the appeals of the highly qualified candidates who had liberal or Democratic Party affiliations. His proffered reasons were also inconsistent with other statements he made or actions he took. ….

Similarly, we did not find credible ELSTON’s explanation that he may have denied the appeal of a highly qualified candidate who had worked for the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military because he concluded the candidate would not “stand up for the law with respect to sentencing and Department policy” due to the statement in her essay that she would be able to exercise prosecutorial discretion as a federal prosecutor. We also did not credit ELSTON’s other explanation for denying this candidate – that she was not academically qualified because she was in the top third rather than the top quarter of her class at Stanford Law – since it was inconsistent with his actions in approving other candidates from lower-tier law schools with lower grades. During his interview, ELSTON also frequently pointed to lines in candidates’ essays that may have been a basis for deselecting candidates because he said these statements could be indications that the candidates would improperly follow their own consciences rather than the Department’s policies. These included statements such as the candidate wanting to work for the Department because the job would allow the candidate “to consider what is best for my country.”

In addition to ELSTON’s failure to provide credible explanations for his actions during his interview, we concluded that ELSTON was not candid with others in the Department who questioned him during the hiring process about why candidates were being deselected. ….

Moreover, ELSTON tried to minimize his role in selecting candidates when he was questioned by others about the Committee’s decisions. ELSTON frequently explained that other Committee members had been responsible for the decisions and described his role as a conduit. However, the evidence demonstrated that he was casting the deciding vote on a significant number of candidates that Fridman had approved and McDonald had rejected.

In sum, we found that ELSTON was aware that McDonald was rejecting candidates based on her perception of the candidates’ political or ideological affiliations and that he failed to intervene, discuss it with her, or stop her from doing so. We also concluded that ELSTON committed misconduct, and violated federal law and Department policy, when he deselected candidates and denied appeals based on his perception of the political or ideological affiliations of the candidates.

* * *

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

* * *

The documentary evidence and witness interviews also support the conclusion that two members of the 2006 Screening Committee, Esther Slater McDonald and Michael ELSTON, took political or ideological affiliations into account in deselecting candidates in violation of Department policy and federal law. For example, the evidence showed that McDonald wrote disparaging statements about candidates’ liberal and Democratic Party affiliations on the applications she reviewed and that she voted to deselect candidates on that basis.

We also found that ELSTON, the head of the 2006 Screening Committee, failed to take appropriate action when he learned that McDonald was routinely deselecting candidates on the basis of what she perceived to be the candidates’ liberal affiliations. The evidence also showed that ELSTON himself deselected some candidates – and allowed the deselection of others – based on impermissible considerations. Despite his initial denial in our interview that he did not consider such inappropriate factors, he later admitted in the interview that he may have deselected candidates in a few instances due to their affiliation with certain causes. In addition, ELSTON was unable to give a credible reason as to why specific highly qualified candidates with liberal or Democratic credentials were deselected.

We concluded that, as a result of the actions of McDonald and ELSTON, many qualified candidates were deselected by the Screening Committee because of their perceived political or ideological affiliations. We believe that McDonald’s and ELSTON’s conduct constituted misconduct and also violated the Department’s policies and civil service law that prohibit discrimination in hiring based on political or ideological affiliations.

However, because both McDonald and ELSTON have resigned from the Department, they are no longer subject to discipline by the Department for their actions. Nevertheless, we recommend that the Department consider the findings in this report should either McDonald or ELSTON apply in the future for another position with the Department.

[Footnote] 59 However, we found evidence that McDonald knew that using political and ideological affiliation was inappropriate, but did it anyway. As noted above, in an e-mail dated October 25, 2006, unrelated to the Honors Program and SLIP, McDonald advised a friend applying for a career position with the Department “there’s not much I can do apart from recommending you because there are legal constraints on career hiring to ensure that it’s not political.”

[Footnote] 60 Although ELSTON stated that he did not know whether McDonald’s no votes were actually based upon the negative comments she was making about the candidates’ liberal affiliations, we found that statement disingenuous. Fridman told ELSTON that McDonald was doing this, and the notations on the applications, which ELSTON recognized as McDonald’s handwriting, showed that McDonald was circling and commenting on these groups. Moreover, many of these candidates had stellar credentials, and there was no other apparent reason for McDonald recommending their deselection.

[Footnote] 61 OPR Counsel H. Marshall Jarrett recused himself from the evaluation of DeFalaise’s conduct.

(Emphasis supplied.)

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Text of the Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct violated by Mr. Elston.

Thomas W. Hartmann

After summarizing multiples instances in which Thomas W. Hartmann’s conduct raises the question as to his fitness to practice law, Scott Horton concludes with this comment:

For an attorney to be formally admonished and removed from legal proceedings twice for unprofessional conduct is an extraordinary matter. However, Hartmann is defiant, insisting that his actions are proper. One wonders if the disciplinary authorities of the Connecticut[, Illinois and/or Missouri] bar[s] are following these developments.

While this question is more than appropriate to ask, it can be made moot if and when a grievance is filed against Mr. Hartmann. To do so, simply:

  1. Print, complete and sign the official Complaint Form for Illinois and Missouri (or .pdf);
  2. Print and attach this page to the Complaint Form; and
  3. Mail the complaint to the address noted on the Complaint Form.

Personal Information:

  • Bar: Illinois
    • Full Licensed Name: Thomas W. Hartmann
    • Date of Admission as Lawyer by Illinois Supreme Court: April 29, 2002
    • Registered Business Address:
      DOD General Counsel

      595 Summer St., Suite 300
      Stamford, CT 06901-1407
    • Registered Business Phone: (703) 699-2761
    • Illinois Registration Status: Active and authorized to practice law – Last Registered Year: 2008
    • Malpractice Insurance (Current as of date of registration; consult attorney for further information): In annual registration, attorney reported that he/she does not have malpractice coverage. (Some attorneys, such as judges, government lawyers, and in-house corporate lawyers, may not carry coverage due to the nature of their practice setting.)
  • Bar: Missouri

Bar Information: Illinois

Bar Information: Missouri

While reviewing this matter, it is important to keep in mind that the privilege to practice law imposes duties and responsibilities on each attorney who accepts a license to practice law. These obligations are described in the Preamble to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct :

The practice of law is a public trust. Lawyers are the trustees of the system by which citizens resolve disputes among themselves, punish and deter crime, and determine their relative rights and responsibilities toward each other and their government. Lawyers therefore are responsible for the character, competence and integrity of the persons whom they assist in joining their profession; for assuring access to that system through the availability of competent legal counsel; for maintaining public confidence in the system of justice by acting competently and with loyalty to the best interests of their clients; by working to improve that system to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing society; and by defending the integrity of the judicial system against those who would corrupt, abuse or defraud it.

To achieve these ends the practice of law is regulated by the following rules. Violation of these rules is grounds for discipline.

* * *

The quality of the legal profession can be no better than that of its members. Lawyers must exercise good judgment and candor in supporting applicants for membership in the bar.

Lawyers also must assist in the policing of lawyer misconduct. The vigilance of the bar in preventing and, where required, reporting misconduct can be a formidable deterrent to such misconduct, and a key to maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the profession as a whole in the face of the egregious misconduct of a few.

It is also important to bear in mind that although Mr. Hartmann may deny improper motives or conduct, any such denial or protestation must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. As noted in the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, for Mr. Hartmann to believe that his conduct was proper, he must have “actually supposed the fact in question to be true” (which belief “may be inferred from circumstances”) and for that belief to be reasonable requires “that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.” Additionally, because “a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question” to be improper, Mr. Hartmann reasonably should have known that his conduct was improper.

Accordingly, Mr. Hartmann’s conduct violated the following the following rules of professional conduct:

Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct:

Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct:

Allegation: Mr. Hartmann made extra-judicial statements regarding pending prosecutions in violation of the Illinois and Missouri bar associations.

As noted by Prof. Horton in his post, Mr. Hartmann “appeared on national television brandishing harsh labels and prejudging cases on which he was slated to exercise an appellate review function—raising questions under professional ethics rules which later fueled challenges against him. Specifically, on February 14, 2008, Mr. Hartmann appeared on PBS’s NewsHour in which he made the following statements, which, even if factually accurate (which they are not), violate the Illinois and Missouri rules of professional conduct:

JIM LEHRER: Next, the 9/11 trials. Ray Suarez has our story.

RAY SUAREZ: The six Guantanamo detainees now set to face trial by military commission all face charges announced on Monday for their direct involvement in planning the September 11th terrorist attacks.

They include: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the attacks; Waleed bin Attash, alleged to have selected and trained two of the hijackers; Ramzi Binalshibh; Ali Abdul al-Aziz Ali; and Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, each charged with coordinating and financing and training for the attacks; and Mohammed al-Qahtani, the so-called 20th hijacker, who was barred entry to the U.S. a month before 9/11.

If convicted, each could face the death penalty.

The legal process was outlined by an act of Congress in 2006. The trials themselves will take place in a specially designed set of courtrooms known as Camp Justice on the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo.

Here to walk us through that process is Brigadier General Thomas Hartmann, the legal adviser to the convening authority for the Office of Military Commissions at the Department of Defense.

General, welcome.

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN, Legal Adviser, U.S. Military Tribunal System: Good evening.

RAY SUAREZ: How will these trials differ from a conventional criminal trial in the United States? Will the defendants be able to examine the evidence against them and directly confront their accusers?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: Yes, absolutely. Every piece of evidence that goes before the jury, the finder of fact, will be subject to their review, cross-examination, challenge, objection, just like you would see in an American court or a military court martial. So they have those full rights in the courtroom.

RAY SUAREZ: One aspect that’s gotten a lot of attention and is likely to come up in the trial is the source of that information. There’s a theory in legal circles, “fruit of a poisoned tree.” If information is introduced in court that was obtained by torture, could that end up slowing or even preventing these trials from moving forward?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: The trials will be governed by the rules of evidence and the rules of procedures that Congress has put in place under the Military Commission Act that you mentioned. And we will leave it up to the trial counsel and the defense counsel and the judge to make the determinations of what’s admissible in the court.

We’re a country that is governed by the rule of law and not by the rule of men, and we will follow the rule of law in these proceedings. It’s not effective to be able to try these cases in the press or anywhere else. We’ll decide them in the courtroom on Guantanamo.

RAY SUAREZ: So at this point, it’s not clear exactly how evidence that may have been obtained by physical coercion will be treated when we’re actually at trial?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: All the evidentiary decisions will be made by the trial counsel and the defense counsel duking it out in the courtroom, and the judge will make that final decision.

RAY SUAREZ: Who’s going to be sitting in judgment on these defendants?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: Military judges. Each of the judge advocate generals, the uniformed judge advocate generals, have nominated people, and the chief judge will appoint a particular judge to a case, but there are 12 sitting judges who are available to take the trials. They’re all experienced military judges; they’re all uniform; they’ve got decades of experience.

RAY SUAREZ: As this process is approached, various defense counsel have expressed concerns, misgivings about whether they’re going to be able to examine all the evidence that’s being brought to bear against their clients or whether they’ll be roadblocks, impediments where people will say, “Sorry, you just don’t have the clearance to see this stuff.”

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: Well, they will — if they need discovery, they have the rights to discovery, reasonable and material evidence, as it’s set forth in the manual for military commissions, very similar to the manual for military court martial.

And they will have the right to seek discovery. The judge will rule if there are any challenges on that discovery, and it will proceed very much like a normal trial.

RAY SUAREZ: You use the word “reasonable.” Who decides what’s reasonable?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: The reasonable is an objective standard. And ordinarily in discovery the two trial counsel, the trial counsel and the defense counsel, try to reach a conclusion. And if they cannot, the judge makes the decision of what’s reasonable.

RAY SUAREZ: Have members of the military legal profession raised any concerns about their ability to try this case? Has it been hard to fill all the slots you need to move forward because of misgivings in the uniformed ranks about this process?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: I don’t think so. The uniformed ranks are stretched thinly because of the global war on terror and trying to deal with all that.

But we’re getting the resources we need from the judge advocates general from the uniformed services, and we continue to get resources from them as the process expands and more trials are brought, more charges are sworn.

RAY SUAREZ: One of the prominent members of the team, Colonel Steven David, said of the process, when reporters were asking him how to proceed, “You’re asking me to tell you how we’re going to get to a place we’ve never been with a map I don’t have.”

He seemed to be a little unsure about how all this is going to work once it really gets going.

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: Well, in the defense community, they have today, as we speak, nine uniformed counsel, and they’ll get another one within one day. They have four civilian counsel, and they have three more military counsel in the hopper on the way through the process.

One will come in April, and two more will come in May. And at this point, there are only 12 accused, the six that were accused the other day, and then you had six before that. So there are 12 people. That’s a good ratio of support.

The defense also has analysts, and they will get more analysts. They have interpreters, and they have computer resources. They have places to review classified information. So we’re resourcing them very well.

RAY SUAREZ: Do these defendants, because of the highly charged nature of this case, worldwide audience, the conflict about how exactly to proceed, can they go into court and say, “I want my own legal team, and I don’t want to be tried with these guys because of what we’re all being charged with”?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: The chief prosecutor has recommended that these cases, the ones I announced on Monday, be charged jointly and be tried jointly. That decision still needs to be made by Judge Crawford, the convening authority. And even if she should decide to send them to trial jointly, they can challenge that in the courtroom.

And the judge can say, “I’m going to sever these.” You’re either joint or severed, so the judge can decide if he wants to sever them.

And each of them has the right to a detailed military counsel effective on the swearing of the charges on Monday, so that right has kicked in. They haven’t all received one yet.

But they can also get civilian counsel of their own choosing at their own expense. And Hamdan is one of the cases that was tried last week in connection with motions and discovery, and Hamdan had sitting at his defense table at Guantanamo Bay five defense counsel, one military defense counsel, one Department of Defense civilian, two members of a distinguished law firm in the United States, and one professor from Emory University.

And Hamdan on his appeal to the Supreme Court had seven counsel, all of them civilians. So we think that they’re well-represented, the resources are there, and the resources will continue to be there.

RAY SUAREZ: Well, how important is that? Are you very conscious in this process, as we begin it, that the world is watching this, and to the degree that it deviates from the kind of trial someone would be able to demand on United States soil, that there may be questions around the world about how this works?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: Very conscious of it. If you study the rights, the rights are amazing that are made available to these accused, the right to remain silent, the right to have — the right to see all the evidence that goes to the finder of fact, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

The burden of proof is on the government, presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt did not even exist at Nuremberg. They get to call witnesses. They get to cross-examine witnesses. They get to call their own witnesses.

If they are found guilty, they get an automatic right of appeal to the Court of Military Commission Review. That doesn’t exist anywhere but in our system that they get an automatic right of appeal. So these rights are tremendous.

We think that they equate very closely to the rights we make available to our own soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in the uniformed services. And I think many, many people out there watching will think that they are a national treasure, our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, and to provide the same thing is a reflection of the American standard of justice.

RAY SUAREZ: But you’ve also announced your intention to seek the death penalty in these cases. Does that add a burden for the prosecution that may be difficult to carry, given the rules under which this is moving forward?

If there are any circumstances where people can’t see the sources of evidence, where they can’t find out where information being introduced against them came out, wouldn’t that be mitigation if they appeal their death penalty?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: Well, let me take you way back. The prosecutors have recommended that it go forward as a capital case. Judge Crawford, the convening authority, still needs to make that decision as to whether that will be a capital charge.

And even then, even then a jury of at least 12 members, at least 12 members must unanimously agree on the findings and the sentence. And, as I mentioned, they will have access to the discovery and to the extent that they don’t think they’re getting the right discovery, they will bring that to the attention of the judge, and the judge will fix that within the rule of law.

RAY SUAREZ: And the 12 members are all active-duty military?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: The 12 members — it’s at least 12 members. It could be more. But if it’s more, it’s still unanimous. It has to be a unanimous decision.

They’re military personnel chosen based upon their age, experience, judicial temperament, and factors of that sort, in terms of sitting in the trial. It’s virtually identical to the process we use in a military court martial practice.

RAY SUAREZ: And very quickly before we go, how soon might we see the first opening arguments?

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: Opening arguments, I can’t predict. We expect that you will see arraignments probably sometime in the spring, and that’s when the accused is read the charges, announces his rights to counsel, what he wants for counsel, and how he enters a plea.

After that, the case will proceed through discovery, motions, and that will take some time, and then you’ll see opening statements after that.

RAY SUAREZ: General Hartmann, thanks for joining us.

BRIG. GEN. THOMAS HARTMANN: Thank you.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Prior to his appearance on PBS, Mr. Hartmann penned this op-ed that ran in the Los Angeles Times on December 19, 2007:

I have read with great disappointment the Op-Ed article by Morris D. Davis, former chief prosecutor for the Office of Military Commissions, particularly his comments with regard to Susan Crawford, the military commissions convening authority.

Since October, Davis has repeatedly complained about the very military commissions he oversaw for two years. He has criticized the commission process for moving too slowly, resulting in only one case being tried, by a guilty plea. After that plea was negotiated, with Davis’ written concurrence, he claimed publicly that he was not properly consulted.

Davis has recently protested that politics has been inserted into the process, which he in many ways controlled, alleging improper pressure from me, from the department’s general counsel, Jim Haynes, and now from Crawford. Specifically, Davis insinuates that she is politically motivated and that she lacks impartiality. He claims — though that he never breathed a word of this to me — that the pressure to move cases more rapidly was politically motivated.

But one should be careful when one challenges the reputation of others. Crawford has not directed or influenced the way any military commission case will be tried. Davis knows that I, without any political interference, directed him to evaluate more carefully the evidence, the cases, the charging process, the materiality of the cases, the speed of charging, the training program and the overall case preparation in the prosecution office. Interestingly, when I testified before Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) that some cases are moved more quickly than others because they have the most material evidence, he commented: “Well, I think it’s almost prosecutorial incompetence not to think in those terms. It’s important that you do so.”

Davis further contends that he resigned within hours of learning that I would report to General Counsel Haynes, and as my subordinate, Davis would be under Haynes in the chain of authority. This was also just hours after he learned the results of an independent military panel — appointed by Haynes after consultation with the service Judge Advocates General — that concluded I had not improperly asserted my authority. That report was immediately made available to the public. It is worthy of note that Haynes had, months before, signed a performance evaluation on Davis, suggesting that Davis was already in the chain of command. Davis did not object then.

Davis also charges that the commissions are no longer “full, fair, and open trials.” This is particularly biting as he knows that the process offers unprecedented rights to alleged war criminals. Indeed, he wrote and spoke of that often. He also knows how much effort the prosecution and defense teams have dedicated to the fairness of the process — a process played out in United States vs. Hamdan.

Regarding his new allegations that the trials are not open, Davis knows that national security demands that certain evidence remain classified. He had an especially high security clearance for that very reason. But there will be no “secret” trials. Though we must safeguard classified information in order to protect ongoing operations and our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, not one piece of evidence will go to a commission jury without review and the opportunity to object by the accused and his counsel.

Military commissions are now moving forward fairly and transparently. As they continue, critics will see uniformed service members, including judges, prosecutors and defense counsel, conduct trials with the dignity, fairness, and respect for law that defines American military justice — a justice system that remains the envy of the world.

Both of his PBS interview and his LA Times op-ed were made in violation of the Illinois and Missouri rules of professional conduct.

Allegation: Contrary to his role as legal advisor to the Pentagon, a purportedly neutral position, Mr. Hartmann failed to retain the required independence from the prosecution, and has been barred from participating, in military war tribunals.

Prof. Horton also identifies additional conduct of Mr. Hartmann that violated the Illinois and Missouri rules of professional conduct, including “accounts of Hartmann’s bullying and intimidation of other lawyers participating in the process circulated[,]” “specific allegations that he was jockeying to have cases publicized and tried “before the elections,” that he refused to resign once “he was banned from involvement in the case” and that he “was inappropriately aggressive in pushing for prosecution of certain cases that he felt had media value.” These general allegations are fully supported in the public record, including but not limited to the following articles:

As reported by William Glaberson in the New York Times :

The former chief military prosecutor for the planned war-crimes trials of Guantánamo detainees said yesterday that he had been pressured by military officials to rely increasingly on classified evidence, which would require that long trial sessions be held behind closed doors rather than in open proceedings.

“Who ever said we had to have open trials?” the former chief prosecutor said a military official, Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Hartmann, told him in September.

The former prosecutor, Col. Morris D. Davis, described the dispute in an interview yesterday. Colonel Davis said it was part of an internal disagreement over whether war-crimes trials at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, are to be largely public, displaying evidence against terrorism suspects, or largely closed, which could increase criticism of Guantánamo.

Colonel Davis, a career Air Force lawyer, said one of his priorities as chief prosecutor had been to get as much evidence as possible declassified so people around the world could assess the strength of cases against terrorism suspects. But he said two officials told him in September that he was wasting time declassifying evidence and that it was more important to move quickly by filing charges against detainees.

“No matter how perfect the trial is,” Colonel Davis said, “if it’s behind closed doors, it’s going to be viewed as a sham.”

Colonel Davis resigned Oct. 5 after a bitter turf dispute with General Hartmann, who was named legal adviser this summer to Susan J. Crawford, the senior official in the Office of Military Commissions at the Defense Department.

* * *

In the interview yesterday, Colonel Davis read from notes he said he made after a telephone conversation with General Hartmann on Sept. 10. He said the general expressed irritation at the slow pace of prosecutions and made the remarks about conducting trials with closed sessions.

* * *

In August, Colonel Davis filed a formal complaint at the Pentagon claiming that General Hartmann had overstepped his role by asserting control over the prosecution office. This month, Pentagon officials told Colonel Davis that they were backing General Hartmann, and Colonel Davis asked to be reassigned.

In the interview, Colonel Davis said General Hartmann noted twice in September that a legal rule permitted military commission proceedings to be closed when classified evidence was being presented and said, “We’ve got to use it.” He said that on Sept. 21, Ms. Crawford told him she agreed with General Hartmann.

Colonel Davis, who has been assigned to another legal position after two years as the chief military prosecutor for Guantánamo, said he felt it was important to keep trials as open as possible.

He said that while he supported the use of military commissions, “this whole process is under a cloud” because of critics who have asserted that the administration created a legal system for detainees that gives them fewer rights than the country’s civilian justice system. He said the criticism could be mitigated “by keeping it as open and transparent as possible.”

Colonel Davis said he had worked with prosecutors to select evidence that could secure convictions while trying to limit the need to close the Guantánamo trials, which are expected to draw international attention.

And as reported by Jess Bravin at the Wall Street Journal:

WASHINGTON — In March, a plea bargain guaranteed Australian David Hicks, an inmate at the U.S. military prison in Guantanamo Bay, his freedom by year’s end. The deal helped Australian Prime Minister John Howard, a U.S. ally, avoid a bruising domestic controversy.

Now, the former chief prosecutor at the Guantanamo military commission in Cuba for suspected terrorists says in an interview that the Hicks case was the beginning of political interference in the offshore justice system. Col. Morris Davis resigned earlier this month to protest new rules he says will ensure that political officials have similar control over future war-crimes prosecutions.

* * *

Gen. Hemingway’s successor, Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann, arrived in July and asserted direct control of the prosecution effort, prompting conflict with Col. Davis over the office’s leadership. Gen. Hartmann is neither a judge nor a prosecutor. He is appointed by the Pentagon general counsel to advise the administrator of the military commission — a position that has no exact analogy in civilian courts.

An internal review ultimately sided with Gen. Hartmann, rejecting Col. Davis’s view that federal law insulated the chief prosecutor from the legal adviser’s direct control. Earlier this month, Deputy Secretary England issued memorandums that essentially put the prosecutions under the control of the Pentagon’s general counsel.

Marc Falkoff, who was the principal lawyer in the habeas representation of seventeen Yemeni men detained by the U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay, confirms Col. Davis’ allegations of the improper politicization of these trials in this op-ed at the Jurist:

Last month, Colonel Morris Davis stepped down as chief prosecutor for the military commissions at Guantánamo, citing political interference with the independence of his office. The resignation was a remarkable development in Guantánamo’s embattled history, illuminating the degree to which politics rather than principle governs our notorious offshore prison.

* * *

We already know, therefore, that the military commissions are a bad idea for those of us who want to see speedy justice at Guantánamo. But with the resignation of Colonel Davis as chief prosecutor, we are now learning that the military commissions – whatever their inherent flaws and virtues – have themselves been corrupted by politics. If Davis’s allegations are to be credited, then the commissions system is being manipulated by political actors in an improper, unethical and potentially illegal manner – a politicization of the Guantánamo justice system that echoes the U.S. Attorneys scandal.

According to Davis, for more than a year Pentagon officials have sought to influence his decisions about “who we will charge, what we will charge, what evidence we will try to introduce, and how we will conduct a prosecution.” * * *

More recently, Davis filed a formal complaint alleging that Brigadier General Thomas Hartmann, the Legal Advisor to the authority overseeing the military commissions process, had pushed him to file cases that would attract more public attention and garner support for the tribunal system, even though such cases would require secretive, closed proceedings. (By Pentagon regulation, the Legal Advisor is supposed to be an impartial administrator of justice, not an arm of the prosecution.)

In September of this year, Davis threatened to resign if anyone tried to intimidate him. He has now done so, stating bluntly that, “as things stand right now, I think it’s a disgrace to call it a military commission – it’s a political commission.”

What makes this all the more alarming is that Colonel Davis is the last person you would expect to stand up as a whistleblower. To be sure, other officers have gone public about abuses in the Guantánamo system. * * * But none of these men had, like Colonel Davis, previously spoken out in support of all things Guantánamo.

For years, Davis has been the Administration’s de facto spokesperson in defense of the military commissions. * * *

And now we have the spectacle of Davis resigning and speaking out about the intimidation and political interference he encountered as Guantánamo’s chief prosecutor. * * *

* * *

For the majority of the prisoners at Guantánamo, the value of Davis’s resignation is that it may finally signal to the American public that politics rather than principle reigns at Guantánamo, and that decisions about the administration of justice at the camp are being made – largely outside of public view and without accountability – by political actors for nakedly political reasons. How else, for example, are we to explain the fact that every European who was dragged to Guantánamo has been returned to his home country, but that nearly ninety percent of the Yemenis who have been detained at the naval base remain there today – even though a number of them have actually been cleared for release by the military?

For more than three years, my colleagues and I have visited with our clients at Guantánamo dozens of times, frequently bringing them “good news” about court victories we have won. To a man, upon hearing our news, our clients have smiled politely and shrugged, pointing out to us that they still have not had their day in court and that they still are not treated in accord with the Geneva Conventions. “You have to understand,” they tell us, “this is all a big game.” More and more, I am starting to think they are right.

Marc Falkoff teaches criminal law and criminal procedure at Northern Illinois University College of Law. Prior to joining the NIU faculty, he was an associate at Covington & Burling, where he was the principal lawyer in the habeas representation of seventeen Yemeni men detained by the U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay. He is the editor of Poems From Guantanamo: The Detainees Speak (University of Iowa Press, 2007).

Col. Morris D. Davis, in his op-ed printed in the Los Angeles Times explains how the Convening Authority, of which Mr. Hartmann was the Legal Advisor, improperly imposed political consideration in the prosecution of these cases:

I was the chief prosecutor for the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until Oct. 4, the day I concluded that full, fair and open trials were not possible under the current system. I resigned on that day because I felt that the system had become deeply politicized and that I could no longer do my job effectively or responsibly.

In my view — and I think most lawyers would agree — it is absolutely critical to the legitimacy of the military commissions that they be conducted in an atmosphere of honesty and impartiality. Yet the political appointee known as the “convening authority” — a title with no counterpart in civilian courts — was not living up to that obligation.

In a nutshell, the convening authority is supposed to be objective — not predisposed for the prosecution or defense — and gets to make important decisions at various stages in the process. The convening authority decides which charges filed by the prosecution go to trial and which are dismissed, chooses who serves on the jury, decides whether to approve requests for experts and reassesses findings of guilt and sentences, among other things.

Earlier this year, Susan Crawford was appointed by the secretary of Defense to replace Maj. Gen. John Altenburg as the convening authority. Altenburg’s staff had kept its distance from the prosecution to preserve its impartiality. Crawford, on the other hand, had her staff assessing evidence before the filing of charges, directing the prosecution’s pretrial preparation of cases (which began while I was on medical leave), drafting charges against those who were accused and assigning prosecutors to cases, among other things.

How can you direct someone to do something — use specific evidence to bring specific charges against a specific person at a specific time, for instance — and later make an impartial assessment of whether they behaved properly? Intermingling convening authority and prosecutor roles perpetuates the perception of a rigged process stacked against the accused.

The second reason I resigned is that I believe even the most perfect trial in history will be viewed with skepticism if it is conducted behind closed doors. Telling the world, “Trust me, you would have been impressed if only you could have seen what we did in the courtroom” will not bolster our standing as defenders of justice. Getting evidence through the classification review process to allow its use in open hearings is time-consuming, but it is time well spent.

Crawford, however, thought it unnecessary to wait because the rules permit closed proceedings. There is no doubt that some portions of some trials have to be closed to protect classified information, but that should be the last option after exhausting all reasonable alternatives. Transparency is critical.

* * *

The Military Commissions Act provides a foundation for fair trials, but some changes are clearly necessary. I was confident in full, fair and open trials when Gen. Altenburg was the convening authority and Brig. Gen. Tom Hemingway [as opposed to Mr. Hartmann] was his legal advisor. Collectively, they spent nearly 65 years in active duty, and they were committed to ensuring the integrity of military law. They acted on principle rather than politics.

The first step, if these truly are military commissions and not merely a political smoke screen, is to take control out of the hands of political appointees like Haynes and Crawford [whose Legal Adviser was Mr. Hartmann] and give it back to the military.

* * *

Morris D. Davis is the former chief prosecutor for the Office of Military Commissions. The opinions expressed are his own and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Air Force.

As reported by William Glaberson, in the New York Times:

GUANTÁNAMO BAY , Cuba — The former chief prosecutor here took the witness stand on Monday on behalf of a detainee and testified that top Pentagon officials had pressured him in deciding which cases to prosecute and what evidence to use.

The prosecutor, Col. Morris D. Davis of the Air Force, testified that Pentagon officials had interfered with his work for political reasons and told him that charges against well-known detainees “could have real strategic political value” and that there could be no acquittals.

His testimony completed one of the more unusual transformations in the contentious history of Guantánamo. Colonel Davis, who is on active duty as a senior Air Force official and was one of the Pentagon’s most vocal advocates of the Guantánamo military commissions, has become one of the most visible critics of the system.

Testifying about his assertions for the first time, Colonel Davis said a senior Pentagon official who oversaw the military commissions, Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Hartmann of the Air Force Reserve, reversed a decision he had made and insisted that prosecutors proceed with evidence derived through waterboarding of detainees and other aggressive interrogation methods that critics call torture.

Called to the stand by a Navy defense lawyer and testifying before a military judge, Colonel Davis said General Hartmann directed him last year to push war crimes cases here quickly. He said the general was trying to give the system legitimacy before a new president took office. He testified that General Hartmann referred to the long difficulties the Pentagon had had in operating the military commissions and said, “If we don’t get some cases going before the election, this thing’s going to implode.”

Spokesmen for the Pentagon and General Hartmann declined to comment on Monday, saying that the questioning was continuing before the military judge. In the past, they have said that they disagreed with some of Colonel Davis’s assertions.

The extraordinary testimony featured Colonel Davis, in uniform and perspiring slightly in an air-conditioned courtroom, being cross-examined by his successor, Col. Lawrence J. Morris of the Army. The two uniformed officers faced each other with natural military politeness, giving way occasionally to a brisk question or stiff response.

The awkward moment of one military officer’s taking on another occurred because lawyers for a detainee facing war crimes charges called Colonel Davis to the stand after he had given news interviews criticizing General Hartmann and the running of the military commissions.

The defense lawyers for the detainee, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, once a driver for Osama bin Laden , said Colonel Davis’s contentions amounted to unlawful influence over the prosecution.

* * *

Mr. Hartmann’s actions as a Pentagon Legal Adviser began to have an affect on the prosecution of the military commission trials. Specifically, Mr. Hartmann was deemed ineligible to participate in the first military commission trial, as reported by Bernard Hibbitts at the Jurist:

[JURIST] A US military judge has ruled that US Air Force Reserve Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann [Air Force Link profile], a top Pentagon legal adviser on the Guantanamo military commission trials, is ineligible to participate in the first military commission trial of a detainee because he is too closely associated with the prosecution , the New York Times reported Saturday. The Times said it had a copy of the decision by Navy Capt. Keith Allred, although it had not been publicly released. The paper quoted Allred as concluding that “National attention focused on this dispute has seriously called into question the legal adviser’s ability to continue to perform his duties in a neutral and objective manner”. Hartmann is legal adviser to Susan J. Crawford, the Convening Authority [backgrounder] for the military commissions. * * * (Emphasis supplied.)

* * *

As reported by William Glaberson, in the New York Times :

In a new blow to the Bush administration’s troubled military commission system, a military judge has disqualified a Pentagon general who has been centrally involved in overseeing Guantánamo war crimes tribunals from any role in the first case headed for trial.

The judge said the general was too closely aligned with the prosecution, raising questions about whether he could carry out his role with the required neutrality and objectivity.

* * *

The judge, Capt. Keith J. Allred of the Navy, directed that Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Hartmann of the Air Force Reserve, a senior Pentagon official of the Office of Military Commissions, which runs the war crimes system, have no further role in the first prosecution , scheduled for trial this month.

General Hartmann, whose title is legal adviser, has been at the center of a bitter dispute involving the former chief Guantánamo military prosecutor, Col. Morris D. Davis of the Air Force.

Colonel Davis has said the general interfered in the work of the military prosecution office, pushed for closed-door proceedings and pressed to rely on evidence obtained through techniques that critics call torture.

“National attention focused on this dispute has seriously called into question the legal adviser’s ability to continue to perform his duties in a neutral and objective manner,” the judge wrote on Friday, in a copy of the decision not released publicly but obtained by The New York Times. Decisions by Guantánamo judges are not typically released publicly until days after being handed down.

* * *

General Hartmann, who has been a controversial figure since his appointment last summer, is the legal adviser to the Pentagon official with broad powers over the war crimes system, Susan J. Crawford. She has the military title of Convening Authority of the Guantánamo war crimes cases.

* * *

General Hartmann has been the military official most publicly identified with prosecutions in recent months. It was he, for example, who announced the Sept. 11 charges and has publicly pressed prosecutors to move faster.

Ruling on a defense lawyers’ request that said General Hartmann had exerted unlawful influence over the prosecution, Judge Allred said that public concern about the fairness of the cases was “deeply disturbing” and that he could not find that the general “retains the required independence from the prosecution.”

* * *

General Hartmann has denied Colonel Davis’s assertions and said the commission system would “follow the rule of law.” He has also said he has pressed prosecutors and others involved in the tribunals to move the cases more quickly.

* * *

Judge Allred’s ruling followed a hearing in Guantánamo on April 28 at which Colonel Davis said General Hartmann pressured him in deciding what cases to prosecute and what evidence to use. The judge called the hearing after lawyers for a detainee, Salim Hamdan, said his charges were unlawfully influenced.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Mr. Hartmann has now not only been barred from fulfilling his function as Legal Advisor in the Hamdan prosecution. As Prof. Horton notes:

Now a second military judge, Col. Steve Henley, has ordered Hartmann’s removal from the proceedings, [the prosecution of Afghan detainee Mohammed Jawad] sustaining the accusations raised against him. In an order handed down on Friday, Hartmann was banned from participation in the case, and the defense counsel were advised that they could make submissions in their quest for access to exculpatory evidence directly to Crawford, bypassing Hartmann. (Emphasis supplied.)

These general allegations are fully supported in the public record, including this report by Jane Sutton for Reuters:

* * *

In the case of alleged Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other prisoners who could face execution if convicted, the military defense lawyers said the charges were tainted by meddling and “overreaching” on the part of Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann.

Hartmann was assigned to provide impartial legal advice to the Pentagon appointee overseeing the Guantanamo trials.

But the former chief prosecutor of the tribunals testified last month that Hartmann essentially took over the prosecution team, pushing it to use evidence obtained through coercion and demanding “sexy” cases that would pique the interest of the American public.

Military defense lawyers asked the tribunals’ chief judge, Marine Col. Ralph Kohlmann, to dismiss the charges on grounds that Hartmann was so heavily involved in drafting them that he “failed to retain the required independence.”

“When the government seeks the death penalty, it must not reduce legal procedures to mere formalities. The integrity of the system must be upheld, regardless of the nature of the crimes charged or identity of the accused,” they said in the documents. “The accused are entitled to due process and a fair trial”

* * *

The judge in the Hamdan case had already barred Hartmann from further involvement in those proceedings.

* * *

Carol Rosenberg of the Miami Herald also reports on this ruling:

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVY BASE, Cuba — One general testified against another at the war court Wednesday, describing a Pentagon official fast-tracking trials here as “abusive, bullying, unprofessional.”

Moreover, Army Brig. Gen. Gregory Zanetti, deputy prison camps commander, in testimony described the approach his counterpart, Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann, employed earlier this year this way:

“Spray and pray. Charge everybody. Let’s go. Speed, speed, speed.”

The colorful testimony — evoking battlefield language — came in pre-trial hearings in the case of Afghan detainee Mohammed Jawad, accused of wounding two U.S. troops by throwing a grenade in a bazaar in Kabul.

Hartmann is the legal advisor overseeing the first U.S. war crimes tribunals since World War II. Jawad’s attorney, Air Force Reserves Maj. David Frakt, wants the Afghan’s charges dismissed on grounds that Hartmann exerted ”unlawful influence” on the trials from his perch at the Pentagon.

Frakt alleges in his motion that Hartmann usurped the role of a prosecutor — rather than act dispassionately — and pushed to get Jawad charged because the case involved battlefield bloodshed.

In June, Hartmann defended his ”intense and direct” management style in testimony, saying he had pressured for speed to kick-start sluggish commissions, not for political reasons.

What was unusual about Wednesday’s testimony was that, while subordinates have described Hartmann’s style as abusive ”nano-management,” this was the first time a general officer of equal rank gave the similar testimony.

In telephone calls and teleconferences from the Pentagon, Zanetti said, Hartmann’s demeanor ”as an attorney from a thousand miles away” was “abusive, bullying and unprofessional. . . pretty much across the board.”

The Pentagon’s chief war crimes prosecutor at the time, now retired Air Force Col. Morris Davis, resigned to protest Hartmann’s behavior.

Davis testified Wednesday at a hearing in the case of another war crimes defendant captured in Afghanistan as a teen, Canadian Omar Khadr. The Jawad prosecution ”went from the freezer to the frying pan, thanks to General Hartmann,” Davis told Khadr’s lawyer.

* * *

Zanetti described struggling with Hartmann over who would run U.S. forces working on trial logistics.

To try to work with Hartmann, who like Zanetti has a one-star on his uniform, the Army brigadier said he sought to discuss the concept of ”command unity” with the Air Force brigadier.

”As a principle, it’s really been around since Alexander The Great. Most military people understand this one,” Zanetti said, with a laugh. “General Hartmann really wanted to run things.”

* * *

(Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, Mike Melia of the Associated Press reports these details:

* * *

The former chief prosecutor, Air Force Col. Morris Davis, testified that Hartmann pushed for Jawad to be charged because the American public would be gripped by the details of the case — a grenade attack on two U.S. soldiers and their interpreter in Afghanistan.

“The guy who threw the grenade was always at the top of the list,” Davis said.

* * *

The judge also ruled that Frakt can submit exculpatory evidence to the tribunals’ top official, Susan Crawford, for her to review whether the charges against Jawad are warranted — without input from Hartmann.

“For the first time, she will be presented with a balanced portrait of the facts and circumstances in this case,” Frakt said.

Hartmann supervises the chief prosecutor at Guantanamo and has extensive powers over the tribunal system. He testified Wednesday that he believed he was doing his job properly and said he has not offered to resign.

* * *

Based on these allegations, Mr. Hartmann’s conduct, as described above, violates the Illinois and Missouri rules of professional conduct.

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Text of the Virginia and Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct violated by Mr. Hartmann.

Update on Wes Teel

As I noted previously, Roger Shuler at the Legal Schnauzer has been following the plight of Wes Teel and his political prosecution by the Department of Justice. In his post, Shuler links to a comment made by Scott Horton at Mark Crispin Miller’s News From Underground and to an interview of Mr. Horton by Sam Seder at Ring of Fire Radio .

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Update on Texas Supreme Court Justices’ Ethics Hearings

As I noted back in July, ethics hearings on grievances filed against Texas Supreme Court Justices Nathan Hecht and David Medina were scheduled to be heard on August 14, 2008.

Chris Rizo, who has covered these complaints for The Southeast Texas Record, reports at LegalNewsline.com that Judge Hecht’s ethics complaint was referred for further grievance proceedings:

AUSTIN, Texas (Legal Newsline)-The Texas Ethics Commission has decided to hold a formal hearing to investigate charges that state Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht accepted an illegal campaign contribution, a watchdog group told Legal Newsline on Friday.

The panel, also on Thursday, postponed the preliminary hearing into charges that Supreme Court Justice David Medina illegally reimbursed himself from his campaign account.

Mr. Rizo also reports that Judge Medina’s complaint was postponed until the regular October meeting of the Texas Ethics Commission:

As for Medina, Texas Watch filed its complaint against him in January. His matter will be taken up behind closed doors at the next regular meeting of the Ethics Commission in October, when the panel will decide whether the case warrants a formal hearing, [Alex Winslow, director of Texas Watch] said.

Read Mr. Rizo’s complete article here .

The Associated Press’ Jay Root also covered the scheduled hearings. He reports via the Houston Chronicle that, (perhaps?) defying conventional wisdom, Justice Hecht represented himself:

AUSTIN — Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht, appearing before the Texas Ethics Commission, defended himself Thursday against allegations he broke campaign finance laws by accepting discounted legal fees to fight an abuse of office complaint.

And that after the unfavorable hearing results, Justice Hecht bravely faced the press:

The state commission took no action Thursday but will consider the matter at a formal hearing later, officials said. Hecht, the longest-serving member of the Texas Supreme Court, quietly slipped past reporters at the state capitol and did not return phone calls from The Associated Press.

* * *

It’s not clear how long Hecht spent at the closed hearing. Reporters waiting for him to emerge were told Hecht had given them the slip.

“He’s been gone,” [Wilhelmina Delco, a member of the Texas Ethics Commission,] said hours after the hearing began early Thursday afternoon. “He eased out the other door.” (Emphasis mine).

As reported by Mr. Root, the complaint against Justice Hecht arose from his support of Harriet Miers’ nomination by President Bush to the United States Supreme Court:

Hecht was sanctioned in 2006 by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, which alleged that he had abused his office by promoting Harriet Miers for a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court. Legal canons bar Texas judges from endorsing candidates for public office, but Hecht was able to get the sanction reversed on appeal by arguing that Miers was not running for elective office.

But Harriet Miers was more than just a Supreme Court nominee that Justice Hecht has decided to promote: Ms. Miers is also Justice Hecht’s former girlfriend and it was also Justice Hecht who first introduced Ms. Miers and President Bush. Unsurprisingly, this story leads back to President George W. Bush.

Read Mr. Root’s complete article here .

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Some good news?

In his 1,000th column at White House Watch, Dan Froomkin quotes from Washington Post Staff Writer Carrie Johnson’s article that the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility notified unspecified bar associations of the findings of wrongdoing in An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General:

Separately, an official in the Justice Department Office of Professional Responsibility said the unit has notified bar associations of its findings against five lawyers singled out in reports thus far.

The elation I initially felt reading the portion of Ms. Johnson’s article that Mr. Froomkin excerpted was tempered when I read the complete paragraph:

Separately, an official in the Justice Department Office of Professional Responsibility said the unit has notified bar associations of its findings against five lawyers singled out in reports thus far. The bar groups could initiate their own disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers, who include former Justice Department White House liaison Monica M. Goodling; former attorney general chief of staff D. Kyle Sampson; and former deputy attorney general chief of staff Michael D. Elston. Two lower-ranking officials, Esther Slater McDonald and John Nowacki, also were cited in the previous reports and their bar associations were notified, the official said. (Emphasis supplied.)

First, either Ms. Johnson did not report or her source did not specify which bar associations that OPR notified of the various allegations. She also didn’t specify whether each bar association in which these attorneys are admitted was notified of the findings. For example, Michael J. Elston , a partner at McGuireWoods LLP , is a member of the Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia Bar Associations. Were each of these bar associations ‘notified’ of Mr. Elston’s conduct?

Second, and more importantly, OPR did not file grievance complaints against any of these five (5) attorneys. As reported by Ms. Johnson, OPR only “notified bar associations of its findings.” This is a distinction with a difference: mere ‘notification’ does not initiate a grievance review process. The effect of OPR’s notification, as Ms. Johnson notes, is that the bar associations “could initiate their own disciplinary proceedings.” This is no different than if a bar association employee had simply learned about An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General online or in a newspaper because, just as with the OPR notification, that bar association also “could initiate their own disciplinary proceedings.” So, unless and until one of these bar associations actually initiates a grievance review, OPR’s ‘notification’ has done nothing more than provide some positive press.

Second, either Ms. Johnson did not report or her source did not specify which bar associations OPR notified of the various allegations and whether each bar association in which one of these attorneys is admitted was notified of the findings. For example, Michael J. Elston , a partner at McGuireWoods LLP , is a member of the Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia Bar Associations. Were each of these bar associations ‘notified’ of Mr. Elston’s conduct?

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Had enough yet?

The Legal Schnauzer shares a letter he recently received. In his post, Message From a Political Prisoner, he describes the receipt of the letter as “a profound experience recently, something I never dreamed would happen to me as a U.S. citizen.” He explains:

My letter was from Wes Teel, a former state judge in Mississippi who is in federal prison in Atlanta after being convicted in the Paul Minor case. Wes and I have never met; we’ve never even talked on the phone. But we got acquainted via e-mail when I began to write about the Minor case last September.

Wes and his codefendants, fellow state judge John Whitfield and well-know plaintiff’s attorney Paul Minor, had been convicted, and Wes was looking at reporting to federal prison in December 2007.

In our e-mail exchanges, I found Wes to be a man of keen intellect, common sense, and good humor–even in the face of going to prison for a crime he did not commit. I came to consider Wes a friend, and I shared his pain when he had a heart attack not long after reporting to federal prison. I shared his concerns about his wife, Myrna, who has multiple sclerosis and needed care while her husband was eight hours away in federal prison. I know he worried about his grandchildren and what they would grow up to think of a country that could imprison their grandfather simply for doing his job as a state judge.

On the surface, Wes and I might seem like unlikely friends. My blog started only because of the wrongdoing I had witnessed from lawyers and judges in Alabama state courts. Corrupt lawyers and judges have brought my wife and me to the edge of ruin–and here was Wes, a lawyer and former judge who was charged with being corrupt himself.

But here is one of many lessons I’ve learned from my Legal Schnauzer journey: Just because you’ve had a bad experience with someone in a certain profession, don’t assume that everyone in that profession is a bad actor.

After studying the Minor case at length, I realized that Wes Teel and John Whitfield were honest judges. They ruled for Paul Minor’s clients because that’s what the facts and the law required them to do. And I realized that, based on the evidence I had seen, Paul Minor was an honest lawyer. Certainly in the cases the government had used to build its prosecution, Minor acted properly, and his client prevailed because they should have prevailed.

The Minor case taught me that not even all Republican judges are corrupt. Another codefendant was Oliver Diaz, a justice on the Mississippi Supreme Court who was tried and acquitted twice. And Diaz is a Republican.

I realized that the bad guys in the Minor case were not lawyers, judges, or even Republicans. No, it is that certain breed of Republican that has been infected by a virus that seems to have started with George W. Bush and Karl Rove and wound up sickening our entire justice system.

Wes Teel is a victim of that justice system. His letter made me sad, angry, and ultimately, determined:

Please go to the full post to read more excerpts of Mr. Teel’s letter, but contemplate this excerpt which, as noted by the Legal Schnauzer, answers the question:

What does it mean to be a political prisoner in the United States?

Due to the conviction, unless it is overturned, I am essentially no longer a citizen. I can’t vote, possess a firearm, hold a bond, run for public office, or ever practice law again. Despite all of this, I have a vested stake in the success of our Republic. I want my grandchildren to grow up and be proud of our constitution and our government. I pray that change will one day come, and my precious grandchildren can come to enjoy the freedoms instituted by our Founding Fathers and paid for by the blood and sacrifice of many patriots.

Had enough yet to file a grievance?

If not, there’s more. Juxtapose the politicized prosecutions of Wes Teel, John Whitfeld, Paul Minor, Oscar Diaz, Don Siegelman, Georgia Thompson and Dr. Cyril Wecht with the politicized refusal by Michael Mukasey to prosecute Michael Elston, Kyle D. Sampson and Monica Marie Goodling. Scott Horton of Harper’s Magazine has named this selective failure to prosecute The Mukasey Doctrine and describes it like this:

Today [Attorney General Michael Mukasey] addressed the annual convention of the American Bar Association, and expanded upon what may be known to future generations as the “Mukasey Doctrine.” This doctrine holds that political appointees in the Justice Department who breach the public trust by using their positions for partisan political purposes face no punishment for their crimes. In the Mukasey view, this is all simple political gamesmanship—“boys will be boys”—and sufficient accountability is provided by exposing their games to the public limelight.

After reviewing in the briefest terms the recent internal Justice Department probe into the politicization of the hiring process in the honors program, with respect to immigration judges and in other areas, here’s what Mukasey has to say:

The conduct described in those reports is disturbing. The mission of the Justice Department is the evenhanded application of the Constitution and the laws enacted under it. That mission has to start with the evenhanded application of the laws within our own Department. Some people at the Department deviated from that strict standard, and the institution failed to stop them.

I want to stress that last point because there is no denying it: the system failed. The active wrong-doing detailed in the two joint reports was not systemic in that only a few people were directly implicated in it. But the failure was systemic in that the system–the institution–failed to check the behavior of those who did wrong. There was a failure of supervision by senior officials in the Department. And there was a failure on the part of some employees to cry foul when they were aware, or should have been aware, of problems.

Note how Mukasey plays the entire affair down and uses the traditional language of the criminal defendant–for him it was a “system failure.” His language is passive: things evidently just happened. But in fact a closer read of the Inspector General’s report shows that the figures involved and the schemes adopted had a clear provenance in the White House, and specifically in the warren of Karl Rove. The actors under investigation, Kyle Sampson and Monica Goodling, had come with Alberto Gonzales from the White House. They benefited from an extraordinary delegation of authority from Gonzales that allowed them, two thirty-somethings with little experience, to exercise the authority of the attorney general in the hiring and firing process. This didn’t “just happen.” It was the result of a careful plan for partisan entrenchment at Justice—consciously pursued in defiance of the law. A serious investigation would have focused on the senior figures responsible for this program. So what is the penalty for such a systematic violation of the law? Well, according to Mukasey, there isn’t one. Those involved have already suffered enough. Yes, they suffer because their misdeeds are now known.

Their misconduct has now been laid bare by the Justice Department for all to see.

* * *

Mukasey insists that the process of partisan entrenchment has been checked following his arrival.

* * *

The message that Mukasey is sending seems to be this: he will refuse to appoint a special prosecutor to look into the matter, whatever the inspector general suggests. In the Mukasey view, it will be enough punishment for the truth to come out.

Had enough yet? Ready to file a grievance?

From Dana Jill Simpson by Glynn Wilson of The Locust Fork Journal spoke to Dana Jill Simpson, who explains why we need to continue this fight:

After hearing about the speech and reading the stories about it, North Alabama attorney Jill Simpson said in a statement that Mukasey is a “disgrace to our country” and those who really pursue justice.

She called on President George W. Bush to restore the rule of law and fire Mukasey.

“He is showing a complete lack of respect for the rule of law by not charging individuals who were part of the United States Justice Department that broke the law,” she said. “He is creating a class of individuals that are above the law in this country and that is wrong. They should be tried for the crimes they committed, but Mr. Mukasey told the ABA they are going to get off Scott free.”

“These Doj employees broke the law it doesn’t matter where they work, ignorance to the law is no excuse, plus the evidence suggests these folks knew what they were doing and broke the law anyway. They should be tried and, if convicted, punished for their crimes,” she said.

Or at least disbarred. It’s time to file grievances against these attorneys.

Updated August 13, 2008 to fix title.

Updated August 15, 2008: More on Wes Teel here.

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Update: E-mail to Professor John Yoo

Professor John C. Yoo
U.S. District Court Judge
jyoo@law.berkeley.edu

Dear Professor Yoo:

I previously sent this e-mail back in April of this year, but, unfortunately, left out the ‘j’ so I sent it to y-o-o @ law.berkeley.edu. I noticed this error today after reading your op-ed, Supreme Court grabbed more power in recent term, in The Philadelphia Enquirer, which included your correct e-mail address and am, therefore, resending this previous e-mail:

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, Kyle D. Sampson, Harriet E. Miers and yourself. In my opinion, you have committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., that raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct in your handling of the Torture Memos violated the Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct.

E.M.

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Sen. Murkowski’s ‘reply’ to my web-mail

Yesterday, I sent a web-mail to Sen. Murkowski in which I requested her to reply to my allegations that she engaged in conduct that raise a substantial question as to her honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. Today, I received the following ‘reply’ from Sen. Murkowski:

Thank you for contacting my office. I will be mailing a response to Alaskans that have contacted me via e-mail. Due to the large volume of correspondence that I receive, I regret that I am only able to respond to their concerns directly. If you are not Alaskan, I encourage you to contact your representatives with your comments and/or concerns so that they may respond. Again, thank you for contacting me. – U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski

Although typical of the reply forms I’ve received from other United States Senators and Representatives, at least it’s a reply. I’ve still received nothing from Kyle Sampson, Harriet E. Miers (although someone from her personal attorney’s law firm stopped by TGP), Judge Mark Everett Fuller or John Yoo, who each received an e-mail from me regarding their own ethical lapses.

Update:  Interestingly, I received Sen. Murkowski’s auto-reply at 1:03 EST, which is only one minute after someone from senate.gov stopped by TGP:

Domain Name senate.gov ? (U.S. Government)
IP Address 156.33.3.# (U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms)
ISP U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms
Location
Continent : North America
Country : United States (Facts)
State : District of Columbia
City : Washington
Lat/Long : 38.9097, -77.0231 (Map)
Language unknown
Operating System Microsoft WinXP
Browser Firefox
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.16) Gecko/20080702 Firefox/2.0.0.16
Javascript disabled
Time of Visit Aug 11 2008 1:02:02 pm
Last Page View Aug 11 2008 1:02:02 pm
Visit Length 0 seconds
Page Views 1
Referring URL unknown
Visit Entry Page http://grievanceproj…rkowski//MESSAGEBODY
Visit Exit Page http://grievanceproj…rkowski//MESSAGEBODY
Out Click
Time Zone unknown
Visitor’s Time Unknown
Visit Number 2,950

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Web-mail to Sen. Lisa Murkowski

Updated 08-11-08 with this ‘reply‘ from Sen. Murkowski.

Sen. Lisa Murkowski
United States Senate
Contact via webmail

Washington, D.C. Office
709 Hart Senate Building
Washington D.C., 20510
202-224-6665
Fax 202-224-5301

Anchorage Office
510 L. Street, Suite 550
Anchorage, AK 99501
907-271-3735
Fax 907-276-4081

Fairbanks Office
101 12th Avenue
Room 216
Fairbanks, AK 99701
907-456-0233
Fax 907-451-7146

Juneau Delegation Office
P.O. Box 21247
709 West 9th Street, Room 971
Juneau, AK 99802
907-586-7400
Fax 907-586-8922

Kenai Delegation Office
110 Trading Bay Road
Suite 105
Kenai, AK 99611
907-283-5808
Fax 907-283-4363

Ketchikan Delegation Office
540 Water Street
Suite 101
Ketchikan, AK 99901
907-225-6880
Fax 907-225-0390

MatSu Delegation Office
851 East Westpoint Drive
Suite 307
Wasilla, AK 99654
907-376-7665
Fax 907-376-8526

Bethel Delegation Office
P.O. Box 1030
311 Willow Street
Building 3
Bethel, AK 99559
907-543-1639
Fax 907-543-1637

Dear Sen. Murkowski,

I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers, John Yoo, Mark Everett Fuller, Monica Goodling. I’ve also included you in this group due to your conduct in the purchase and reporting of the Kenai River property. I believe your conduct violated several of the rules of professional conduct of the Alaska Bar and that these actions raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct in purchasing and reporting the Kenai River property violated your ethical obligations as a member of the Alaska Bar.

E.M./The Grievance Project

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E-mail to Harriet E. Miers, No. 2

Harriet E. Miers, Esq.
Lock Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP
hmiers@lockelord.com

Copy to:

Jerry K. Clements, Esq.
Chair, Lock Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP
jclements@lockelord.com

George Taylor Manning, Esq.
Jones Day
gtmanning@jonesday.com

Dear Ms. Miers,

As I mentioned to you in my prior e-mail , I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, D. Kyle Sampson and yourself . In my opinion, you have committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of both Texas and Washington D.C that raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

I have now updated the statement of facts alleging various violations, by you, of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct with the recent Memorandum Opinion in COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. HARRIET MIERS, et al., Civil Action No. 08-0409 (JDB). in which United States District Judge John D. Bates confirms conduct of Ms. Miers that calls into question her fitness to practice law.

I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct while employed at the White House violated the D.C. Rules of Procedure.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

E.M.

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Update: Harriet E. Miers

I have updated the statement of facts alleging various violations by Harriet E. Miers of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct with the recent Memorandum Opinion in COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. HARRIET MIERS, et al., Civil Action No. 08-0409 (JDB). in which United States District Judge John D. Bates confirms conduct of Ms. Miers that calls into question her fitness to practice law.

Personal Information:

  • Name: Miers, Harriet E.
  • Bar: Texas
  • ID No: 00000067
  • Status: Active

Grievance Information: Texas

Allegations:

Willful Failure to Appear pursuant to a Lawful United States House Judiciary Committee Subpoena

On June 13, 2007, Rep. John Conyers, Jr., and Sen Patrick Leahy, as Chairmen of the United States House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, respectively, issued multiple subpoenas to former White House Counsel Harriet Miers to produce certain requested documents and to appear for testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law on July 12, 2007. See Conyers: Are Subpoenas Optional or Not?, Paul Kiel, TPMMuckraker.com, July 12, 2007; See also page 39, Memorandum to the Members of the Committee on the Judiciary from Rep. John C. Conyers, Jr., Chairman, dated July 24, 2007. On July 9, 2007, George Manning, attorney for Ms. Miers, informed the House Committee that Ms. Miers would “comply with the White House ‘direction[]‘ by current White House Counsel Fred Fielding who “‘directed’ Ms. Miers not to provide testimony to the Committee. Id. at page 41. Chairman Conyers and Subcommittee Chair Linda Sanchez wrote to Mr. Manning stating “that it was incumbent on Ms. Miers to appear so that the Subcommittee could consider her claims of privilege concerning specific documents or in response to particular questions posed as the hearing. Id. Ms. Miers failed to appear before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on July 12, 2007. Id. at page 42. After failing to appear, and in response to an inquiry by Chairman Conyers, “Mr. Manning informed Chairmen Conyers on July 17, 2007, that his client intended to remain noncom pliant with the subpoena. Id . In the Memorandum, Chairman Conyers states:

Even more extraordinary than the executive privilege claims in this matter is the assertion that Ms. Miers, a former White House official not currently employed by the federal government, is absolutely immune from even appearing before the Subcommittee as directed by subpoena. The Supreme Court has specifically held that even a President, while serving in that capacity, can be subpoena by a court and can be required to participate in a civil lawsuit for damages by a private party. [FN 281] The Court’s holding in Jones flies in the face of the claim that a former White House official is somehow immune from even appearing in response to a Congressional subpoena. As with Sara Taylor, who received a subpoena similar to Ms. Miers’ but chose to appear and answer some questions before the Senate Judiciary Committee, no one can doubt that Ms. Miers would have been asked some questions that would not have fallen within even the broadest assertion of executive privilege, but Ms. Miers simply refused to attend her hearing altogether. Id .

* * *

[T]here is an additional reason that Ms. Miers’ claims concerning executive privilege were and should be rejected. When a private party like Ms. Miers is subject to a subpoena, it is improper for the subpoenaed person simply to refuse to … testify based on an assertion of privilege by a third party, in this case, the White House. … To the extent that the White House objected to the subpoena to Ms. Miers as a private citizen, therefore, its proper recourse – which would have been more than adequate to protect its own asserted rights – would have been to seek a court order, rather than unilaterally “directing” Ms. Miers to disobey a lawful subpoena herself. Id. at page 46.

* * *

[M]s. Miers was not being misled by a government entity into thinking she was acting lawfully, but instead she chose, with full knowledge of the possible consequences, to follow the White House’s flawed “directive.” As the entity which issued the subpoena to Ms. Miers, only the Committee was in a position to give her “reasonable reliance” that she could lawfully refuse to comply, but in fact the Committee did precisely the opposite and made clear that she was required to obey her subpoena. Id. at page 48. (emphasis in original)

* * *

As explained in the July 12 and July 19 rulings upheld by the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, the refusal … of Ms. Miers to testify or even appear pursuant to subpoena [has] no proper legal basis. Id. at page 52. FN 281 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703-06 (1997). As the Court noted in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323-331 (1950), “persons summoned as witnesses have certain minimum duties and obligations which as necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery. …We have often iterated the importance of this public duty, which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform when properly summoned.”

As a result of her refusal to appear before the Subcommittee pursuant to a lawful subpoena, the House Judiciary Committee approved a contempt of Congress citation against Ms. Miers. House Democrats Approve Contempt of Congress Citations Wednesday Against 2 Presidential Aides, Laurie Kellman, AP News, July 25, 2007. See also House Committee Approves Contempt Citation, Paul Kiel, TPMMuckraker.com, July 25, 2007. Ms. Miers failure to appear pursuant to subpoena and her receipt of a contempt of Congress citation violate her ethical obligations under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct .

Chairman Conyers’ position has been upheld by United States District Judge John D. Bates in COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. HARRIET MIERS, et al., Civil Action No. 08-0409 (JDB). In his Memorandum Opinion, Judge Bates introduced the position taken by Ms.Miers as unprecedented, is without any support in the case law and fallacious:

Indeed, the aspect of this lawsuit that is unprecedented is the notion that Ms. Miers is absolutely immune from compelled congressional process. The Supreme Court has reserved absolute immunity for very narrow circumstances, involving the President’s personal exposure to suits for money damages based on his official conduct or concerning matters of national security or foreign affairs. The Executive’s current claim of absolute immunity from compelled congressional process for senior presidential aides is without any support in the case law. The fallacy of that claim was presaged in United States v. Nixon itself (id. at 706):

neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial [or congressional] process under all circumstances.

Id. at p. 3.

In footnote 1 of his Opinion, Judge Bates’ states that “The Court will refer to the defendants in this action, and to the executive branch and the current administration generally, as “the Executive.” Id. at p. 2. Accordingly, each and every reference to the Executive is a reference to, inter alia, Mr. Miers.

Because Ms. Miers presented no legitimate claim for absolute immunity, Judge Bates rules that Ms. Miers must, in fact, appear pursuant to the validly issued subpoenas of the United States House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary:

Clear precedent and persuasive policy reasons confirm that the Executive cannot be the
judge of its own privilege and hence Ms. Miers is not entitled to absolute immunity from
compelled congressional process. Ms. Miers is not excused from compliance with the
Committee’s subpoena by virtue of a claim of executive privilege that may ultimately be made. Instead, she must appear before the Committee to provide testimony, and invoke executive privilege where appropriate. [Footnote] 38 [is not included herein] And as the Supreme Court has directed, the judiciary remains the ultimate arbiter of an executive privilege claim, since it is the duty of the courts to declare what the law is. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-05; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.

Id. at p. 91.

In his analysis, Judge Bates provided an exhaustive review of the facts and then summarized the underlying facts in this matter:

The undisputed factual record, then, establishes the following. Notwithstanding a prolonged period of negotiation, [Footnote] 7[,] the parties reached a self-declared impasse with respect to the document production and testimony at issue here. Faced with that reality, the full House of Representatives voted to hold Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten in contempt of Congress and certified the Contempt Report to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia to pursue criminal enforcement of the contempt citations. The Attorney General then directed the U.S. Attorney not to proceed against Ms. Miers and Mr. Bolten. The Committee, then, filed this suit seeking civil enforcement of its subpoena authority by way of declaratory and injunctive relief.

[Footnote] 7 Mr. Fielding’s final letter to Chairman Conyers reveals that the Chairmen had “written ‘on eight previous occasions,’ three of which letters contain or incorporate specific proposals involving terms for a possible agreement.” See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 34.

Id. at pp. 16-17.

Judge Bates also addresses Ms. Miers’ claim of absolute immunity, which was the basis for her refusal to even appear before the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary:

The Executive maintains that absolute immunity shields Ms. Miers from compelled testimony before Congress. Although the exact reach of this proposed doctrine is not clear, the Executive insists that it applies only to “a very small cadre of senior advisors.” See Tr. at 96. The argument starts with the assertion that the President himself is absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony. There is no case that stands for that exact proposition, but the Executive maintains that the conclusion flows logically from Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), where the Supreme Court held that the President “is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.” Id. at 749. “Any such [congressional] power of compulsion over the President,” the Executive asserts, “would obviously threaten his independence and autonomy from Congress in violation of separation of powers principles.” See Defs.’ Reply at 40. The Executive then contends that “[those] same principles apply just as clearly to the President’s closest advisers.” Id. Because senior White House advisers “have no operational authority over government agencies . . . [t]heir sole function is to advise and assist the President in the exercise of his duties.” Id. at 41. Therefore, they must be regarded as the President’s “alter ego.” In a similar context, the Supreme Court has extended Speech or Debate Clause immunity to legislative aides who work closely with Members of Congress. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972). Accordingly, forcing close presidential advisors to testify before Congress would be tantamount to compelling the President himself to do so, a plainly untenable result in the Executive’s view. Indeed, as the Executive would have it, “[w]ere the President’s closest advisers subject to compelled testimony there would be no end to the demands that effectively could be placed upon the President himself.” See Defs.’ Reply at 43.

Unfortunately for the Executive, this line of argument has been virtually foreclosed by the
Supreme Court. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the plaintiff sued “senior White
House aides” for civil damages arising out of the defendants’ official actions. Id. at 802. The defendants argued that they were “entitled to a blanket protection of absolute immunity as an incident of their offices as Presidential aides.” Id. at 808. The Supreme Court rejected that position. Notwithstanding the absolute immunity extended to legislators, judges, prosecutors, and the President himself, the Court emphasized that “[f]or executive officials in general, however, our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm.” Id. at 807. Although there can be no doubt regarding “the importance to the President of loyal and efficient subordinates in executing his duties of office, . . . these factors, alone, [are] insufficient to justify absolute immunity.” Id. at 808-09 (discussing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).

Id. at pp. 79-80.

Judge Bates continues to decimate Ms. Miers’ claim of absolute immunity:

There is nothing left to the Executive’s primary argument in light of Harlow. This case, of course, does not involve national security or foreign policy, and the Executive does not invoke that mantra. The derivative, “alter ego” immunity that the Executive requests here due to Ms. Miers’s and Mr. Bolten’s close proximity to and association with the President has been explicitly and definitively rejected, and there is no basis for reaching a different conclusion here. Indeed, the Executive asks this Court to recognize precisely the type of blanket derivative absolute immunity that the Supreme Court declined to acknowledge in Harlow.

Id. at pp. 81-82.

Judge Bates also expressly pointed out that there is NO judicial precedent for Ms. Miers’ claims:

Thus, it would hardly be unprecedented for Ms. Miers to appear before Congress to testify and assert executive privilege where appropriate. Still, it is noteworthy that in an environment where there is no judicial support whatsoever for the Executive’s claim of absolute immunity, the historical record also does not reflect the wholesale compulsion by Congress of testimony from senior presidential advisors that the Executive fears. [Emphasis in original.]

Id. at pp. 83-84.

And that Ms. Miers’ claims are based solely on two (2) legal opinions issued by the Executive Branch itself:

Tellingly, the only authority that the Executive can muster in support of its absolute
immunity assertion are two OLC opinions authored by Attorney General Janet Reno and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury, respectively.

* * *

[T]he Court is not at all persuaded by the Reno and Bradbury opinions.

Id. at pp. 85-86.

Since Ms. Miers’ failure to appear pursuant to validly issued subpoenas is not supported by any colorable basis in law, her failure to appear is in violation of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, Ms. Miers’ conduct calls into question her fitness to practice law.

Supporting Links:

Conyers: Are Subpoenas Optional or Not?, Paul Kiel, TPMMuckraker.com, July 12, 2007

Memorandum to the Members of the Committee on the Judiciary regarding Full Committee Consideration of Report on the Refusal of Former White House Counsel Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten to Comply with Subpoenas By the House Judiciary Committee, Rep. John C. Conyers, Jr., Chairman, July 24, 2007

House Democrats Approve Contempt of Congress Citations Wednesday Against 2 Presidential Aides, Laurie Kellman, AP News, July 25, 2007

House Committee Approves Contempt Citation, Paul Kiel, TPMMuckraker.com, July 25, 2007

Rules Violated:

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Legal Schnauzer as interpreted by attorney legal*

Although I appreciated very much this post at Legal Schnauzer and the new visitors it generated here at the Grievance Project, I didn’t intend to post about it until I saw this post at attorney legal*.

Compare the schnauzery Legal Schnauzer:

E.M.’s efforts hit close to home for us here at Legal Schnauzer. As someone who has been repeatedly cheated by multiple attorneys–both my own and the dirtbag on the other side–and seen unlawful rulings issued by some 20 judges, I have enough material to keep Grievance Project going for months.

It would be nice to see other lawyers join E.M. in an effort to shine light on a profession that badly needs to be sanitized.

Unfortunately, most lawyers I’m aware of are making a pretty good living with the system the way it is. They don’t want to upset an ugly applecart that is compensating them far better than some other profession (journalism?) would.

with the strangely poetic attorney legal*:

E.M.’s efforts hit close to cave for us here at Legal Schnauzer. As someone who has obsolete repeatedly cheated by multiple attorneys–both my own and the dirtbag on the unprocessed side–and seen unlawful rulings issued by some 20 judges, I have satisfactory perceptible to keep Grievance Project going for months.

It would be nice to see current lawyers join E.M. in an effort to shine light on a profession that badly requirements to be sanitized.

Unfortunately, uttermost lawyers I’m aware of are making a picture reputable living with the classification the way it is. They don’t requirement to upset an ugly applecart that is compensating them far better than some current profession (journalism?) would.

There are a lot more interpretations of the Legal Schnauzer by attorney legal*.

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TGP had some interesting visitors this week

My posts on Kyle Sampson and Monica Marie Goodling received relatively strong traffic here at The Grievance Project. My sincere thanks to each of you who stopped

That site traffic included visitors from the following federal agencies that I found to be notable:

  • U.S. Senate Sergeant At Arms
  • USDA Office of Operations
  • US Department of Justice (multiple visits from different IP addresses)
  • Hunton & Williams (multiple visits from different IP addresses)
  • US Patent and Trademark Office
  • Headquarters USA AISC (Army)
  • Army Information Systems Command – Pentagon
  • Fannie Mae
  • US Sentencing Commission

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Click here for the StatCounter information

It’s not paranoia if they ARE out to get you, No. 7

In Episode No. 5 of the Paranoia, I highlighted the story of Jesselyn Radack as told by Jane Mayer, author of The Dark Side, in her July 14, 2008 interview, Six Questions for Jane Mayer, Author of The Dark Side, with Scott Horton at No Comment. Ms. Radack wrote about her experience in The Canary in the Coal Mine.

In this interview with Bill Moyers about her book, Ms. Mayer continues to provide material for this series:

BILL MOYERS: Who were some of the other conservative heroes, as you call them, in your book?

JANE MAYER: A lot of them are lawyers. And they were people inside the Justice Department who, one of whom, and I can’t name this one in particular, said when he looked around at some of the White House meetings – he was in where they were authorizing the President, literally, to torture people – if he thought that was necessary, he said, “I can’t, I could not believe these lunatics had taken over the country.” And I am not talking about someone who is a liberal Democrat. I’m talking about a very conservative member of this Administration. And there was a-

BILL MOYERS: Your source?

JANE MAYER: My source.

BILL MOYERS: And, yet, when these conservatives – as you write in your book – when these conservatives spoke up, Cheney and company retaliated against their own men.

JANE MAYER: People told me, “You can’t imagine what it was like inside the White House during this period.” There was such an atmosphere of intimidation. And when the lawyers, some of these lawyers tried to stand up to this later, they felt so endangered in some ways that, at one point, two of the top lawyers from the Justice Department developed this system of talking in codes to each other because they thought they might be being wiretapped. And they even felt-

BILL MOYERS: By their own government.

JANE MAYER: By their own government. They felt like they might be kind of weirdly in physical danger. They were actually scared to stand up to Vice President Cheney.

Full transcript here.

These attorneys were right to be frightened of Vice President Cheney. Just ask Harry Whittington.

H/t ThinkProgress via WriteChicPress

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Employment of Kyle D. Sampson reflects poorly on Hunton & Williams, LLP, No. 2

Updated March 10, 2009 to reflect Mr. Sampson’s leave of absence from Hunton & Williams.

My second e-mail to Ms. Field:

Andrea Bear Field
DC Office Managing Partner

cc: Kyle D. Sampson, Partner

Dear Ms. Field,

It has now been several months since I e-mailed you about your colleague, Mr. Kyle D. Sampson about his partnership in Hunton & Williams. As I noted in my prior e-mail, Mr. Sampson has committed numerous violations of the Utah and Washington, D.C., Rules of Professional Conduct. Since then, the United States Department of Justice Offices of Professional Responsibility and Office of the Inspector Generals, in their report, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General,

concluded that Sampson violated Department policy and federal law, and committed misconduct, by considering political or ideological affiliations when hiring IJs. Sampson knew that, historically, most IJ hiring was handled by career employees at EOIR. However, he moved that authority from EOIR and placed it in the OAG. Sampson told us that he had understood it was appropriate to consider “political criteria” in selecting IJs. He stated that his understanding was based on a conversation he had with Ohlson in April 2004 about the Attorney General’s direct appointment authority for IJs, combined with advice he claimed to have received from OLC that IJ hiring was not subject to civil service requirements.

However, as detailed above, Ohlson said he did not tell Sampson that direct appointments were exempt from federal civil service laws. Ohlson said he merely noted to Sampson that direct appointments had been used occasionally in the past to appoint IJs. Nor does the evidence support Sampson’s claim that OLC advised him that civil service laws did not apply to the career IJ positions. Neither OLC nor we could find any record of OLC ever providing such advice to Sampson, and the two officials he identified as possible sources of the advice – AAGs Goldsmith and Levin – had no recollection of advising Sampson that civil service laws did not apply to IJ hiring. To the contrary, the evidence showed that neither would have offered legal guidance on this point informally. While it is possible that Sampson mistakenly inferred on his own that civil service laws did not apply to direct appointments by the Attorney General, there is no evidence that he was ever so advised by OLC.

Moreover, as described in the document attached to his October 8, 2003, e-mail, Sampson sought to use the Attorney General’s direct appointment authority to appoint candidates as IJs who had been recommended by the White House and screened using political criteria
well before those conversations with OLC and Ohlson supposedly occurred. It is clear from Sampson’s October 8 e-mail that he contemplated using political considerations in IJ hiring at least 6 months before his conversation with Ohlson; at least 9 months before Levin (one
of the OLC Assistant Attorney Generals he cited as a possible source of OLC’s legal advice) became the head of OLC in July 2004; and before any conversation he had with Goldsmith (the other OLC Assistant Attorney General cited by Sampson), who did not begin serving in OLC until October 3, 2003, just 5 days before Sampson’s e-mail.

In sum, we concluded that the evidence did not support Sampson’s claim that he was advised by OLC that IJ positions were exempt from federal law governing career civil service positions.

Because the Attorney General’s direct appointment authority to hire IJs is a departure from the usual Department career hiring practices, we considered the possibility that Sampson may have been confused or mistaken about whether civil service laws apply to such hires. Yet, even if Sampson was confused or mistaken in his interpretation of the rules that applied to IJ hiring, we do not believe that would excuse his actions. His actions, which were carried out over a lengthy period of time and were not based on formal advice from anyone, systematically violated federal law and Department policy and constituted misconduct.

Report, pp. 117-118.

In sum, the evidence showed that Sampson, Williams, and Goodling violated federal law and Department policy, and Sampson and Goodling committed misconduct, by considering political and ideological affiliations in soliciting and selecting IJs, which are career positions protected by the civil service laws.

Report, p. 137.

This report confirms my opinion that Mr. Sampson committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of both Utah and Washington D.C that raise a substantial question as to his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. Now that you know of this report, you may want to check whether you are now ethically obligated to report your partner to the Washington, D.C. Bar.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. Please advise if you or your unethical partner wish to comment about these charges.

E.M.

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Monica Marie Goodling

Personal Information:

  • Name: Monica Marie Goodling
  • Bar: Virginia

    Bar Information: Virginia

    • ID No.: N/A
    • Status: Active (presumed)
    • Registered Address: None listed.
    • Registered Phone: None listed.
    • Bar: Virginia
      • No Certification for Fiscal Year, per Virginia State Bar’s Attorneys Without Malpractice database which “includes the names of lawyers who have certified that they represent clients drawn from the public and do not have malpractice insurance.” I have requested the status of Ms. Goodling’s malpractice coverage status from the Virginia Bar membership records and will update this post upon receipt of any information.
      • No result from search of Member Directory database, but inclusion in this database is optional. According to Alicia A. Parker, Sr. Staff Assistant, Virginia State Bar membership records: “Monica Marie Goodling is an active member of the Virginia State Bar in good standing with no record of public discipline.”
      • As noted below, the Virginia State Bar Disciplined Attorneys database is not currently available (last checked July 29, 2008). According to Lily M. Norman, Assistant Clerk, Virginia State Bar Clerk: “A record check on the above attorney has revealed no public discipline!”

    Grievance Information: Virginia

    Grievance Information: Washington, D.C.

    File a grievance against Ms. Goodling

    1. Print, complete and sign the official Complaint Form for Virginia (or .pdf );
    2. Print and attach this page to the Complaint Form; and
    3. Mail the complaint to the address noted on the Complaint Form.

    The Preamble to the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides, in part, that

    A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges,
    other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.

    * * *

    The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.

    * * *

    The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.

    Although testifying that she ‘may have crossed the line’ in violating civil service rules, Ms. Goodling has denied engaging in criminal conduct. Her denial, however, must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances, as defined in the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct (.pdf):

    “Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from circumstances.

    * * *

    “Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.

    “Knowingly,” “known” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.

    * * *

    “Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.

    “Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.

    “Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.

    * * *

    “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.

    Specifically, Ms. Goodling’s conduct violated the following the following Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct (.pdf) :

    • Rule 1.2. Scope of Representation
    • Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule
    • Rule 1.16. Declining or Terminating Representation
    • Rule 2.1. Advisor
    • Rule 3.4. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
    • Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others
    • Rule 4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons
    • Rule 5.4. Professional Independence of a Lawyer
    • Rule 8.2. Judicial and Legal Officials
    • Rule 8.4. Misconduct
    • Rule 8.5. Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law

    Allegation: Monica Goodling engaged in conduct that was a violation of federal laws that prohibit the consideration of political, sexual orientation and other impermissible criteria in making hiring decisions while employed by the Department of Justice.

    As confirmed by the United States Department of Justice Offices of Professional Responsibility and Office of the Inspector Generals in their report, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General:

    The evidence demonstrated that Goodling violated Department policy and federal law, and committed misconduct, by considering political or ideological affiliations in the appointment of IJs and BIA members. Goodling admitted in her congressional testimony that she took political considerations into account” in IJ and BIA hiring. She stated that Sampson had told her that IJ hiring was not subject to civil service laws, and that she “assumed” those laws did not apply to BIA ember hiring. The evidence showed that she used political considerations in assessing candidates for both IJ and BIA positions.

    As detailed above, our investigation found that she solicited and received résumés for IJ and BIA candidates from the White House, from Republican members of Congress, the Republican National Lawyers Association, the Federalist Society, and from individuals with Republican
    Party affiliations. We found no evidence that she solicited candidates from any sources she thought had Democratic affiliations.

    Goodling also admitted in her congressional testimony that she researched Internet sites to learn whether candidates for IJ positions had made financial contributions to political parties. She admitted further that she conducted computer searches on such candidates. Evidence from our investigation revealed that she used the Nexis search string she had received from Williams to conduct research on IJ candidates. Both Angela Williamson and the OIPL employee who briefly assisted Goodling in late 2006 testified to conducting such searches, and the December 5, 2006 e-mail from Goodling to the OIPL employee contains the entire Williams search string, with a few additional terms added by Goodling. We also found documents that were obtained through the search string, which bore markings showing that the search string had been used. Furthermore, we found that Goodling ran the search string on candidates who had applied in response to the public announcements and whose résumés were forwarded in packets by EOIR.

    We also found several instances in which candidates for IJ or BIA positions were asked to fill out the White House PPO form, which sought information about the candidates’ political party affiliation and about their activities to support the Bush/Cheney campaigns.

    Goodling asserted that she had been advised by Sampson that it was appropriate to take political factors into account in hiring IJs. Even assuming Goodling received this advice, her conduct showed that she knew that political factors could not be considered in hiring for career IJ positions. First, she told several IJ or BIA candidates that they should not have been asked to complete the White House PPO form that sought information about political affiliation and voting history. Despite that knowledge, Goodling conducted research on IJ candidates to learn the same kind of information covered by the PPO forms. Second, Goodling’s claim that she believed it was appropriate to use political considerations in selecting IJs is inconsistent with the statements she made to the Civil Division attorney handling the Gonzalez v. Gonzales litigation. She stated to the Civil Division attorney that she did not use political considerations in selecting IJs, a position she reversed in her immunized
    testimony before Congress. If Goodling actually believed that political considerations were appropriate in IJ hiring, and if she had been told by Sampson that OLC had so advised, it is reasonable to believe that she would have said so to the Civil Division attorney, rather than making such inaccurate statements.

    Goodling also acknowledged that Sampson never told her that the civil service laws did not apply to BIA member hiring. Rather, she testified that she “assumed” that to be the case. Even if that assumption was initially justified, and we believe it was not, we determined that
    Goodling subsequently asked an OLC attorney for an opinion regarding the legal framework for hiring the Chair and Vice Chair of the BIA. She was advised that all BIA positions were either Schedule A career or SES career positions. Yet, despite having received this advice, she followed the same procedures she used in selecting IJ candidates, and considered
    political or ideological affiliations in recommending four individuals for BIA positions. [FN] 83

    Finally, we concluded that Goodling engaged in misconduct by making misrepresentations to the Civil Division attorneys representing the Department in the Gonzalez v. Gonzales litigation. An attorney from the Civil Division interviewed Goodling in January 2007 to learn how the OAG had handled the IJ hiring process. In the interview, Goodling told the attorney that she did not take political considerations into account in IJ hiring. The Civil Division attorney’s recollection of this point was specific and was corroborated by the memoranda he wrote
    contemporaneously and circulated within the Department in connection with deliberations about how to handle the lawsuit.

    [FN] 83 We also note that the political screening Goodling conducted on IJ candidates (even candidates provided by the White House) caused significant delays in filling IJ vacancies and significantly contributed to an increasing number of unfilled IJ positions.

    Report, pp. 117-118.

    In sum, the evidence showed that Sampson, Williams, and Goodling violated federal law and Department policy, and Sampson and Goodling committed misconduct, by considering political and ideological affiliations in soliciting and selecting IJs, which are career positions protected by the civil service laws.

    Report, p. 137.

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    Text and comments of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct violated by Ms. Goodling

    Update: Kyle D. Sampson

    I have updated the statement of facts alleging various ethical violations by Kyle D. Sampson of the Utah and Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct with the recent report, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General, by the United States Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility and Office of the Inspector General, which concluded that Kyle D. Sampson engaged in conduct during the course of his employment at the Department Justice that calls into question his fitness to practice law.

    Personal Information:

    • Name: Sampson, Kyle D.
    • Bar: Utah
    • ID No: 8112
    • Status: Active

    Grievance Information: Utah

    Grievance Information: Washington, D.C.

    Allegations:

    Illegal Utilization of political considerations personally and in conjunction with Monica Goodling in Hiring and Firing Personnel at the Department of Justice in violation of the Hatch Act

    As originally reported by Dan Eggen in the Washington Post,

    “The Justice Department considered political affiliation in screening applicants for immigration court judgeships for several years until hiring was frozen in December after objections from department lawyers, current and former officials said yesterday. “The disclosures mean that the Justice Department may have violated civil service laws, which prohibit political considerations in hiring, for as long as two years before the tenure of Monica M. Goodling, the former aide to Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales who testified about the practice this week. “Goodling told the House Judiciary Committee on Wednesday that she “crossed the line” in considering political affiliation for several categories of career applicants at Justice, including immigration judges.

    * * *

    “The department’s hiring practices have come under scrutiny in the furor over the firings last year of nine U.S. attorneys. A Justice Department investigation of the dismissals has been expanded to include whether Goodling and other Gonzales aides improperly took politics into account in hiring for nonpolitical jobs. “Goodling testified that Sampson told her that the department’s Office of Legal Counsel had concluded that immigration judges were not covered by civil service rules. The Justice Department said after her testimony that it had “located no record” of an OLC opinion that reached that conclusion.”

    Officials Say Justice Dept. Based Hires on Politics Before Goodling Tenure, Dan Eggen, Washington Post, May 26, 2007

    Additional Sources:

    Letter regarding Investigation of Kyle Sampson, From U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, August 24, 2007

    Document Shows Widening Probe Into DOJ Hiring , Paul Kane, Washington Post, August 30, 2007

    This has now been confirmed by the United States Department of Justice Offices of Professional Responsibility and Office of the Inspector Generals in their report, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General:

    We concluded that Sampson violated Department policy and federal law, and committed misconduct, by considering political or ideological affiliations when hiring IJs. Sampson knew that, historically, most IJ hiring was handled by career employees at EOIR. However, he moved that authority from EOIR and placed it in the OAG. Sampson told us that he had understood it was appropriate to consider “political criteria” in selecting IJs. He stated that his understanding was based on a conversation he had with Ohlson in April 2004 about the Attorney General’s direct appointment authority for IJs, combined with advice he claimed to have received from OLC that IJ hiring was not subject to civil service requirements.

    However, as detailed above, Ohlson said he did not tell Sampson that direct appointments were exempt from federal civil service laws. Ohlson said he merely noted to Sampson that direct appointments had been used occasionally in the past to appoint IJs. Nor does the evidence support Sampson’s claim that OLC advised him that civil service laws did not apply to the career IJ positions. Neither OLC nor we could find any record of OLC ever providing such advice to Sampson, and the two officials he identified as possible sources of the advice – AAGs Goldsmith and Levin – had no recollection of advising Sampson that civil service laws did not apply to IJ hiring. To the contrary, the evidence showed that neither would have offered legal guidance on this point informally. While it is possible that Sampson mistakenly inferred on his own that civil service laws did not apply to direct appointments by the Attorney General, there is no evidence that he was ever so advised by OLC.

    Moreover, as described in the document attached to his October 8, 2003, e-mail, Sampson sought to use the Attorney General’s direct appointment authority to appoint candidates as IJs who had been recommended by the White House and screened using political criteria
    well before those conversations with OLC and Ohlson supposedly occurred. It is clear from Sampson’s October 8 e-mail that he contemplated using political considerations in IJ hiring at least 6 months before his conversation with Ohlson; at least 9 months before Levin (one
    of the OLC Assistant Attorney Generals he cited as a possible source of OLC’s legal advice) became the head of OLC in July 2004; and before any conversation he had with Goldsmith (the other OLC Assistant Attorney General cited by Sampson), who did not begin serving in OLC until October 3, 2003, just 5 days before Sampson’s e-mail.

    In sum, we concluded that the evidence did not support Sampson’s claim that he was advised by OLC that IJ positions were exempt from federal law governing career civil service positions.

    Because the Attorney General’s direct appointment authority to hire IJs is a departure from the usual Department career hiring practices, we considered the possibility that Sampson may have been confused or mistaken about whether civil service laws apply to such hires. Yet, even if Sampson was confused or mistaken in his interpretation of the rules that applied to IJ hiring, we do not believe that would excuse his actions. His actions, which were carried out over a lengthy period of time and were not based on formal advice from anyone, systematically violated federal law and Department policy and constituted misconduct.

    Report, pp. 117-118.

    In sum, the evidence showed that Sampson, Williams, and Goodling violated federal law and Department policy, and Sampson and Goodling committed misconduct, by considering political and ideological affiliations in soliciting and selecting IJs, which are career positions protected by the civil service laws.

    Report, p. 137.

    Rules Violated (Pursuant to Rule 8.5. Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law , Utah Rules of Professional Conduct):

    1. Rule 8.4 – Misconduct – This Rule governed the practice of law in the District of Columbia from January 1, 1991, through January 31, 2007. As of February 1, 2007, the New Rules took effect.

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    It’s not paranoia if they ARE out to get you, No. 6

    At No Comment, Scott Horton continues with his stellar reporting on the politicization of, and abuse of power in, the Department of Justice with this July 23, 2008 post of his Six Questions for Former U.S. Attorney David Iglesias, Author of In Justice. Mr. Iglesias. one of the United States Attorneys fired by DoJ on December 7 – Pearl Harbor Day – of 2007, explains, in a nutshell, what happened:

    One cannot fully comprehend the recent Justice Department meltdown without understanding the belief in New Mexico, Missouri, and Washington State Republican circles, that the 2000 election and subsequent contests were rife with fraud. It set the stage for what followed during the scandal surrounding the forced resignations in 2006 of United States Attorneys John McKay of Seattle, Todd Graves of Kansas City, and me. We were all criticized by Republican operatives for not filing voter or election fraud cases in our respective districts. Each of us examined the evidence and did not find any provable cases, so no indictments were filed. I remember hearing Republican activists allege that the Democrats stole the election in New Mexico during the 2000 presidential election. I heard that illegal immigrants were voting in large numbers. If true this would be criminal, but prosecutors may not base their cases on rumor and innuendo but on admissible evidence they can prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. * * *

    Voter fraud became the bogeyman of New Mexico politics. And what person was best equipped to prevent this alleged problem from happening again? The United States Attorney. Hence in the summer of 2002 the Executive Office of United States Attorney in Washington emailed all 93 U.S. Attorneys asking us to work with state and local election officials to prevent election fraud. * * * That changed dramatically in 2004, when the local media covered numerous instances of apparent voter fraud. * * *

    In response, I set up one of only two election fraud task forces in the country. * * *

    I also set up a hotline for citizens to call into the local FBI office. I believed that we would find provable cases of fraud that I could prosecute, and I was determined to find them. * * * After almost two years of investigation, we were unable to come up with a single prosecutable case. I conferred with main Justice and with the local FBI office. It was ultimately my call, and I followed the professional staff in finding that there wasn’t enough evidence to support a prosecution. Main Justice and the FBI did not disagree with my assessment.

    But local Republican leaders disagreed. They could not believe that the investigation failed to produce a prosecution. During the 2004-06 time period, Rumaldo Armijo and I received numerous phone calls and emails from former state G.O.P. counsel Patrick Rogers. He exhorted us to file cases. We could only tell him what we would tell any member of the public–that we would file provable cases and even then, we would not file a case just before an election if we felt it could affect the outcome of the election. This was policy of the Justice Department, per career attorney Craig Donsanto, who wrote the election fraud manual that all U.S. attorneys used. Significantly, Rogers never told Armijo or me that he was also an official of a group called the American Center for Voting Rights—a G.O.P. organization alleged to be engaged in voter suppression efforts. I did not find this important fact until after I left the Justice Department. I knew Rogers to be involved in the litigation over the voter I.D. law and knew him to be a fiercely partisan Republican. In 2006, I heard from a friend of mine who was active in the state party that the party was upset with me. At one point he implored me, “can’t you file something?” So I heard the rumbling of the party in the 2005-06 timeframe.

    I was aware of the simmering discontent of the local Republicans. Just before the 2006 midterm election that discontent boiled over when I received a highly improper phone call from Congresswoman Heather Wilson in mid-October and another call from Senator Pete Domenici in late October. * * * Both Wilson and Domenici were talking about the same investigation. Wilson had used her opponent’s weak record in pursuing corruption cases as part of her attack strategy. I knew that if I told them I was close to indicting the case that would be used by Wilson in connection with her election campaign. I also knew they had no legitimate need to know when I would be filing the indictments. I was put on the list to be fired on November 7, 2006—Election Day. The timeline alone is damning and it was clear to me that I was placed on the list because I would not rush an indictment of a high-profile Democrat in a way that would benefit Wilson in her campaign. * * *

    As Mr. Horton notes in his introduction,

    His meteoric career is not simply the stuff of movies–after all, some of David Iglesias’s experiences as a Navy JAG at Guantánamo Bay furnished the material for Aaron Sorkin’s play “A Few Good Men,” later converted into a Hollywood blockbuster. (Italics in original.)

    Even a stellar career in the Navy that is ‘the stuff of movies’ followed by six (6) years of public service as a United States Attorney was not sufficient to insulate Mr. Iglesias from the Bush administration. And throughout this whole sordid affair, Mr. Iglesias has maintained his professionalism, demonstrated his strength of character and, as a result, provides a model of conduct to which all attorneys should strive to emulate.

    Read the rest of the interview here .

    Buy David Iglesias’ book In Justice: Inside the Scandal That Rocked the Bush Administration.

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    It’s not paranoia if they ARE out to get you, No. 5

    In his July 14, 2008 No Comment post, Six Questions for Jane Mayer, Author of The Dark Side, Scott Horton introduces his interview with Jane Mayer, author of The Dark Side:

    In a series of gripping articles, Jane Mayer has chronicled the Bush Administration’s grim and furtive dealings with torture and has exposed both the individuals within the administration who “made it happen” (a group that starts with Vice President Cheney and his chief of staff, David Addington), the team of psychologists who put together the palette of techniques, and the Fox television program “24,” which was developed to help sell it to the American public. In a new book, The Dark Side, Mayer puts together the major conclusions from her articles and fills in a number of important gaps. Most significantly, we learn the details on the torture techniques and the drama behind the fierce and lingering struggle within the administration over torture, and we learn that many within the administration recognized the potential criminal accountability they faced over these torture tactics and moved frantically to protect themselves from possible future prosecution. I put six questions to Jane Mayer on the subject of her book, The Dark Side. (italics in original)

    In the interview, Ms. Mayer describes yet another instance in which the Bush administration has retaliated against someone who dared raise a voice in dissent:

    [Horton:] You spend more time showing how the torture process compromised lawyers than how it compromised health care professionals. One of the more revealing cases involves Jessica (sic) Radack, a young career attorney in the Justice Department’s Honors Program, who dispensed ethics advice concerning plans for the interrogation of John Walker Lindh. It seems that her advice was contrary to the ethical views of senior Bush Administration lawyers, and you note that when a federal judge demanded to see the internal Department of Justice records relating to the matter, all of Radack’s emails, including the advice actually dispensed, had been deleted and the hard copies removed, and none of this was furnished to the court. Did the Justice Department ever undertake an internal probe into the obstruction?

    [Mayer:] Radack was in some ways an early guinea pig showing how high the costs were for anyone—including administration lawyers—who dissented from the Bush Administration’s determination to rewrite the rules for the treatment of terrorists. Her job in the department was to give ethical advice. She was asked whether an FBI officer in Afghanistan could interrogate John Walker Lindh and use his statements against him in any future trial. By the time she was asked this, however, as she knew, Lindh’s father had already hired a lawyer to represent him. So she concluded that it would not be proper for the FBI to question him outside the presence of his counsel.

    To her amazement, the FBI agent went ahead and did so anyway, and then the prosecutors in the Justice Department proceeded to use Lindh’s statements against him in their criminal prosecution. She told me, “It was like ethics were out the window. After 9/11, it was, like, ‘anything goes’ in the name of terrorism. It felt like they’d made up their minds to get him, regardless of the process.” Radack believed that the role of the ethics office was to “rein in the cowboys” whose zeal to stop criminals sometimes led them to overstep legal boundaries. “But after 9/11 we were bending ethics to fit our needs,” she said. “Something wrong was going on. It wasn’t just fishy—it stank.”

    What happened next was truly scary. She tried to ensure that a judge overseeing the case, who asked for all information regarding the Department’s handling of Lindh, was given the full record, including her own contrary advice. But instead, she said she found that her superiors at Justice sent the judge only selective portions of the record, excluding her contrary opinion. Her case files, she said, were tampered with, and documents missing. Among the senior Justice Department officials who were sent her files, she said was Alice Fisher, a deputy to Michael Chertoff who followed him as head of the Department’s Criminal Division.

    Radack complained about what she thought were serious omissions of the record being withheld from the judge. Within weeks of disagreeing with the top Justice Department officials, Radack went from having been singled out for praise, to being hounded out of the department. Radack got a job in private practice, but after her story appeared in Newsweek, with copies of some of her emails, the Justice Department opened a leak investigation. The U.S. Attorney then opened a criminal investigation. Radack has since become an advocate for whistle-blowers’ rights. But the episode served as a warning to anyone in the government who stood in the way of the so-called, “New Paradigm.” It is unclear to me what sort of investigation, if any, there has been of this case, including of the potential obstruction. (emphasis supplied)

    Read the rest of the interview here.

    Update: Prof. David Luban, who blogs at Balkinzation, notes by e-mail that Jesselyn Radack wrote about this experience in The Canary in the Coal Mine, which is available for purchase here.

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    Nominees needed for 10 Worst U.S. Prosecutors for 2008

    I was searching for like-minded souls one night several months ago when I stumbled upon the “good” prosecutors at Bad Prosecutors. I felt right at home when I read this statement :

    Welcome! This Blog is published by the Bennett Law Firm with Sherri Katz and Bob Bennett being principal contributors. For over thirty years, the firm has been involved in criminal, civil, and administrative investigations. Both Sherri Katz and Bob Bennett have served in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas. They consider themselves to be “good” prosecutors with experience in both state district attorneys offices and federal prosecutors with the United States Attorney’s Office. When we see bad prosecutors or prosecutors engaged in bad acts, we see a need to speak out and let the world know of our protestations and anger. Maybe you feel the same? If so, we hope you will share with us and others what bad prosecutors and bad prosecutorial acts the world needs to know about. Thru notoriety, recusals, and even disbarments, we hope to bring to justice to what some bad prosecutors do. (Emphasis supplied.)

    Mr. Bennett is a partner with the Bennett Law Firm, L.L.P., which is

    … the largest law firm in Texas that specializes in representing members of the legal profession in grievance matters and other professional concerns. Robert Bennett has represented lawyers before the Grievance or “Just Cause” in every part of the state in the last ten (10) years. Depending on the allegations brought by the State Bar Commission, he has generally been able to meet the expectations of his clients and negotiated a resolution that is acceptable.

    Yesterday, Bob Bennett honored my blog with this comment asking for help in preparing his 10 Worst U.S. Prosecutors for 2008:

    we are in the process of updating our 10 Worse Prosecutors for 2008 and would appreciate any nominations. We are looking at the prosecutors in Alabama. Any suggestions would be helpful.

    I would start with Leura Canary, Stephen Feaga, Louis Franklin, Alice Martin, Richard Gregorie, Rachel Paulose and Dunn Lampton. Please leave a comment if you have any suggestions. Please also take some time to check out Bad Prosecutors.

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    It’s not paranoia if they ARE out to get you, No. 4

    h/t: Nonnie at Hysterical Raisins, via e-mail, and Roger Shuler at Legal Schnauzer

    In her July 11, 2008 Raw Story article Alabama US Attorney denies any involvement in university editor’s termination, Lindsay Beyerstein shines light on the political firing of blogger Roger Shuler by the University of Alabama Birmingham for blogging:

    The abrupt dismissal of a veteran University of Alabama employee who blogged about the firing of seven US Attorneys has added a bizarre new twist to allegations that the state’s US Attorneys targeted political opponents for prosecution.

    Roger Shuler — a high-profile blogger and leading critic of Alabama’s judicial system — has written extensively about alleged corruption among U.S. Attorneys for over a year. In particular, Shuler focused on two US Attorneys from his home state: Alice H. Martin of the Northern District and Leura G. Canary of the Middle District.

    An editor in the University of Alabama Birmingham publications office for the last 12 years and a university employee for 19, Shuler was placed on administrative leave May 7 and formally fired May 19.

    “I had worked there for 19 years and never received anything but positive performance reviews,” Schuler [sic] wrote RAW STORY in May. “I never received an oral warning about anything. Then I was fired without warning, contrary to university policy and almost certainly in violation of federal law.”

    Though he admits he can’t prove it, Shuler believes that he was fired for criticizing Alice Martin and other high-ranking political players in Alabama, including Canary, and Alabama’s Republican governor, Bob Riley.

    He’s not alone. Scott Horton, a journalist for Harper’s Magazine and a professor at Columbia University who has written extensively about the US Attorney scandal, also believes Shuler’s firing was politically fueled.

    “Shuler’s problem arose not because he blogged nor because he did so from his workplace, because it’s clear he didn’t,” says Horton, who has been following both the Siegelman and Shuler’s cases closely. “His problem came from the fact that he wrote critical, well received insights targeting a number of very powerful figures in Alabama, starting with U.S. Attorney Alice Martin and prominent Republicans with which she is aligned, and including a number of major figures in the Alabama media.”

    These allegations are just the introduction to the article. Beyerstein follows with the details that back up these allegations in the remainder of Alabama US Attorney denies any involvement in university editor’s termination .

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    Welcome, USDOJ.

    Thank you for visiting The Grievance Project.  (Statcounter and Sitemeter information is at the end of this post).

    Earlier today, your boss, Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, testified before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Attorney General Mukasey concluded his prepared remarks with the following statement:

    As I have said many times, to members of the public and to Department employees, it is crucial that we pursue our cases based solely on what the law and facts require, and that we hire our career people without regard for improper political considerations. It is equally crucial that the American people have complete confidence in the propriety of what we do. My promise to you is that I have done, and I will continue to do, what I can to ensure that politics is kept out of decisions about cases and out of decisions about career hiring at the Department of Justice.

    I wouldn’t doubt that the minimal attention that Attorney General Mukasey has paid to the politicization at DOJ is, in fact, the outer limit of what he can or will do (or is allowed to do) to ensure that politics is kept out of the Department. What he has done, however, is simply not enough. If you’re an attorney at DOJ, whether in Arlington, Virginia (according to Statcounter), Washington, D.C. (according to SiteMeter) or elsewhere, you are likely to have an affirmative obligation under the rules of professional conduct in which you’re admitted to report the ethical violations of other attorneys, such as Alberto Gonzales, Kyle D. Sampson, Lisa Murkowski, Harriet E. Miers, Mark Everett Fuller, John Yoo and Michael B. Elston and Esther Slater McDonald, who engage in conduct that raises questions as the attorney’s fitness to practice law. Specifically, Rule 8.3 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduc (.pdf) states that

    A lawyer having reliable information that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law shall inform the appropriate professional authority.

    I encourage you to file a grievance against any former or current DOJ attorney who you know has breached his or her ethical obligations.

    Rule 8.3 of the Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct similarly provides that

    A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.

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    CREW files grievances against Michael J. Elston and Esther Slater McDonald

    As far back as 2006, I began contacting various parties – including CREW – to suggest that an organized effort to file grievances would be an effective tactic for responding to the litany of attorneys engaged in questionable ethical conduct. Like most people and organizations I contacted, CREW never responded. Of the few responses I did receive, only one or two were in support of the idea and the rest usually just stated a simple reason or two why the idea wouldn’t work. As attorney after attorney continued to violate their ethical obligations with impunity, my frustration grew that there was no organized effort to promote a grievance strategy. As a result, I launched The Grievance Project in October, 2007.

    When the DOJ IG report An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring in the Department of Justice Honors Program and Summer Law Intern Program was released, I began preparing a grievance complaint against Michael J. Elston for his conduct described therein as well as for his role in the firing of United States Attorneys, including John McKay, Bud Cummins, Carol Lam and Paul Charlton. When I first saw Marcy Wheeler’s headline today declaring that CREW had filed grievances against Mr. Elston, my initial thoughts were that I just got ’scooped’ by CREW and that I had wasted a lot time working on my Elston complaint. Almost immediately, I was quite pleased that CREW had finally adopted a (my?) grievance strategy and had filed the complaints.

    A few thoughts now that I’ve read both Wheeler’s post and CREW’s press release:

    • Marcy Wheeler notes that this may have an affect on the law firms that have hired Mr. Elston and Ms. Esther Slater McDonald, stating that “[a]t the very least, one would hope this would embarrass the big corporate firms these two alleged law-breakers work for. After all, it appears that Alberto Gonzales still has only temporary employment. If all these hacks found themselves unemployable because of what they did, that’d be a start.” This was precisely my point regarding Hunton & Williams when they hired Kyle D. Sampson .
    • Although Mr. Elston is a member of the Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Virginia Bars, CREW filed a complaint against Mr. Elston only in Virginia and only sent copies of Virginia complaint to the the Illinois, Kansas and Missouri Bars. I believe a stronger approach would not just provide these states with a copy of the Virginia complaint but would also be to file official complaints against Mr. Elston in Illinois, Kansas and Missouri (or .pdf ).
    • CREW’s complaint against Mr. Elston only addresses his violations of his ethical obligations with respect to the issues raised in the DOJ IG report . Because Mr. Elston is also in violation of his ethical obligations due to his involvement with his role in the firing of United States Attorneys, including John McKay, Bud Cummins, Carol Lam and Paul Charlton, I will finish my Elston complaint with respect to to these violations.
    • Now that CREW has adopted a (my?) grievance strategy, I’ve prepared grievance complaints against Alberto Gonzales, Kyle D. Sampson, Lisa Murkowski, Harriet E. Miers, Mark Everett Fuller, and John Yoo that are ready for CREW to simply print and file. If you agree, contact:
      • Naomi Seligman, CREW’s Deputy Director and Communications Director, at 202.408.5565 or nseligman @ citizensforethics.org, and
      • Melanie Sloan, CREW’s Executive Director, at msloan @ citizensforethics.org.

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    Texas Watch files ethics complaints against Texas Supreme Court justices

    Updated August 15, 2008 with results of August 14, 2008 hearings.

    Chris Rizo at The Southeast Texas Record (h/t The Daily Muck at TPMMuckraker) reported yesterday that “[a]t least two Texas Supreme Court justices have ethics complaints pending against them” that were “filed by the judicial watchdog group Texas Watch” and which are scheduled for review on August 14, 2008. Mr. Rizo reports that the

    The complaint against [Justice Nathan] Hecht stems from representation by the Jackson Walker law firm in a dispute with the Commission on Judicial Conduct in 2006 over promoting President George W. Bush’s short-lived nomination of former White House Counsel Harriet Miers to the U.S.
    Supreme Court.

    The complaint against [Justice David] Medina alleges that he may have violated state law by paying himself nearly $57,000 from his political funds over three years as mileage reimbursement for commuting between Austin and his Houston-area home.

    Texas Watch announced filing the complaints against Justices Hecht and Medina back in January 24, 2008, at which time they also announced a third complaint against a sitting Texas Supreme Court justice:

    AUSTIN – Complaints were filed this morning against Texas Supreme Court Justices Nathan Hecht and David Medina with the Texas Ethics Commission by the citizens group Texas Watch. The complaints allege that the justices used political contributions to pay for personal travel.

    * * *

    Earlier this week, Texas Watch filed a complaint against Justice Paul Green for violating the same statutory prohibition on converting political funds to personal use by paying for commuting expenses. Texas Watch has also notified the Public Integrity Unit of the Travis County District Attorney’s office of the complaints the group filed today.

    Complete January 24, 2008 Texas Watch Press Release here

    ========================================================

    Until I read Chris Rizo’s article today, I hadn’t heard of Texas Watch. Texas Watch describes itself as

    a non-partisan, advocacy organization working to improve consumer and insurance protections for Texas families. Texas Watch’s thousands of activists across the state make their voices heard to preserve their rights and protections. Texas Watch strives to provide a counter to wealthy special interest lobby efforts and ensure Texas laws reflect the true needs of Texas families and consumers.

    The above complaints were filed under its Court Watch project which

    [f]or more than a decade, … has served to educat[e] the public about the importance of the Texas Supreme Court. Court Watch serves as a key resource on civil court issues, producing regular reports, analyses and releases to the public, the media and decision-makers. These activities foster broader public awareness, discussion and debate about the role of the Texas civil justice system and the actions of the Texas Supreme Court.

    Harriet E. Miers and former Texas Supreme Court justice Alberto Gonzales should be the next project for Court Watch.

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    E-mail to House Judiciary Committee regarding John Yoo

    U.S House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary via Committee Contact Form

    Honorable John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, via House Contact Form

    Hon. Howard L. Berman via House Contact Form

    Hon. Rick Boucher via House Contact Form

    Hon. Jerrold Nadler via House Contact Form

    Hon. Robert C. Scott via House Contact Form

    Hon. Melvin L. Watt via House Contact Form

    Hon. Zoe Lofgren via House Contact Form

    Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee via House Contact Form

    Hon. Maxine Waters via House Contact Form

    Hon. William D. Delahunt via e-mail

    Hon. Robert Wexler via House Contact Form

    Hon. Linda T. Sánchez via House Contact Form

    Hon. Steve Cohen via House Contact Form

    Hon. Hank Johnson via House Contact Form

    Hon. Betty Sutton via House Contact Form

    Hon. Luis Gutierrez via House Contact Form

    Hon. Brad Sherman via House Contact Form

    Hon. Tammy Baldwin via House Contact Form

    Hon. Anthony D. Weiner via House Contact Form

    Hon. Adam B. Schiff via House Contact Form

    Hon. Artur Davis via House Contact Form

    Hon. Debbie Wasserman Schultz via House Contact Form

    Hon. Keith Ellison via House Contact Form

    Dear Chairman Conyers and Democratic Members of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary:

    I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including John Yoo, Alberto Gonzales, D. Kyle Sampson, and Harriet Miers. In my opinion, Professor Yoo has committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., that raise a substantial question as to his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

    Please consider questioning Professor Yoo regarding his unethical conduct as an attorney with the Department of Justice.

    E.M.

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    Is John Yoo a Monster?

    No, according to John H. Richardson of Esquire. Why not?

    He wasn’t wrong all the time:

    Consider also that courts and Congress have endorsed many of Yoo’s opinions, including the use of military commissions and the extended detention without criminal charges of “enemy combatants” who are American citizens.

    The questions were really, really hard:

    And consider this — we still can’t even agree on the basic question that Yoo is asking his law class today, which turns out to be not a quibble or a technicality but the very first question that landed on his desk on the afternoon of September 11, 2001:

    Is this a war? How can the president respond? Can he use the Army? Will he need congressional approval? Is this a war? (Italics in original)

    He’s the administration scapegoat, a family man, a selfless public servant and agrees with several progressive ideas, such as a woman’s right to make her own health care decisions, or ‘unexpected quirks’ as Mr. Richardson calls them:

    These are hard questions. Most of us shrug them off and judge Yoo and Bush through the lens of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo. But Yoo didn’t shrug them off. He put them at the center of his thinking. As a consequence, he is being hauled before Congress in May and will be forever defined by the abuses of the Bush administration.

    From his office, he has a million-dollar view of San Francisco and the Golden Gate Bridge. There are law books everywhere. His screen saver is a picture of his wife. His iPhone screen saver is a picture of his wife too, which helps take the edge off all the hate calls. On the floor, there’s a shopping bag from a local hippie institution called Amoeba Music. On the wall, a framed goodbye card from the Department of Justice. “Thank you for your excellent service to America,” John Ashcroft wrote. “We are stronger and safer because of you.”

    He turns out to have lots of unexpected quirks. He’s pro-choice. He thinks flag burning is a legitimate form of free speech. He thinks the government is “wasting a lot of resources” in the war on drugs. He thinks the phrase “war on terror” is misleading political rhetoric. He’s cowriting an article that makes a conservative case for gay marriage. “Our argument is, the state should just stay out of these things, because it doesn’t hurt anybody.” And he’s definitely alarmed by the more theocratic Republicans. “When Mike Huckabee says he wants to amend the Constitution so that it’s consistent with God’s law, that scares the bejesus out of me.”

    And people are angry with him and they let him know about their anger, and he’s smart, and he was practicing law on the cutting edge in the “heat of battle”, and he didn’t evacuate his D.C. office, worked there until 3:00 a.m. on September 12, 2001, and then he continued working from home, and other attorney’s signed off on his opinions, and his opinions were only supposed to be used to authorize torture by the CIA but not by the Army, and it was a “thankless job,” and he “really tried,” and “suicide terrorism in the age of nuclear weapons” is different, and we interned the Japanese in World War II (which is worse), and we only tortured 3 people, and waterboarding is only ‘”on the line” of being torture.

    Note however that, in this same article, Prof. Yoo justifies his advice because:

    His memo also includes a long list of examples of acts that various courts have found to be torture, page after page of severe beatings and electric shocks and even one case where guards shackled a man to a bed, placed a towel over his face, and poured water down his nose — a nearly exact description of waterboarding, “which people ignore because they focus on that one sentence,” Yoo says. “So if you read the whole opinion, I don’t think of it as a license to do anything you want to.”

    Mr. Richardson did manage to provide some counter arguments including these from Jonathon M. Freiman, attorney for Jose Padilla in Padilla’s civil suit against Prof. Yoo. Note how Mr. Freiman bristles, pounds Prof. Yoo and is “particularly passionate” and especially scornful:

    Jonathan Freiman, Jose Padilla’s attorney, bristles when I run Yoo’s arguments down for him. “The Supreme Court has said every time it’s been asked since 9/11, a state of war is not a blank check. The Constitution applies.”

    * * *

    It’s a dangerous question, Freiman says. “The argument that the entire United States has become a battlefield by virtue of those heinous attacks on 9/11 is just an argument to make the Constitution completely optional, an argument to extend presidential power to the level of monarchy — to every inch of life in this country.”

    For the next two hours, he pounds Yoo from every possible angle: They already had Padilla under arrest and could have held him under charges like conspiracy or levying war. But they wanted to interrogate him and they wanted to use harsh methods, so they just made up their own rules. This was the natural result of rejecting the Geneva Conventions instead of treating Al Qaeda members as ordinary war criminals. “Before 9/11, you’re either a criminal or a soldier. What the government said was, We want a third category where the black shade is drawn, where there are no protections whatsoever, where there is no law.”

    Freiman is particularly passionate when he rips into the torture memo itself. Did I know that the Justice Department was now investigating how it ever came to be written? Did I know that the man who took over Yoo’s department withdrew it, calling it “deeply flawed, sloppily reasoned, overbroad, and incautious in asserting extraordinary constitutional authorities on behalf of the president?” What Yoo should have done was look at the Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishment. He should have considered international treaties against torture and cruelty and civil rights along with a host of domestic laws and statutes. But Yoo wasn’t acting as an honest lawyer, he says. As the Padilla lawsuit states, he was “a key member of a small, secretive group of executive officials who exerted tremendous influence over antiterrorism policy and who were known as the ‘War Council.’ “ So he bent the law to justify a course of action he was already determined to take.

    Freiman is especially scornful about the “necessity argument,” as legal philosophers call it — the idea that the president can take extraordinary actions in an emergency to protect the nation, that the information in Padilla’s head was worth cracking it open. “That’s the argument that every despotic regime in every corner of the globe has been making for sixty years,” he says. “Necessity, national security. The Nazis invoked necessity too. The question is, How do you deal with those threats? Are you bound by human rights, or are you not?”

    This is why Freiman filed Padilla’s lawsuit against Yoo. To redraw that line, he says, to recover our sense of justice and decency, to salvage the idealism that once shone so bright, America must pass judgment on John Yoo.

    And this counter argument:

    Some say this is where he should have balked. “Torture violates the very premise of the legal system itself, that there is something irreducible and inviolable about every person,” says Yoo’s fellow Berkeley law professor Robert H. Cole. “You can’t write a memo about it the way you would write about snowmobiling in Yosemite.” At the very least, they say, Yoo should have warned of the moral danger the question posed to the essence of America. (Emphasis supplied.)

    Mr. Richardson has Prof. Cole’s quote tucked in between the things that ’some’ say and the other things that ‘they’ say, as if ‘he’ was ‘their’ spokesman. But, if Prof. Cole has accurately described Prof. Yoo’s actions, i.e., that they “violate[d] the very premise of the legal system itself…,” would that not in fact be tantamount to a violation of the rules of professional conduct? Asking whether Prof. Yoo is a monster may make for a ‘good’ title for an apologia such as Mr. Richardson’s but it is little more. If the question is whether Prof. Yoo violated the rules of professional conduct of Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., the answer is: He did.

    File a grievance against John Yoo.

    Read the entire apologia here.

    I’ve e-mailed Prof. Cole and Mr. Freiman for their comments. I will update this post with any response received.

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    Professor John Yoo and The Justice Case

    Paul Kiel reported yesterday at TPMMuckraker that

    the House Judiciary Committee authorized a subpoena for David Addington, Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, to testify about the administration’s torture policy

    And now the AP reports that John Yoo, probably the most infamous of the infamous characters that walked the halls of the Justice Department during the Bush administration, has agreed to testify as well without compulsion. That’s a departure from his original position, when he said that he could not testify about his role in authorizing the use of torture because he had not received the green light from the DoJ.

    The AP adds: “Former Attorney General John Ashcroft, former Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, and former Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin have also agreed to give testimony at a future hearing. Former CIA Director George Tenet is still in negotiations with the committee.”

    Melissa, both at Left in Alabama as well as at her own Writechic Press, adds this:

    Since our own Rep. Artur Davis is on the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, God willing and the creek don’t rise, he’ll be there when torture lawyer John Yoo is questioned.

    That’s right! An anonymous source has told The Raw Story that John Yoo, a former Justice Department lawyer who wrote the Torture Memos will testify before the House Judiciary Committee. The memos which gave carte blanche to human rights violations and laughed in the face of the Geneva Conventions have now been repudiated at DoJ though damned if the U.S. Attorney General will hold the Republican Freak Show accountable which is just another form of corruption (to throw Mukasey’s words in his face). Here’s a link to the committee members in case you want to suggest questions.

    Davis’ presence will be a refreshing switch from the obsequious, Bush-booty kissing that Sen. Jeff Sessions does. Tear Yoo up, Artur, for all the citizens of Alabama who know torture is wrong and are mad about Yoo.

    In the comments to my post on Professor John Yoo, Melissa asks “What questions can we send to Rep. Artur Davis?” Although I have complete faith that Rep. Davis will be well-prepared to properly examine Prof. Yoo, I would suggest that any examination include discussion of The Justice Case. As Professor Marty Lederman, lecturer Keith Jon Heller, Professor Scott Horton and others have discussed the Justice Case in far more detail and expertise than I have and can, I would note that much of this discussion has revolved around Professor’s Yoo’s potential criminal liability. From my standpoint, unsurprisingly, I would address (and have addressed here) Professor Yoo’s ethical obligations.

    In introducing a guest post at Balkinization by Kevin Jon Heller, Senior Lecturer, University of Auckland Faculty of Law, Professor Marty Lederman writes:

    There has been a great deal of discussion in the blogosphere and the legal academy about the question of whether the OLC torture memoranda were not merely wrong, horrifying and indefensible, but actually criminal. My own view, roughly speaking, is the following:

    1. This is in some sense an academic question, in that criminal prosecution of the lawyers is virtually unthinkable absent evidence that one or more of them actually believed that the conduct they were blessing was, in fact, unlawful.

    2. Such evidence of the lawyers’ belief in the illegality of the conduct they approved is unlikely ever to emerge because, in some important sense, John Yoo, David Addington, et al., believed in the “correctness” of the conclusions contained in the torture memos.

    * * *

    When, if ever, such “aspirational” constitutional interpretation by executive actors is appropriate — and whether it must be done openly, and with full candor — are very important and difficult questions. For now, my point is merely to describe what I think was going on here, in order better to understand why actual criminal prosecution is almost unthinkable.

    3. * * * And, surely, the most prominent and substantial historical precedent here is the Justice Case in the Nuremberg tribunals, in which the U.S. itself led the prosecution of several Nazi Ministry of Justice officials — government lawyers — for their involvement in the execution of the infamous “Nacht und Nebel,” or “Night and Fog,” decrees. The Justice Case is often invoked as an historical analogy for the criminal culpability of Bush Administration lawyers. Like many others, therefore, I have been wondering whether that is in fact a fair analogy. What was it, exactly, that the U.S. prosecutors claimed the German lawyers did to deserve criminal punishment? Was it, for instance (as some have suggested), that the lawyers advised German officials that the “Nacht und Nebel” decrees were lawful under German domestic law, while failing to also tell their government clients that the decrees would nevertheless violate the laws of war and constitute crimes against humanity? If so, then perhaps the Justice Case might have a lot to say about our current situation, because John Yoo, et al., in effect advised the President that he could authorize torture and like conduct under domestic law, and further informed him that he could, at least as a matter of domestic law, simply ignore the laws of war.

    All of which is a long-winded way of introducing the important work of a guest blogger, Kevin Jon Heller of the University of Auckland (and Opinio Juris), who is actually undertaking a comprehensive and very important new study of what, exactly, the prosecution’s theories of culpability were at Nuremberg, especially in the Justice Case. In a forthcoming post, Kevin argues that the Justice Case might have less to teach us about the possibility of criminal culpability of Bush Administration lawyers than has previously been suggested. I don’t know for certain whether Kevin’s account is subject to serious debate or question, since I haven’t yet been through the primary materials myself. But I do know that Kevin has looked more closely at this question than any other recent scholar, and that his very important work will be the starting place for any further discussion about the Nuremberg tribunals and the torture memos.

    With that introduction, Mr. Heller provides a detailed analysis of The Justice Case:

    Scholars who argue that John Yoo’s authorship of the infamous torture memos makes him complicit in various war crimes -– torture, illegal detention, etc. -– almost invariably cite the WWII-era case United States v. Alstoetter, commonly referred to as the Justice Case, for the proposition that a government lawyer can be held criminally responsible for giving erroneous legal advice to his political superiors. Here, for example, is what Scott Horton, an excellent scholar and one of our finest bloggers, has to say :

    Can a lawyer at the Department of Justice be criminally liable for giving opinions that lead to the torture and abuse of prisoners in war time? The answer is: Yes. The precedent is United States v. Altstoetter. The sentence handed down was ten years, less time served awaiting trial. It’s a case for John Yoo to study in the period leading up to his inevitable prosecution.

    I do not know enough about Yoo’s actions to venture a general opinion about their possible criminality. I do know something, however, about the Justice Case -– I am currently writing a book for Oxford University Press on the jurisprudence of that trial and the eleven other trials held in the American zone of occupation between 1946 and 1949, which are collectively known as the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT). So I thought readers might be interested in a detailed look at what the Justice Case says -– or doesn’t say -– about the culpability of government lawyers who advise their clients that unlawful conduct is, in fact, lawful. The bottom line, in my view, is that as reprehensible as Yoo’s opinions were –- and they were indeed reprehensible -– the case provides far less support for prosecuting him than most scholars assume.

    Before delving into the details of the case, it is important to note that reading NMT judgments can be an exercise in frustration, because they are far less legally precise than the judgments issued by modern international tribunals. In particular, the Tribunals rarely specify the mode of participation they use to convict a defendant -– ordering, aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise, etc. -– and often even fail to identify which of the defendant’s acts discussed in the judgment they consider criminal. The latter flaw is particularly troublesome when trying to apply the legal principles articulated in the Justice Case to Yoo’s situation, because –- as explained below -– none of the defendants in the case were acting simply as legal advisors to the Ministry of Justice. As a result, we can only speculate whether the Tribunal would have convicted any of the relevant defendants if they had held a position of authority similar to Yoo’s.

    The Justice Case itself, which was held in Nuremberg between March and December 1947, involved 16 defendants who were associated in various capacities with the criminal-justice system in Nazi Germany. Some were judges and prosecutors in the Nazis’ infamous Special Courts and People’s Courts; others were officials in the Reich Ministry of Justice. The crux of the prosecution’s case, according to Telford Taylor, the NMT’s Chief Prosecutor, was that the defendants were guilty of “judicial murder and other atrocities, which they committed by destroying law and justice in Germany and then utilizing the emptied forms of legal process for persecution, enslavement, and extermination on a vast scale.” Particularly relevant to Yoo’s situation is Paragraph 13 of the Indictment, which alleged that the Ministry defendants were criminally responsible for their involvement in the execution of Hitler infamous “Nacht und Nebel” decree (for background on the decree, see Scott Horton’s post here ):

    The Ministry of Justice participated with the OKW and the Gestapo in the execution of Hitler’s decree of “Night and Fog” whereby civilians of occupied territories who had been accused of crimes of resistance against occupying forces were spirited away for secret trial by certain Special Courts of the Justice Ministry within the Reich, in the course of which the victims’ whereabouts, trial, and subsequent disposition were kept completely secret, thus serving the dual purpose of terrorizing the victims’ relatives and barring recourse to any evidence, witnesses, or counsel for the defense. The accused was not informed of the disposition of his case, and in almost every instance those who were acquitted or who had served their sentences were handed over by the Justice Ministry to the Gestapo for “protective custody” for the duration of the war. In the course of the above-described proceedings, thousands of persons were murdered, tortured, ill-treated, and illegally imprisoned.

    The Tribunal had little difficulty concluding that the Night and Fog decree had “no legal basis either under the international law of warfare or under the international common law as recognized by all civilized nations” (1131). The primary issue, then, was which of the defendants could be held criminally responsible for the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed pursuant to the decree. According to the Tribunal, such individual responsibility required the prosecution to prove “that a defendant had knowledge of an offense charged in the indictment . . . and that he was connected with the commission of that offense” (1093).

    Three of the defendants in the Justice Case held positions in the Ministry of Justice that involved, among other things, giving legal advice to the Reich Minister: Wolfgang Mettgenberg, who was Representative of the Chief of the Criminal Legislation and Administration Division; Guenther Joel, who was Legal Adviser for criminal prosecutions; and Wilhelm von Ammon, who was Ministerial Counsellor of the Criminal Legislation and Administration Division. All three were convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

    There is, however, a fundamental problem with citing these convictions as precedent for prosecuting John Yoo or other Bush Administration attorneys who “merely” advised that certain conduct was lawful: namely, that Mettgenberg, Joel, and van Ammon were not only legal advisors to the Reich Minister. On the contrary, all three men possessed considerable political authority, as well -– and repeatedly used that authority to actually enforce the Night and Fog decrees.

    At this point, Mr. Heller discusses the details of Mettgenberg, Joel, and Von Ammon. These details can be found at the Balkinzation post here.

    As these examples indicate, Mettgenberg, Joel, and von Ammon did not simply advise their political superiors that they could legally authorize the commission of actions that qualified as war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law. The defendants personally authorized the commission of those crimes. In other words, Mettgenberg, Joel, and von Ammon were among the political superiors who made the discretionary decisions that were necessary to implement the Night and Fog decree. It is thus difficult to argue that their convictions stand for the proposition that, to quote Scott Horton again, “lawyers who dispense bad advice about law of armed conflict, and whose advice predictably leads to the death or mistreatment of prisoners, are war criminals.” On the contrary, the Tribunal never -– literally never -– singled out a specific legal opinion offered by any of the Ministry defendants as being even partly responsible for their convictions.

    Indeed, the only specific discussion of legal advice in the Justice Case seems to imply that “merely” giving such advice, no matter how erroneous or damaging, does not give rise to criminal responsibility.

    * * *

    To be sure, the Tribunal does not specifically say that a legal opinion could never give rise to criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, the quoted passage appears to draw a very clear distinction between offering an erroneous legal opinion, which is not criminal, and choosing to implement an illegal government policy, which is.

    Does all of this mean that the Justice Case completely exonerates government lawyers who advise their political superiors that war crimes or crimes against humanity are lawful? That is a difficult question. It is certainly possible that the Tribunal would have been willing to convict one of the defendants in the Justice Case for giving such advice to the Reich Minister, particularly if that advice had been a necessary precondition for the creation and enforcement of policies that qualified as war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. Nothing in the judgment itself, however, directly supports that conclusion. Moreover, at a bare minimum, I think the Tribunal would have required the prosecution to prove that the defendant gave the legal advice knowing that the actions he approved actually violated international law. That requirement is implied, I believe, in the Tribunal’s repeated insistence regarding the Night and Fog decree that “[a]ll of the defendants who entered into the plan or scheme, or who took part in enforcing or carrying it out, knew that its enforcement violated the international law of war” (1038).

    The Justice Case , in short, provides far less support for prosecuting government lawyers like Yoo than scholars have assumed, at least insofar as their role in promoting torture and illegal detentions was actually limited to providing legal advice. At most -– and I believe that the argument is unacceptably speculative -– the Tribunal’s judgment suggests that a government lawyer is liable for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed pursuant to his legal advice if he knew that certain actions violated international law, but nevertheless failed to inform his political superiors of that fact. Whether Yoo would be a criminal under that standard, I leave for others who know far more about his actions to decide.

    BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE: all citations are to III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (William S. Hein & Co. ed. 1997)

    In the comments section to this post, Professor Scott Horton adds this comment:

    We should always stress in going into this that the point of this exercise is not to compare John Yoo and his colleagues with the Nazis, but rather to distill the operating international law principles governing lawyers who dispense advice to governments in a war setting. (It’s worth a passing note that the Justice Case distinguishes itself from several other Nuremberg cases in that many of the defendants were career justice employees who were late-comers to the party, i.e., became party members after the Machtergreifung, when party membership was obligatory for those holding higher government posts). We should also note that this trial was one of the U.S. cases, not one of the international cases, for reasons which Telford Taylor and others have described — namely that the British and French were cold to the idea of trying the lawyers, fearing this would raise uncomfortable issues for themselves in their colonial rearguard mode.

    Aside from the unwarranted flattery, this is a very good post– with good criticism — that does a solid job of summarizing some important details of the Altstoetter case. It’s regretable that much of the material from the case is difficult to access and research, and that the case record itself is rather rambling. But Kevin has done a good job of assembling and summarizing key parts of it.

    I agree with Kevin that the evidence relating to the Nacht- und Nebelerlass defendants (NNE), especially von Ammon, is key for this point. Of course in the case of Altstoetter proper, the conviction did in fact turn specifically on three letters. But Kevin is correct that the defendants were all involved in the Justice Ministry’s actual administration of the program. We need to be much more careful in distinguishing what the Justice Ministry’s role was in this program. And I don’t agree with him as to the role of the legal opinions. The NNE was a counterinsurgency program designed to give military and occupation security authorities the power to apprehend civilians believed to be engaged in behind-the-lines attacks on Axis troops the authority to “disappear” persons without the need to go through the legal formalities that international law at the time would have required of an occupying power dealing with civilians. The internal records from the High Command (OKW) show that attacks on soldiers by civilians behind the lines of the East Front (especially in occupied Soviet territory) were the immediate inspiration. The original memoranda talk about a new kind of enemy which was fully disguised within the civilian population and was ideologically motivated and driven. These conclusions are correct — as CPSU documents reveal the party’s organization of such a terror campaign against German soldiers. As the proposal emerged from OKW, military and security authority was to be plenary and to rest on executive war-making notions. Von Ammon objected that this approach was a violation of the principle of legality, and he and his colleagues insisted that a process of adjudication be introduced; he also noted the need to arrange for wills, for the custody of children of the “disappeared” and the like. This was the role of the legal administration with respect to NNE. As Detlev Vagts has pointed out, the bulk of von Ammon’s proposals were ameliorative in nature.

    The NNE program, and the court’s treatment of it in Altstoetter, has frequently been cited as the first international law authority on the concept of “disappearings,” which is a more modern crime against humanity. But an essential element of “disappearings” is that the person is treated outside the established legal regime (either that provided by the criminal justice system or the laws of armed conflict). The thrust of von Ammon’s position was to recognize this and to insist that a substitute judicial process be provided. This contrasts rather sharply with views articulated by the Bush Administration with respect to the “extraordinary renditions” program, for instance.

    But his clearest offense was providing the legal rationale for evasion of the requirements of international law, for instance by providing for the projection of German domestic law into occupied territory. (Even on this point, note that von Ammon was very concerned about the operation of the special judicial process in occupied territory; he wanted the detainees to be transferred to Reich territory.)

    The tribunal’s view was that von Ammon and his colleagues should have properly advised on the limitations of international law. They did not do so. If we had to put von Ammon’s mistakes on legal interpretation side-by-side with Yoo’s, the comparison would be very much in von Ammon’s favor, I think. That’s largely a result of the fact that many of the violations which the Tribunal noted really became crystalized after World War II, and at the time of the Justice Case were fairer game for argument than today.

    Still, I am not trying to curry any sympathy for von Ammon — just the contrary, I think he got off lightly with his seven years served — but to make the point that the administration of the Justice Ministry’s plans was not the largest failing.

    On the other hand, it did constitute an overt act in a sense in which the mere rendering of an opinion may not, also a significant point.

    The bigger issues here are the JCE issues, which go to the notion introduced in the charge of “foreseeable” damage, among other things.

    Philippe Sands’s key finding — if there is just one — is that the bottom up narrative that the Administration puts forward surrounding the introduction of torture techniques is a sham. He follows the story to its roots, and he finds that it is, to the contrary, a “top down” story, with a number of lawyers engaging in an elaborate scheme to cover it up with the paper trail that starts with the Diane Beaver memoranda. Key to this unraveling is the story of the senior lawyers’ trip to GTMO at the launch of the process, a trip about which Haynes repeatedly lied. Now it’s possible to explain this from a PR angle focused on domestic politics, which undoubtedly was a major focus of the White House throughout, but a prosecutor could just as well make the case that this shows recognition and belief that the scheme was essentially criminal (or presented substantial likelihood of criminal culpability) and thus needed to be concealed. In fact the key participants had been warned repeatedly at that point that regardless of their curious views about the laws of war, a large majority in the legal community would take a different perspective and could well view their conduct as criminal. This advice was clearly propelling their conduct.

    The other striking parallel with the facts surrounding the NNE, which came out only with the examination of the records of the international law department at OKW at the close of the process, is that the German military lawyers had taken almost exactly the same stance that the American JAGs took on the Bush Administration’s detainee initiatives. They argued stringently for firm application of Geneva and Hague standards and said that this was driven by enlightened self-interest, i.e., to protect German soldiers. These views were overruled on the grounds that this was a “new kind of warfare” in which the principal foe, and the foe in the cross-hairs of the NNE, was terrorist in nature.

    Several of the senior JAGs have now described to me their direct dealings with Yoo in which they stressed criminal liability as the major concern. Yoo’s response was consistently that he could “fix the problem” by getting the Criminal Division to issue get-out-of-jail cards for all concerned. And this puts Yoo a step closer to the implementation of a plan and a step away from the issuance of a detached opinion.

    However, what we need now is to get to the bottom of all these carefully obscured dealings. It’s clear that will never happen before the Bush Administration leaves office, but after it’s gone, getting a clear picture of the lawyers’ dealings should be a priority.

    Whether or not Professor Yoo committed a crime and, if he did, whether he will ever be prosecuted either here in the United States or in some other country, it is clear to me that Professor Yoo violated his ethical obligations and should at least lose the right to practice law. In my post stating why Professor Yoo should be investigated for violation of his obligations under the Pennsylvania and D.C. Rules of professional conduct , I quote with approval this post from Professor David Luban:

    Of course it’s clear to [Professor] Marty [Lederman] that an OLC lawyer who goes to a party and tries to impress the admiring guests by blabbing about the hush-hush FISA opinion he is working on at the office has violated an ethical obligation – the obligation of confidentiality. And it’s clear that if the lawyer writes an opinion without doing the legal research, his negligence violates the ethical obligation of competence, because, in the words of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct , “Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” I can’t believe that Marty thinks the basic rules of lawyer’s ethics are irrelevant just because the lawyer works for the Office of Legal Counsel. You might want to quibble about labeling all these rules “ethical obligations,” because Rules of Conduct don’t always have to do with ethics in the moralist’s sense. Sometimes they are just a regulatory code. But in the examples I gave, the ethical dimension is undoubtedly there: the rule against betraying confidences and taking the pains reasonably necessary for doing your job are regulatory rules with an ethical basis.

    Now it happens that one of these rules is labeled “Advisor.” It reads: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”

    “Independent” professional judgment means “independent of the client,” as the first comment to the rule makes clear: “Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront….However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.” And “candid” advice means telling the client what the law, in the lawyer’s best judgment, actually means. This rule, too, has an ethical basis. In the first place, it tells lawyers not to chicken out from hard conversations; it’s a requirement of a certain measure of guts. In the second place, it tells the lawyer that as an advisor, he or she is more than an instrument of the client’s will. This is true for lawyers in private practice, but I see no reason at all to think that a lawyer-advisor carries different obligations when the client is White House.

    This obligation of the advisor is very different from the standard conception of the lawyer’s role as courtroom advocate. In the courtroom, the lawyer’s job is to press the client’s case, counting on the opposing lawyer to highlight its weaknesses, and on the judge to check the lawyer’s one-sided presentation of the law. In the advice-giving setting, there is no opposing voice and no judge. That’s why, for more than four decades, the codes of responsibility for lawyers have distinguished sharply between the advocate’s role and the advisor’s. The advocate, in the words of the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility, “should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law.” But not the advisor: the advisor is supposed to give the law to the client straight.

    But what if the client doesn’t want the law straight? There’s an old legal adage attributed to Elihu Root: “The client never wants to be told he can’t do what he wants to do; he wants to be told how to do it, and it is the lawyer’s business to tell him how.” Root was a corporate lawyer, and he was cynically expressing – a century ago – the scofflaw attitude of business people who resent lawyers who say “no.” But lawyers who say yes to whatever the client wants (“Dr. Yes” was reportedly John Ashcroft’s nickname for John Yoo) violate basic ethical norms of what legal advisors are supposed to do. As I’ve written elsewhere , lawyers who write opinions saying yes to whatever their clients want are no better than indulgence sellers.

    Marty thinks that OLC lawyers are in a fundamentally different relationship with their client than private lawyers of corporate clients. I think that’s partly right – but only partly. The part that’s right is that OLC opinions can bind the executive branch – if not by law, then by custom. That puts OLC opinions on a nearly-equal footing with decisions of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, where most cases involving the executive branch get litigated. The big difference is that the OLC renders its opinions in secret, and without hearing adversarial arguments to satisfy the basic maxim of procedural justice – audi alteram partem , “hear the other side.”

    That makes the duties of independence and candor even more crucial. Lawyers whose legal advice – including secret advice – writes the law for the most dangerous branch of government have an awesome responsibility. It’s a responsibility not only to the client and the law, but to a country that is, without knowing it, being governed by twenty unknown lawyers in the Justice Department. (Quite frankly, the OLC is a scandal to democratic government, but that’s a subject for a different day.) Marty is quite right that the OLC’s mission should be to help the President fulfill the duty of faithful execution of the laws. But he’s wrong if he thinks that mission substitutes for the basics of legal ethics. That mission is over and above the duties of legal ethics.

    And he’s wrong if he thinks that indulgence-selling is fundamentally different when the lawyers are writing indulgences to the President rather than private clients. Indulgence-selling is fundamentally worse when lawyers are absolving the President rather than Enron – but that’s because the President’s public trust runs deeper, not because the nature of the sin is different.

    * * *

    The fact is, though, that the ethical conduct of the million lawyers is far more important to the legal system than the journeywork of the nine justices. As I have written in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity , the lawyer-client consultation is the primary point of intersection between “The Law” and the people it governs, the point at which the law in books becomes the law in action. Most law is outside the courts, not in it; and most legal “decisions” take place in conversations between lawyers and their clients – conversations that never leave the office. This is a familiar law-and-society theme – but familiar as it is, we often forget it.

    Marty errs, if I’m right, in thinking that the constitutional tremendousness of what the OLC does puts it on a plane above ordinary legal practice. But it’s a mistake, in my opinion, to get swept up in the higher ecstasies of Constitutional Law and the Thrones, Powers, and Dominations who occupy Constitutional Law Heaven – the Justices, the clerks, the theorists (sorry, Jack!), and the high priests in the OLC and the Solicitor General’s office. The law, as the Book of Deuteronomy says, “is not in the heavens, that you should say, ‘Who among us can go up to the heavens and get it for us and impart it to us, that we may observe it?’” The law is very near. It’s what we find in our lawyer’s office on the fourth floor of the Kresge Building, three doors down from the orthodontist. (If you see the Home Depot on your left, you’ve gone too far.) It’s law’s ordinariness, and the extraordinary role that lawyers play in vending it to us, that is precisely why legal ethics is important: if the lawyers are just Holmesian Bad Men and Bad Women following Elihu Root’s cynical advice, the law might as well not be there.

    And that is why ethical obligations matter in the Office of Legal Counsel. It’s perhaps odd that the OPR is investigating for violations of the maxim of competence. But it makes a certain amount of sense: a legal opinion that is deeply eccentric in its interpretation of the law is not much different from an opinion written without adequate research. I’ve suggested that the more genuine violation is of the rule requiring candid and independent advice. But it would be almost impossible to prove a violation of that rule: to show lack of candor would require showing that the lawyer knew how eccentric his opinion was, and that seems impossible.

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    It’s not paranoia if they ARE out to get you, No. 3

    h/t: Capt at Alternate Reality , mdking at Writechic Press and Roger Shuler at Legal Schnauzer

    In their May 1, 2008 Raw Story article Break-ins plague targets of US Attorneys, Larisa Alexandrovna, Muriel Kane and Lindsay Beyerstein report on the troubles that seem to befall people that don’t toe the Republican party line. In addition to the house fire and automobile accident suffered by Dana Jill Simpson and the burglary of the office of Don Siegelman’s lawyer, Susan James, as Scott Horton previously noted, Alexandrovna, Kane and Beyerstein and the stories of five other people associated with the Siegelman matter and two other federal cases.

    In Alabama, for instance, the home of former Democratic Governor Don Siegelman was burglarized twice during the period of his first indictment. Nothing of value was taken, however, and according to the Siegelman family, the only items of interest to the burglars were the files in Siegelman’s home office.

    Siegelman’s attorney [Susan James ] experienced the same type of break-in at her office.

    In neighboring Mississippi, a case brought against a trial lawyer and three judges raises even more disturbing questions. Of the four individuals in the same case, three of the US Attorney’s targets were the victims of crimes during their indictment or trial. This case, like that of Governor Siegelman, has been widely criticized as a politically motivated prosecution by a Bush US Attorney.

    The main target of the indictment, attorney Paul Minor, had his office broken into, while Mississippi Supreme Court Justice, Oliver E. Diaz Jr., had his home burglarized. According to police reports and statements from Diaz and from individuals close to Minor, nothing of value was taken and the burglars only rummaged through documents and in Minor’s case, also took a single computer from an office full of expensive office equipment.

    The incidents are not limited to burglaries. In Mississippi, former Judge John Whitfield was the victim of arson at his office. In Alabama, the whistleblower in the Don Siegelman case, Dana Jill Simpson, had her home burned down, and shortly thereafter her car was allegedly forced off the road.

    While there is no direct evidence linking these crimes to the US Attorneys’ office targeting these individuals, or to the Bush administration, there is a distinct pattern that makes it highly unlikely that these incidents are isolated and unrelated.

    All of these crimes remain unsolved.

    These allegations are just the introduction to the article. Alexandrovna, Kane and Beyerstein follow with the details that back up these allegations in the remainder of Break-ins plague targets of US Attorneys .

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    Horton hears a Yoo

    Horton hears a Yoo

    Updated April 23, 2008 to add poster art parody courtesy of the talented nonnie9999 who has many more posters at Hysterical Raisins. If I knew how, I would add this caption: … and then he rebuked him. Many thanks, Nonnie.

    As Melissa from Writechic Press noted here, New York attorney and Columbia Law School professor Scott Horton ’spanked’ Professor John C. Yoo in an Op-Ed Monday in the L.A. Times. In his Opinion column, Prof. Horton discusses the National Lawyers Guild’s campaign to have Prof. Yoo fired from his tenured position at UC Berkeley’s Boalt Hall School of Law. While recognizing the possible chilling effect the firing would have on academia, Prof. Horton correctly dispenses with this concern:

    But does academic freedom really sit at the heart of this controversy? It’s not Yoo’s ideas in an academic setting that give rise to his current problems but his conduct as a government lawyer.

    And although Prof. Yoo claims that “he only advised and theorized; [and that] others took the decision to implement the program[,]” Prof. Horton explains that the facts do not support this defense:

    It also appears that government lawyers had told Bush administration officials that some of the techniques already in use were illegal, even criminal. In fact, a senior Pentagon lawyer described to me exchanges he had with Yoo in which he stressed that those using the techniques could face prosecution. Yoo notes in his Pentagon memo that he communicated with the Criminal Division of the Justice Department and got assurances that prosecutions would not be brought. The question becomes, was Yoo giving his best effort at legal analysis, or was he attempting to protect the authors of the program from criminal investigation and prosecution?

    In any case, Yoo kept the program running. Even the man who came in to run the Office of Legal Counsel after Yoo’s departure, Jack Goldsmith, has written that he understood Yoo’s project this way. Goldsmith also rescinded Yoo’s memos.

    According to Human Rights First, more than 100 people have died in U.S. detention in the war on terrorism. It documented 11 cases where the deaths resulted from coercive interrogation techniques, and others where there was at least some connection. Yoo insists that there is no relationship between the deaths and his advice, because he didn’t set policy or carry it out, he merely offered a legal opinion. But had he refused to give the opinion that was sought, the program might have been suspended and some of those detainees might be alive. (Emphasis supplied.)

    Prof. Horton charitably notes that:

    It’s possible that when all the facts about their preparation and use come out, Yoo will be exonerated. But the criminal law and ethical issues surrounding his work on the memos are very serious.

    But before he can be exonerated, Prof. Yoo’s conduct must be properly investigated to determine if his actions have violated the applicable rules of professional conduct. And before he can be investigated, grievances must be filed against Prof. Yoo in Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C.

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    Starting to notice but not quite there.

    At The Nation, Professor Stephen Gillers is correct when he writes in The Torture Memo that:

    The press tends to overlook the lawyers when scandal breaks, focusing instead on their clients. That’s understandable, but in public and commercial life no serious move is possible (no corporate maneuver, no new financial instrument, no war, no severe interrogation tactic) without legal approval. Even if the advice proves wrong, the client, if sued or indicted, can claim reliance on counsel.

    When lawyers in private practice mess up, they face serious jeopardy. They can be fired, sued for malpractice, disbarred or prosecuted. Yoo and Bybee face no such risks. The President won’t protest. He got what he wanted. And while a state disciplinary body can investigate, that is unlikely without Justice Department help.

    I disagree that the involvement of the Department of Justice is required to instigate an investigation of Mr. Yoo, Mr. Bybee or any other unethical attorney in the service of the federal government. As I note here , anybody, from any state, can file an ethics complaint against any attorney practicing anywhere in the 50 states and Washington, D.C. Mr. Gillers continues:

    In his book The Terror Presidency, [Bybee's successor, Jack] Goldsmith, now a Harvard law professor, writes that the torture memos had “no foundation” in any “source of law” and rested on “one-sided legal arguments.”

    * * *

    How could two really smart guys authorize torture using “one-sided legal arguments” that have “no foundation” in law? How could they be guilty of a “stunning failure of lawyerly craft”? The sad answer seems to be that they knew what the President wanted and delivered: torture is OK if you call it something else. Detainees are outside the protection of due process and civilized law. The President’s authority is close to absolute. Anyway, no court can review him. (On this last point, the Supreme Court disagreed.)

    * * *

    So maybe the best and brightest lawyers got it so wrong because they forgot whom they served. Maybe they acted politically, not professionally. If so, we are dealing with a perversion of law and legal duty, a betrayal of the client and professional norms, not mere incompetence, which would be bad enough. Whatever the reason, Jarrett should find that this work is not “consistent with the professional standards that apply to Department of Justice attorneys.” [H. Marshall] Jarrett[, counsel for the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility,] must hold the lawyers accountable if he means to restore OLC’s reputation and vindicate the rule of law.

    I agree with Mr. Gillers’ characterization of these attorney’s actions but must again strongly disagree that it is Mr. Jarrett that must hold anybody accountable. To repeat myself: anybody, from any state, can file an ethics complaint against any attorney practicing anywhere in the 50 states and Washington, D.C.

    In his response at Balkinization to Boalt (Cal Berkeley) School of Law Dean Chris Edleyn’s defense of John Yoo, Scott Horton explains in more detail why John Yoo should be held to account :

    [T]he facts establish that the torture policies were settled upon and had in fact been implemented. The principal authors were facing severe blow back from career lawyers inside the government. And John Yoo was carted in to use the powers of OLC to silence lawyers protesting the illegality of what was done. I believe that an objective examination of the facts will show that this is precisely how John Yoo understood his role. In essence, he was not an independent legal advisor. He had become a facilitator, an implementor of the torture policies. His role had shifted from passive advisor to actor, pushing a process forward.

    Dean Edley then states that the ethical accountability and legal liability of the legal advisor cannot be compared to those of the policy maker. This statement rests on a false understanding of the facts. But it also reflects a misconception of the established law. Indeed, Dean Edley asks what appears to be a rhetorical question:

    Did the writing of the memoranda, and his related conduct, violate a criminal or comparable statute?

    The answer to that question is “yes.” The liability of an attorney dispensing advice with respect to the treatment of persons under detention in wartime is subject to a special rule. It cannot be viewed in the same manner as advice given in a complex commercial dispute, for instance.

    This principle was established by the United States in one of the most dramatic of the post-World War II proceedings, United States v. Altstoetter, the “lawyers’ case.” Following on the guidelines established by Justice Robert H. Jackson, the U.S. chief prosecutor, Telford Taylor, and his deputy, Charles M. La Follette, established clear principles of accountability for lawyers dispensing legal advice in circumstances virtually identical to those faced by John Yoo. There are three major principles relevant to John Yoo’s case that appear from the charge, accepted by the Tribunal. First, the case dealt with persons under detention in wartime (not POWs, in fact most of the cases in question addressed persons not entitled to POW or comparable protections). Second, it had to be reasonably foreseeable that the advice dispensed would result in serious physical or mental harm or death to a number of the persons under detention. Third, the advice given was erroneous. In fact several of the lawyers in Altstoetter were able to articulate far better defenses for their erroneous legal advice that John Yoo had, but the standard did not require it to be “outrageously” false, just incorrect.

    Each of these criteria is satisfied with respect to Yoo’s advice under the torture memoranda. They explicitly address persons under detention. It was reasonably foreseeable that persons would suffer serious physical or mental harm or death as a result of the application of the techniques (in fact there have been more than 108 deaths in detention, a significant portion of them tied to torture). And the analysis was false, a point acknowledged ultimately by the OLC itself. Accordingly, a solid basis exists under the standard articulated by the United States under which John Yoo may be charged and brought to trial. * * *

    However, my point here is not to make the prosecutor’s case against Yoo. It is to show that what he did raises not merely ethics issues, but actual criminal culpability . * * * (Emphasis supplied).

    Also at Balkinization, Professor John Balkin asks whether John Yoo and Jay Bybee violated the canons of professional ethics. In drawing his conclusion, Professor Balkin considered, among others, the Gillers and Horton arguments that I highlighted above, and wrote:

    My own conclusion is that Yoo and Bybee did violate their professional obligations to the President as constitutional actor, and to the country as a whole. The reason is a combination of their outrageous theory of presidential dictatorship and their all too eager assistance in what appears to be a conspiracy to commit war crimes. But I do not pretend that the question is at all an easy one.

    Note that even if I am right that Yoo violated the canons of professional ethics, he has not been sanctioned by any court or professional organization, much less convicted of any crime by a domestic court or international tribunal. This is important to keep in mind in the debate over whether the University of California should discipline or investigate him.

    While I also do not pretend that the question of whether these attorneys violated the canons of professional ethics is an easy one, I am confident that the answer to the question is ultimately yes. And if the answer is yes, then the question becomes what can you and I do to hold these attorneys accountable for their actions in addition to lobbying Congress, writing blog posts and comments, praying and waiting?

    Consider first this from Mr. Horton in his response to Dean Edley:

    A final aspect of Dean Edley’s memorandum troubles me. He is appropriately concerned about freedom of expression for his faculty. But he should be much more concerned about the message that all of this sends to his students. Lawyers who act on the public stage can have an enormous impact on their society and the world around them. They can make great sums of money. They can be a force for social good. And they can also be vessels of horrendous injustice and oppression. Indeed they can foment and advance a criminal design. * * *

    Much of the nobility of this profession lies in the duty of a lawyer to exercise independent professional judgment and to warn a client from an enterprise which is not merely foolish but at times actually immoral and criminal. Elihu Root famously termed this the lawyer’s first calling. When confronted with a trying circumstance, John Yoo not only failed to give proper warning — He became an active part of an enterprise bent on overriding the most fundamental legal and ethical prohibitions. Perhaps a criminal enterprise. And that is and will likely be seen by future generations as a far more troublesome matter than Dean Edley recognizes.

    Edley owes it to his institution and to the students it is training to accept the full ethical and legal challenges that the case of John Yoo raises, and to treat them earnestly. * * * (Emphasis supplied).

    And also this from Mr. Horton from April 3, 2008:

    It’s also time for the organized bar to act decisively. So far bar organizations have denounced the torture memoranda and issued learned reports and articles. But I’m still haunted by a question a student put to me following a presentation I made at Columbia University on Tuesday evening. “If the bar is so serious about this,” the student said, “then explain to me how it’s possible that John Yoo and his confederates haven’t been disbarred.” I started to answer about the complexity of the disbarrment process, but I stopped. The student was right. If the bar were serious about this, it should have used its disciplinary tools to deal with it. This is not a case of an eccentric academic mouthing some cock-eyed theories. It is about a government official using the power of a government office to induce people to commit serious crimes.

    * * *

    Silence will buy us a continuation of this corruption of our nation. But isn’t it worth raising your voice and articulating your anger to get our country back? It should start with insisting that Congress use the tools it has–oversight and the budget–to force changes. Say “no” to torture; it’s an easy first step on the road back to decency. (Emphasis supplied.)

    I noted in response to this post then, and reiterate today, that appealing to this Congress is insufficient and that it is now for direct action by you, the citizen/activist. Each of you can file a grievance against each and every one of these attorneys whether you live in the same or a different state and whether you are personally involved in the matter or are just an interested citizen. By doing so, you can force these bar associations to investigate these matters. Take action: file a grievance.

    And remember, it’s not just Yoo and Bybee. There’s Alberto Gonzales, Harriet E. Miers, Kyle D. Sampson, Senator Lisa Murkowski, Judge Mark Everett Fuller and many others.

    E.M.

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    E-mail to Professor John Yoo

    Updated August 11, 2008 to correct the address of Professor Yoo.

    Professor John C. Yoo
    U.S. District Court Judge
    yoo@law.berkeley.edu

    Dear Professor Yoo:

    I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, D. Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers and yourself. In my opinion, you have committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., that raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

    I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct in your handling of the Torture Memos violated the Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct.

    E.M.

    Technorati Tags: , , , , , , , ,

    John Yoo

    Personal Information:

    • Name: John Yoo
    • Bar: Pennsylvania
    • ID No.: 69500
    • Status: Active

    To file a grievance against Mr. Yoo in either or both Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., print and complete the official Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., Complaint Forms, print and attach this page to the Complaint Form and send to the address noted on the forms.

    Grievance Information: Pennsylvania

    Grievance Information: Washington, D.C.

    Allegations:

    John Yoo provided advice to his client that violated his ethical obligations to provide independent, professional and competent advice in authoring and issuing the “Torture Memo” in March of 2003. This advice provided violated both the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct (large .pdf file) and the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct (effective January 1, 1991 through January 31, 2007), including the following rules:

    Pennsylvania:

    • Rule 1.1 Competence: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
    • Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer: (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
    • Rule 1.13 Organization as Client: (b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.
    • Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation: (a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law….
    • Rule 2.1 Advisor: In representing a client, a lawyer should shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.
    • Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions: A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.
    • Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others: In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid aiding and abetting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
    • Rule 5.4 Professional Independence Of A Lawyer: (c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
    • Rule 8.5. Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law: (a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct. (b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: (1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits shall be applied, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and (2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.

    Washington, D.C.:

    • Rule 1.1 — Competence (a) A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. (b) A lawyer shall serve a client with skill and care commensurate with that generally afforded to clients by other lawyers in similar matters.
    • Rule 1.16 – Declining or Terminating Representation (a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) The representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law….
    • Rule 2.1 – Advisor In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.
    • Rule 3.1 – Meritorious Claims and Contentions A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or for the respondent in a proceeding that could result in involuntary institutionalization, shall, if the client elects to go to trial or to a contested fact-finding hearing, nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that the government carry its burden of proof.
    • Rule 3.3 – Candor Toward the Tribunal (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: … (2) Counsel or assist a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good-faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.
    • Rule 4.1 – Truthfulness in Statements to Others In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
    • Rule 5.4 – Professional Independence of a Lawyer … (c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.

    Mr. Yoo’s conduct is not the typical conduct that is a violation of the applicable rules of professional conduct, such as stealing from a trust account, failing to communicate with a client or a violating advertising rules. Professor David Luban explains:

    Now it happens that one of these rules is labeled “Advisor.” It reads: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.”

    “Independent” professional judgment means “independent of the client,” as the first comment to the rule makes clear: “Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront….However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.” And “candid” advice means telling the client what the law, in the lawyer’s best judgment, actually means. This rule, too, has an ethical basis. In the first place, it tells lawyers not to chicken out from hard conversations; it’s a requirement of a certain measure of guts. In the second place, it tells the lawyer that as an advisor, he or she is more than an instrument of the client’s will. This is true for lawyers in private practice, but I see no reason at all to think that a lawyer-advisor carries different obligations when the client is White House.

    This obligation of the advisor is very different from the standard conception of the lawyer’s role as courtroom advocate. In the courtroom, the lawyer’s job is to press the client’s case, counting on the opposing lawyer to highlight its weaknesses, and on the judge to check the lawyer’s one-sided presentation of the law. In the advice-giving setting, there is no opposing voice and no judge. That’s why, for more than four decades, the codes of responsibility for lawyers have distinguished sharply between the advocate’s role and the advisor’s. The advocate, in the words of the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility, “should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law.” But not the advisor: the advisor is supposed to give the law to the client straight.

    But what if the client doesn’t want the law straight? There’s an old legal adage attributed to Elihu Root: “The client never wants to be told he can’t do what he wants to do; he wants to be told how to do it, and it is the lawyer’s business to tell him how.” Root was a corporate lawyer, and he was cynically expressing – a century ago – the scofflaw attitude of business people who resent lawyers who say “no.” But lawyers who say yes to whatever the client wants (“Dr. Yes” was reportedly John Ashcroft’s nickname for John Yoo) violate basic ethical norms of what legal advisors are supposed to do. As I’ve written elsewhere, lawyers who write opinions saying yes to whatever their clients want are no better than indulgence sellers.

    [Professor] Marty [Lederman] thinks that OLC lawyers are in a fundamentally different relationship with their client than private lawyers of corporate clients. I think that’s partly right – but only partly. The part that’s right is that OLC opinions can bind the executive branch – if not by law, then by custom. That puts OLC opinions on a nearly-equal footing with decisions of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, where most cases involving the executive branch get litigated. The big difference is that the OLC renders its opinions in secret, and without hearing adversarial arguments to satisfy the basic maxim of procedural justice – audi alteram partem , “hear the other side.”

    That makes the duties of independence and candor even more crucial. Lawyers whose legal advice – including secret advice – writes the law for the most dangerous branch of government have an awesome responsibility. It’s a responsibility not only to the client and the law, but to a country that is, without knowing it, being governed by twenty unknown lawyers in the Justice Department. (Quite frankly, the OLC is a scandal to democratic government, but that’s a subject for a different day.) Marty is quite right that the OLC’s mission should be to help the President fulfill the duty of faithful execution of the laws. But he’s wrong if he thinks that mission substitutes for the basics of legal ethics. That mission is over and above the duties of legal ethics.

    And he’s wrong if he thinks that indulgence-selling is fundamentally different when the lawyers are writing indulgences to the President rather than private clients. Indulgence-selling is fundamentally worse when lawyers are absolving the President rather than Enron – but that’s because the President’s public trust runs deeper, not because the nature of the sin is different.

    Marty is a constitutional lawyer, and an extraordinarily good one. If I were to venture a diagnosis, I think that fact makes him suspicious that ethics rules – mere ethics rules – miss the special, exalted status of constitutional lawyering at the upper reaches of government. He thinks that ethics rules don’t capture the refracted sunbeams of the Faithful Execution Clause.

    Constitutional law, in the eyes of many, is the Holy of Holies in American law. It’s up there in the Empyrean. Ethics rules, by contrast, are the lowliest of the low. They are court rules rather than statutes, they are state rather than federal, and they govern a million people rather than 300 million. They are also, to be perfectly frank, very dull. Constitutional law is exciting and charismatic. It’s the province of The Supreme Court of the United States. Legal ethics is the province of grubby little grievance committees. It’s what you cram for before you take the multistate professional responsibility exam. (As one of my students remarked some years back, the MPRE is like the written part of the driver’s test.)

    The fact is, though, that the ethical conduct of the million lawyers is far more important to the legal system than the journeywork of the nine justices. (Emphasis supplied.) * * *

    * * * The law, as the Book of Deuteronomy says, “is not in the heavens, that you should say, ‘Who among us can go up to the heavens and get it for us and impart it to us, that we may observe it?’” The law is very near. It’s what we find in our lawyer’s office on the fourth floor of the Kresge Building, three doors down from the orthodontist. (If you see the Home Depot on your left, you’ve gone too far.) It’s law’s ordinariness, and the extraordinary role that lawyers play in vending it to us, that is precisely why legal ethics is important: if the lawyers are just Holmesian Bad Men and Bad Women following Elihu Root’s cynical advice, the law might as well not be there.

    And that is why ethical obligations matter in the Office of Legal Counsel. It’s perhaps odd that the OPR is investigating for violations of the maxim of competence. But it makes a certain amount of sense: a legal opinion that is deeply eccentric in its interpretation of the law is not much different from an opinion written without adequate research. (Emphasis supplied.)

    When analyzing whether Mr. Yoo’s conduct comports with applicable Rules, including both the violations described by Professor Luban above the additional violations noted below, it is important to note that his statements of denial are not to be taken at face value in making a determination. Specifically, Rule 1.0 Terminology of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct and the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct: Terminology provide that whether someone ‘believes’ something or whether someone ‘knows’ something is to be inferred from the circumstances and whether the conduct, belief or knowledge of the attorney is ‘reasonable’ or not is based on the “reasonably prudent and competent lawyer”, requires “that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable” and “denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question”.

    The basic facts of Mr. Yoo’s authorship of The Torture Memo were reported on April 2, 2008, by Dan Eggen and Josh White of The Washington Post:

    The Justice Department sent a legal memorandum to the Pentagon in 2003 asserting that federal laws prohibiting assault, maiming and other crimes did not apply to military interrogators who questioned al-Qaeda captives because the president’s ultimate authority as commander in chief overrode such statutes.

    The 81-page memo, which was declassified and released publicly yesterday, argues that poking, slapping or shoving detainees would not give rise to criminal liability. The document also appears to defend the use of mind-altering drugs that do not produce “an extreme effect” calculated to “cause a profound disruption of the senses or personality.”

    * * *

    Nine months after it was issued, Justice Department officials told the Defense Department to stop relying on it. But its reasoning provided the legal foundation for the Defense Department’s use of aggressive interrogation practices at a crucial time, as captives poured into military jails from Afghanistan and U.S. forces prepared to invade Iraq .

    Sent to the Pentagon’s general counsel on March 14, 2003, by John C. Yoo, then a deputy in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, the memo provides an expansive argument for nearly unfettered presidential power in a time of war. It contends that numerous laws and treaties forbidding torture or cruel treatment should not apply to U.S. interrogations in foreign lands because of the president’s inherent wartime powers.

    “If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate a criminal prohibition, he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on the United States by the al Qaeda terrorist network,” Yoo wrote. “In that case, we believe that he could argue that the executive branch’s constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his actions.”

    Interrogators who harmed a prisoner would be protected by a “national and international version of the right to self-defense,” Yoo wrote. He also articulated a definition of illegal conduct in interrogations — that it must “shock the conscience” — that the Bush administration advocated for years.

    “Whether conduct is conscience-shocking turns in part on whether it is without any justification,” Yoo wrote, explaining, for example, that it would have to be inspired by malice or sadism before it could be prosecuted.

    * * *

    The document is similar, although much broader, than a notorious memo primarily written by Yoo in August 2002 that narrowly defined what constitutes illegal torture. That document was also later withdrawn.

    In his 2007 book, “The Terror Presidency,” Jack Goldsmith, who took over the Office of Legal Counsel after Yoo departed, writes that the two memos “stood out” for “the unusual lack of care and sobriety in their legal analysis.”

    The documents are among the Justice Department legal memoranda that undergirded some of the highly coercive interrogation techniques employed by the Bush administration, including extreme temperatures, head-slapping and a type of simulated drowning called waterboarding.

    * * *

    Yoo, now a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley, defended the memo in an e-mail yesterday, saying the Justice Department altered its opinions “for appearances’ sake.” He said his successors “ignored the Department’s long tradition in defending the President’s authority in wartime.”

    “Far from inventing some novel interpretation of the Constitution,” Yoo wrote, “our legal advice to the President, in fact, was near boilerplate.”

    Yoo’s 2003 memo arrived amid strong Pentagon debate about which interrogation techniques should be allowed and which might lead to legal action in domestic and international courts.

    After a rebellion by military lawyers, then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld in December 2002 suspended a list of aggressive techniques he had approved, the most extreme of which were used on a single detainee at the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The prisoner, military investigators later would determine, was subjected to stress positions, nudity, hooding, exposure to dogs and other aggressive techniques.

    Largely because of Yoo’s memo, however, a Pentagon working group in April 2003 endorsed the continued use of extremely aggressive tactics. The top lawyers for each military service, who were largely excluded from the group, did not receive a final copy of Yoo’s March memo and did not know about the group’s final report for more than a year, officials said.

    Thomas J. Romig, who was then the Army’s judge advocate general, said yesterday after reading the memo that it appears to argue there are no rules in a time of war, a concept Romig found “downright offensive.”

    * * *

    In a 2004 memo for the Navy inspector general’s office, then-General Counsel Alberto J. Mora objected to the ideas that cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment could be allowed at Guantanamo and that the president’s authority is virtually unlimited.

    Mora wrote that he spoke with Yoo at the Pentagon on Feb. 6, 2003, and that Yoo “glibly” defended his own memo. “Asked whether the President could order the application of torture, Mr. Yoo responded, ‘Yes,’ ” Mora wrote. Yoo denies saying that.

    Glenn Greenwald explains further,on April 2, 2008, how Mr. Yoo’s conduct violated the canons of professional conduct:

    Yet again, the ACLU has performed the function which Congress and the media are intended to perform but do not. As the result of a FOIA lawsuit the ACLU filed and then prosecuted for several years, numerous documents relating to the Bush administration’s torture regime that have long been baselessly kept secret were released yesterday, including an 81-page memorandum (.pdf) issued in 2003 by then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo (currently a Berkeley Law Professor) which asserted that the President’s war powers entitle him to ignore multiple laws which criminalized the use of torture:

    If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate a criminal prohibition, he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on the United States by the al Qaeda terrorist network. In that case, we believe that he could argue that the executive branch’s constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his actions.

    As Jane Mayer reported two years ago in The New Yorker — in which she quoted former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora as saying that “the memo espoused an extreme and virtually unlimited theory of the extent of the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority” — it was precisely Yoo’s torture-justifying theories, ultimately endorsed by Donald Rumsfeld, that were communicated to Gen. Geoffrey Miller, the commander of both Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib at the time of the most severe detainee abuses (the ones that are known).

    It is not, of course, news that the Bush administration adopted (and still embraces) legal theories which vest the President with literally unlimited power, including the power to break our laws. There are, though, several points worth noting as a result of the disclosure of this Memorandum:

    (1) The fact that John Yoo is a Professor of Law at Berkeley and is treated as a respectable, serious expert by our media institutions, reflects the complete destruction over the last eight years of whatever moral authority the United States possessed. Comporting with long-held stereotypes of two-bit tyrannies, we’re now a country that literally exempts our highest political officials from the rule of law, and have decided that there should be no consequences when they commit serious felonies.

    John Yoo’s Memorandum, as intended, directly led to — caused — a whole series of war crimes at both Guantanamo and in Iraq. The reason such a relatively low-level DOJ official was able to issue such influential and extraordinary opinions was because he was working directly with, and at the behest of, the two most important legal officials in the administration: George Bush’s White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales, and Dick Cheney’s counsel (and current Chief of Staff) David Addington. Together, they deliberately created and authorized a regime of torture and other brutal interrogation methods that are, by all measures, very serious war crimes.

    If writing memoranda authorizing torture — actions which then directly lead to the systematic commission of torture — doesn’t make one a war criminal in the U.S., what does?

    * * *

    Yoo wasn’t just a law professor theorizing about the legalization of torture. He was a government official who, in concert with other government officials, set out to enable a brutal and systematic torture regime, and did so. If this level of depraved criminality doesn’t remove one from the realm of respectability and mainstream seriousness — if not result in war crimes prosecution — then nothing does.

    * * *

    (4) Since the Nuremberg Trials, “war criminals” include not only those who directly apply the criminal violence and other forms of brutality, but also government officials who authorized it and military officials who oversaw it. Ironically, the Bush administration itself argued in the 2006 case of Hamdan — when they sought to prosecute as a “war criminal” a Guantanamo detainee whom they allege was a driver for Osama bin Laden — that one is guilty of war crimes not merely by directly violating the laws of war, but also by participating in a conspiracy to do so.

    That legal question was unresolved in that case, but Justices Thomas and Scalia both sided with the administration and Thomas wrote (emphasis added):

    “[T]he experience of our wars,” Winthrop 839, is rife with evidence that establishes beyond any doubt that conspiracy to violate the laws of war is itself an offense cognizable before a law-of-war military commission. . . . . In [World War II], the orders establishing the jurisdiction of military commissions in various theaters of operation provided that conspiracy to violate the laws of war was a cognizable offense. See Letter, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific (Sept. 24, 1945), Record in Yamashita v. Styer, O. T. 1945, No. 672, pp. 14, 16 (Exh. F) (Order respecting the “Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals” provided that “participation in a common plan or conspiracy to accomplish” various offenses against the law of war was cognizable before military commissions).

    * * *

    The fact that a lawyer does something in his capacity as a lawyer does not mean it’s proper, legitimate or legal. The fact that an argument is packaged in lawyerly wrapping doesn’t mean it’s reasonable or offered in good faith. All sorts of lawyers — from those representing crime families to those representing terrorists — have been convicted of crimes because they concealed and/or promoted their clients’ illegal acts. Lawyers aren’t any more immune from the rule of law than anyone else.

    Harper’s Scott Horton makes the point in much the same way:

    These memoranda have been crafted not as an after-the-fact defense to criminal charges, but rather as a roadmap to committing crimes and getting away with it. They are the sort of handiwork we associate with the consigliere, or mob lawyer. But these consiglieri are government attorneys who have sworn an oath, which they are violating, to uphold the law.

    Along those lines, Marcy Wheeler and Slate’s Emily Bazelon both demonstrate how un-lawyerly Yoo’s opinions were. Yoo wasn’t acting as a lawyer in order legally to analyze questions surrounding interrogation powers. He was acting with the intent to enable illegal torture and used the law as his instrument to authorize criminality.

    Professor Marty Lederman explains that Mr. Yoo’s authorship of the Torture Memo was contrary to established federal law and protocol:

    I’ve now completed reading the March 14th OLC Opinion. As you might expect, there is a great deal within it that warrants very careful attention and analysis. There is nothing like it in our long legal history, as far as I know. After all, how often is it that a Department of Justice memo is issued that matter-of-factly argues that the Commander in Chief can authorize pouring corrosive acid on a detainee — can authorize cutting out a tongue and poking out an eye — nothwithstanding a statute that would prohibit that very conduct?

    * * *

    An OLC legal conclusion does establish the official views of the Executive branch unless overruled by the President, the Attorney General, or OLC itself (as Jack Goldsmith did in the last week of 2003). Therefore, it’s a very solemn function for the Office to have. Actually, by law the function has been assigned to the Attorney General ever since the Judiciary Act of 1789; but in recent decades, the AG has delegated the opinion-rendering function to OLC.

    Well, not to OLC, exactly, but to an officer of the United States, the “Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel.”

    On Friday, March 14th, 2003, that officer was Jay Bybee. [UPDATE: Post corrected to reflect fact that Jay Bybee remained AAG on the 13th.] Yet John Yoo issued the Opinion in his own name. John Yoo did not have the legal authority to issue this opinion . . . unless either Jay Bybee or John Ashcroft delegated Yoo the authority to issue such a momentous opinion without the supervision of the head of the office.

    * * *

    This [the issuance of the March 14, 2003 OLC Opinion under the name of John Yoo] was, in my view, a serious abuse of authority and/or violation of protocol. And it demonstrates exactly why it is so important to abide by such procedural norms — so that an unconfirmed, rogue deputy in OLC can’t just go around offering the most important and ground-shifting legal advice in the Executive branch without that advice having been thoroughly scrubbed and critiqued by others who are more accountable and more seasoned.

    Professor Marty Lederman also notes that “[i]n late 2004, new OLC head Jack Goldsmith reviewed the March 2003 memo, was stunned by what he later called the “unusual lack of care and sobriety in [its] legal analysis” — it “seemed more an exercise of sheer power than reasoned analysis” — and immediately called the Pentagon to implore them not to rely upon it. Later, the next head of OLC, Dan Levin, wrote the Pentagon to confirm that they rescind any policies that had been based on the Yoo memo.

    Writing about Philippe Sands’s article “The Green Light” in Vanity Fair, which as he notes is a teaser for Sands’ forthcoming book The Torture Team, Scott Horton notes, on April 2, 2008 in his article The Green Light that Mr. Yoo’s conduct does not meet the threshold required by the ‘Adviser’ rules described by Professor Luban, as noted above:

    We’ve all heard ad nauseam the Administration’s official torture narrative. This is a different kind of war, they argue. Each invocation of “different” is to a clear point: the Administration wishes to pursue its war unfettered by the laws of war. Unfettered, indeed, by any form or notion of law. But Sands’s work is important because he has looked carefully at the chronology: what came first, the decision to use torture techniques, or the legal rationale for them?

    Gonzales and Haynes laid out their case with considerable care. The only flaw was that every element of the argument contained untruths. The real story, pieced together from many hours of interviews with most of the people involved in the decisions about interrogation, goes something like this: The Geneva decision was not a case of following the logic of the law but rather was designed to give effect to a prior decision to take the gloves off and allow coercive interrogation; it deliberately created a legal black hole into which the detainees were meant to fall. The new interrogation techniques did not arise spontaneously from the field but came about as a direct result of intense pressure and input from Rumsfeld’s office. The Yoo-Bybee Memo was not simply some theoretical document, an academic exercise in blue-sky hypothesizing, but rather played a crucial role in giving those at the top the confidence to put pressure on those at the bottom. And the practices employed at Guantánamo led to abuses at Abu Ghraib.

    The fingerprints of the most senior lawyers in the administration were all over the design and implementation of the abusive interrogation policies. Addington, Bybee, Gonzales, Haynes, and Yoo became, in effect, a torture team of lawyers, freeing the administration from the constraints of all international rules prohibiting abuse.

    Sands notes the focal role that the torture lawyers saw for the Attorney General’s opinion power. It was, as Harvard law professor Jack Goldsmith suggested in a recent book, a device that could be used to give a sort of pardon in advance for persons undertaking criminal acts.

    And of course, the torture lawyers fully appreciated from the outset that torture was a criminal act. Most of the legal memoranda they crafted, including the March 2003 Yoo memorandum released today, consist largely of precisely the sorts of arguments that criminal defense attorneys make–they weave and bob through the law finding exceptions and qualifications to the application of the criminal law. But there are some major differences: these memoranda have been crafted not as an after-the-fact defense to criminal charges, but rather as a roadmap to committing crimes and getting away with it. They are the sort of handiwork we associate with the consigliere, or mob lawyer. But these consiglieri are government attorneys who have sworn an oath, which they are violating, to uphold the law.

    * * *

    Of course they missed some things along the way. The legal analyses were so poorly crafted–making the sorts of sophomoric arguments that would land a law student a failing grade on an examination, that Justice was forced to rescind them. (Emphasis supplied.)

    * * *

    They also missed the established precedent I have cited repeatedly here, namely United States v. Altstoetter, under the rule of which the conduct of the torture lawyers is a criminal act not shielded by any notions of government immunity.

    In his response at Balkinization to Boalt (Cal Berkeley) School of Law Dean Chris Edleyn’s defense of John Yoo, Scott Horton explains in more detail why John Yoo should be held to account for additional actions that violate the ‘Adviser’ rules, by failing to even address applicable and established law, let alone distinguish or otherwise explain how it is not relevant:

    [T]he facts establish that the torture policies were settled upon and had in fact been implemented. The principal authors were facing severe blow back from career lawyers inside the government. And John Yoo was carted in to use the powers of OLC to silence lawyers protesting the illegality of what was done. I believe that an objective examination of the facts will show that this is precisely how John Yoo understood his role. In essence, he was not an independent legal advisor. He had become a facilitator, an implementor of the torture policies. His role had shifted from passive advisor to actor, pushing a process forward.

    Dean Edley then states that the ethical accountability and legal liability of the legal advisor cannot be compared to those of the policy maker. This statement rests on a false understanding of the facts. But it also reflects a misconception of the established law. Indeed, Dean Edley asks what appears to be a rhetorical question:

    Did the writing of the memoranda, and his related conduct, violate a criminal or comparable statute?

    The answer to that question is “yes.” The liability of an attorney dispensing advice with respect to the treatment of persons under detention in wartime is subject to a special rule. It cannot be viewed in the same manner as advice given in a complex commercial dispute, for instance.

    This principle was established by the United States in one of the most dramatic of the post-World War II proceedings, United States v. Altstoetter, the “lawyers’ case.” Following on the guidelines established by Justice Robert H. Jackson, the U.S. chief prosecutor, Telford Taylor, and his deputy, Charles M. La Follette, established clear principles of accountability for lawyers dispensing legal advice in circumstances virtually identical to those faced by John Yoo. There are three major principles relevant to John Yoo’s case that appear from the charge, accepted by the Tribunal. First, the case dealt with persons under detention in wartime (not POWs, in fact most of the cases in question addressed persons not entitled to POW or comparable protections). Second, it had to be reasonably foreseeable that the advice dispensed would result in serious physical or mental harm or death to a number of the persons under detention. Third, the advice given was erroneous. In fact several of the lawyers in Altstoetter were able to articulate far better defenses for their erroneous legal advice that John Yoo had, but the standard did not require it to be “outrageously” false, just incorrect.

    Each of these criteria is satisfied with respect to Yoo’s advice under the torture memoranda. They explicitly address persons under detention. It was reasonably foreseeable that persons would suffer serious physical or mental harm or death as a result of the application of the techniques (in fact there have been more than 108 deaths in detention, a significant portion of them tied to torture). And the analysis was false, a point acknowledged ultimately by the OLC itself. Accordingly, a solid basis exists under the standard articulated by the United States under which John Yoo may be charged and brought to trial. * * *

    However, my point here is not to make the prosecutor’s case against Yoo. It is to show that what he did raises not merely ethics issues, but actual criminal culpability . * * * (Emphasis supplied).

    In addition to the points addressed by Scott Horton above, Phillipe Sands elaborates on Mr. Yoo’s conduct in his article The Green Light. In this case, the issue is Mr. Yoo’s independence. As confirmed by Mr. Feith to Mr. Sands, the purpose of these documents was to permit conduct that was criminal and otherwise forbidden by the Constitution, the Geneva Conventions and federal statutes.

    Relating to this was a second document, one that had been the subject of media speculation for some weeks. The authors of this document, a legal opinion dated August 1, 2002, were two lawyers in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel: Jay Bybee, who is now a federal judge, and John Yoo, who now teaches law at Berkeley. Later it would become known that they were assisted in the drafting by David Addington, then the vice president’s lawyer and now his chief of staff. The Yoo-Bybee Memo declared that physical torture occurred only when the pain was “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death,” and that mental torture required “suffering not just at the moment of infliction but … lasting psychological harm.” Interrogations that did not reach these thresholds—far less stringent than those set by international law—were allowed. Although findings that issue from the Office of Legal Counsel at Justice typically carry great weight, at the press conference Gonzales went out of his way to decouple the Yoo-Bybee Memo from anything that might have taken place at Guantánamo. The two lawyers had been asked, in effect, to stargaze, he said. Their memo simply explored “the limits of the legal landscape.” It included “irrelevant and unnecessary” discussion and never made it into the hands of the president or of soldiers in the field. The memo did not, said Gonzales, “reflect the policies that the administration ultimately adopted.”

    * * *

    In the administration’s account there was no connection between the decision on Geneva and the new interrogation rules later approved by Rumsfeld for Detainee 063; its position on Geneva was dictated purely by the law itself. I asked Feith, just to be clear: Didn’t the administration’s approach mean that Geneva’s constraints on interrogation couldn’t be invoked by anyone at Guantánamo? “Oh yes, sure,” he shot back. Was that the intended result?, I asked. “Absolutely,” he replied. I asked again: Under the Geneva Conventions, no one at Guantánamo was entitled to any protection? “That’s the point,” Feith reiterated. As he saw it, either you were a detainee to whom Geneva didn’t apply or you were a detainee to whom Geneva applied but whose rights you couldn’t invoke. What was the difference for the purpose of interrogation?, I asked. Feith answered with a certain satisfaction, “It turns out, none. But that’s the point.”

    That indeed was the point. The principled legal arguments were a fig leaf. The real reason for the Geneva decision, as Feith now made explicit, was the desire to interrogate these detainees with as few constraints as possible. Feith thought he’d found a clever way to do this, which on the one hand upheld Geneva as a matter of law—the speech he made to Myers and Rumsfeld—and on the other pulled the rug out from under it as a matter of reality. Feith’s argument was so clever that Myers continued to believe Geneva’s protections remained in force—he was “well and truly hoodwinked,” one seasoned observer of military affairs later told me.

    * * *

    Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Dunlavey and the others at Guantánamo, interrogation issues had arisen in other quarters. In March 2002 a man named Abu Zubaydah, a high-ranking al-Qaeda official, was captured in Pakistan. C.I.A. director George Tenet wanted to interrogate him aggressively but worried about the risk of criminal prosecution. He had to await the completion of legal opinions by the Justice Department, a task that had been entrusted by Alberto Gonzales to Jay Bybee and John Yoo. “It took until August to get clear guidance on what Agency officers could legally do,” Tenet later wrote. The “clear guidance” came on August 1, 2002, in memos written by Bybee and Yoo, with input from Addington. The first memo was addressed to Gonzales, redefining torture and abandoning the definition set by the 1984 torture convention. This was the Yoo-Bybee Memo made public by Gonzales nearly two years later, in the wake of Abu Ghraib. Nothing in the memo suggested that its use was limited to the C.I.A.; it referred broadly to “the conduct of interrogations outside of the United States.” Gonzales would later contend that this policy memo did “not reflect the policies the administration ultimately adopted,” but in fact it gave carte blanche to all the interrogation techniques later recommended by Haynes and approved by Rumsfeld. The second memo, requested by John Rizzo, a senior lawyer at the C.I.A., has never been made public. It spells out the specific techniques in detail. Dunlavey and his subordinates at Guantánamo never saw these memos and were not aware of their contents.

    The lawyers in Washington were playing a double game. They wanted maximum pressure applied during interrogations, but didn’t want to be seen as the ones applying it—they wanted distance and deniability. They also wanted legal cover for themselves.

    At The Nation, Professor Stephen Gillers adds in The Torture Memo that Mr. Yoo was neither independent nor competent in rendering his legal advice on torture:

    In his book The Terror Presidency, [Bybee's successor, Jack] Goldsmith, now a Harvard law professor, writes that the torture memos had “no foundation” in any “source of law” and rested on “one-sided legal arguments.”

    * * *

    How could two really smart guys authorize torture using “one-sided legal arguments” that have “no foundation” in law? How could they be guilty of a “stunning failure of lawyerly craft”? The sad answer seems to be that they knew what the President wanted and delivered: torture is OK if you call it something else. Detainees are outside the protection of due process and civilized law. The President’s authority is close to absolute. Anyway, no court can review him. (On this last point, the Supreme Court disagreed.)

    * * *

    So maybe the best and brightest lawyers got it so wrong because they forgot whom they served. Maybe they acted politically, not professionally. If so, we are dealing with a perversion of law and legal duty, a betrayal of the client and professional norms, not mere incompetence, which would be bad enough. Whatever the reason, Jarrett should find that this work is not “consistent with the professional standards that apply to Department of Justice attorneys.” [H. Marshall] Jarrett[, counsel for the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility,] must hold the lawyers accountable if he means to restore OLC’s reputation and vindicate the rule of law.

    Finally, at Balkinization, Professor John Balkin asks whether John Yoo and Jay Bybee violated the canons of professional ethics. In drawing his conclusion, Professor Balkin considered, among others, the Gillers and Horton arguments that I highlighted above, and writes:

    My own conclusion is that Yoo and Bybee did violate their professional obligations to the President as constitutional actor, and to the country as a whole. The reason is a combination of their outrageous theory of presidential dictatorship and their all too eager assistance in what appears to be a conspiracy to commit war crimes. But I do not pretend that the question is at all an easy one.

    Note that even if I am right that Yoo violated the canons of professional ethics, he has not been sanctioned by any court or professional organization, much less convicted of any crime by a domestic court or international tribunal. This is important to keep in mind in the debate over whether the University of California should discipline or investigate him.

    Mr. Yoo has engaged in conduct that is not independent, not competent and not reasonable. His conduct, including but not limited to the facts and analysis described above, is a violation of the rules of professional conduct of both Pennsylvania and California and more than amply demonstrates that he is unfit to practice law. Take action: file a grievance.

    Text and comments of the Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., Rules of Professional Conduct violated by Mr. Yoo

    Welcome to readers of Left in Alabama and Pine Belt Progressive

    Thank you to Gene’O for referring readers from Pine Belt Progressive and Left in Alabama. You will find that I am not as prolific as Glenn Greenwald is or Scott Horton, who recently announced he was going to stop blogging at No Comment, was, but I hope you will stop by from time to time for new posts.

    For some background, the following is from an e-mail I sent to Gene’O in response to some questions he had about The Grievance Project:

    For most of my professional life, my political interests have been mainly directed at the state and local level through fairly typical community involvement like church, my legal practice, civic and business groups, etc. The Jose Padilla case basically changed that and I started to focus more and more on national, specifically Constitutional, issues. The more I learned, the more I was amazed at the unethical conduct of the attorneys who enabled these numerous violations.

    Like Alberto Gonzales, for instance, who tried to get a document executed by John Ashcroft, while knowing full well that Ashcroft was in ICU recovering from surgery, was sedated and had relinquished the responsibilities of Attorney General. If I tried to get a deed or a will signed under those circumstances, I would likely be disbarred.

    And like Harriet E. Miers who refused to even appear for a legal subpoena (Congress has the inherent right to arrest her and have her brought before the Congress). And there’s plenty more. My list of these attorneys, from all three branches of the federal government, is currently at 95+ and growing.

    I e-mailed various columnists, bloggers, etc., to champion the idea of filing grievances against these attorneys, but noone was interested so I eventually started The Grievance Project.

    Gene’O noted that because the grievance form:

    asks for an address and phone number, and it indicates that the person filing a grievance may be called to give testimony. That’s going to make people pause. Some will even fear retaliation or media exposure. Rational or not, people are going to consider that. That’s one issue. (Think about how many people are afraid to use their real names on petitions and discussion threads. Think about how many readers it takes to get just one or two people who leave comments. That’s why I’m concerned about this issue.)

    He’s right with respect to many and probably most people that will ever read anything here at TGP. Even before I knew who Don Siegelman was, I was concerned about being Siegelmanned. So, I decided to do this anonymously – at least as best as I can since I’m a lawyer, not a techie. I was uncomfortable at first with the idea of asking people to do something that was very much in the public eye while I chose to remain anonymous. However, I figured that if Thomas Paine could publish Common Sense anonymously and still be considered a Founding Father, I could write TGP anonymously. Of course, right off the bat, the anonymity calls into question my credibility, but this at least forces me to be precise in what I write. (This also means it takes me considerably longer to write the attorney posts.)

    So as to this typical reader as a target audience, I would hope only to educate some and encourage them to educate others. I only envision this audience participating in a filing such as what fdl is doing with the McCain FEC complaint. The bloggers are filing the complaint with the FEC and readers are ’signing on’ by signing a petition.

    Ultimately, I think it would take an ‘activist’ type of person willing to actually file a complaint. That’s my second target audience.

    My third target audience is to continue to attract the interest of other bloggers, like those at Pine Belt Progressive and Left in Alabama, who recognize that this is a viable option, so I can eventually get the publicity necessary to attract someone from the second target audience or form an online alliance strong enough to do something on a grand scale that can’t be ignored.

    My fourth target audience would be a publisher willing to finance TGP at the next level where I could hire 1-2 people to help prepare and file these applications myself for an article or whatever.

    My fifth target audience is the attorneys in the states in which these enabling attorneys are admitted. Most state’s rules of professional conduct impose an ethical obligation on an attorney in that state to report unethical conduct engaged in by another attorney in that state (under certain specified conditions). So, once an attorney becomes aware of conduct that must be reported, it then becomes a separate and distinct ethics violation of that second attorney if that second attorney fails to report the misconduct. Hopefully, eventually, a Birmingham lawyer – it will probably will have to be an Auburn alum since Judge Fuller’s an Alabama alum – will step up, uphold their own oath and file a complaint against Judge Fuller.

    A sixth target audience would be attorneys willing to contribute by researching and writing posts on attorneys and/or critically analyzing my posts for weaknesses in my arguments. I sincerely appreciate your interest. I’m convinced that the tactic is sound and only requires the publicity to continue to attract the right people.

    Please feel free to add to the discussion. I have no stated comment policy other than that the first comment is moderated, so note that it may take me some time to get to any new commenters.

    E.M.

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    E-mail to Judge Mark Everett Fuller

    Judge Mark Everett Fuller
    U.S. District Court Judge
    mark_fuller@almd.uscourts.gov

    Dear Judge Fuller,

    I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, D. Kyle Sampson, Harriet Miers and yourself. In my opinion, you have committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of Alabama that raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.

    I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct in your handling of the Don Siegelman matter violated the Alabama Rules of Procedure.

    E.M.

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    A Call to Action

    Far more eloquently than I have previously argued, Scott Horton called for action from the organized bar associations at No Comment last week:

    It’s also time for the organized bar to act decisively. So far bar organizations have denounced the torture memoranda and issued learned reports and articles. But I’m still haunted by a question a student put to me following a presentation I made at Columbia University on Tuesday evening. “If the bar is so serious about this,” the student said, “then explain to me how it’s possible that John Yoo and his confederates haven’t been disbarred.” I started to answer about the complexity of the disbarrment process, but I stopped. The student was right. If the bar were serious about this, it should have used its disciplinary tools to deal with it. This is not a case of an eccentric academic mouthing some cock-eyed theories. It is about a government official using the power of a government office to induce people to commit serious crimes. (Emphasis supplied.)

    * * *

    Silence will buy us a continuation of this corruption of our nation. But isn’t it worth raising your voice and articulating your anger to get our country back? It should start with insisting that Congress use the tools it has–oversight and the budget–to force changes.

    Mr. Horton is correct both in his description of what is at stake and his conclusion that action is required. Like Mr. Horton, I also encourage everyone to lobby Congress.

    In addition to lobbying Congress, I would also encourage citizen activists to file grievances with the various bar associations against these attorneys. Note that you, an individual, can only lobby Congress to begin fulfilling its oversight role. However, each of you, can file a grievance against each and every one of these enabling attorneys even if you live in a different state and even if you have nothing to do with the case. You can force the bar associations to begin to take action.

    It definitely is time for action.

    E.M.

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    Alberto Gonzales: Not just unethical, but criminal?

    As reported by Jason Leopold at the Online Journal on February 29, 2008, (h/t nonnie9999), Alberto Gonzales not only engaged in unethical conduct, but likely also engaged in conduct that was criminal:

    John McKay, the former US attorney for the Western District of Washington who was also fired in late 2006 for reasons that appear to have been motivated by partisan politics, wrote in a lengthy article in the January edition of the Seattle University Law Review [incorrect link in original document] that Iglesias’s firing stands out among the other eight federal prosecutors because it demonstrates “the very real prospect of improper interference with an ongoing criminal investigation involving public corruption and the seeking of political advantage.”

    “Violations of the obstruction of justice statute may have occurred and should be investigated,” McKay wrote. “Even as the role of the White House remains shrouded in its claims of executive privilege, 23 certain White House employees appear to have been heavily involved in the dismissal of U.S. Attorney Iglesias. In several e-mails it appears that these officials were reacting directly to the complaints of Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) and the ongoing investigation into public corruption in New Mexico. For example, Deputy White House Counsel Bill Kelley smugly e-mailed Gonzales’ Chief of Staff Kyle Sampson to report that Domenici’s office was ‘happy as a clam’ on learning of Iglesias’s ouster. Senior Counselor to the President Karl Rove bragged about Iglesias’s dismissal by proclaiming ‘he’s gone’ to the New Mexico Republican Party Chairman, who had previously complained to Rove about Iglesias.”

    * * *

    This chain of events troubles McKay who wrote in his law review article that former Attorney General Gonzales ultimately approved Iglesias’s termination with the full knowledge that it was based on partisan politics.

    Gonzales admitted “he took multiple phone calls from Domenici concerning [Iglesias], urging that he be replaced, and has admitted that [President Bush] spoke with him about the ‘problems’ with Iglesias,” McKay wrote.
    ”Gonzales has even admitted that one of the reasons that Iglesias was fired was because Senator Domenici had “lost confidence” in Iglesias. “While these allegations are troubling under any analysis, a thorough and independent investigation is necessary to determine whether criminal laws have been violated,” McKay added. “Among the considerations facing the inspector general is whether the actions of former Attorney General Gonzales constituted obstruction of justice by removing Iglesias.”

    Don’t hold your breath waiting for justice. No attorney employed by the Michael Mukasey-led Department of Justice will initiate an investigation of and pursue a criminal prosecution against Alberto Gonzales. As Leopold reports, they’re too busy fighting voter fraud:

    Recently, the OPR contacted Iglesias’s former executive assistant, Rumaldo Armijo, to interview him about whether he was pressured by Pat Rogers, a Republican attorney in Albuquerque, and Mickey Barnett, a Republican lobbyist, to bring charges of voter fraud against Democrats in the state, Iglesias confirmed when asked about the matter during an interview.

    Rogers was affiliated with the American Center for Voting Rights, a now defunct non-profit organization that sought to defend voter rights and increase public confidence in the fairness and outcome of elections. However, it has since emerged that the organization played a major role in suppressing the votes of people who intended to cast ballots for Democrats in various states. Rogers is also the former chief counsel to the New Mexico Republican Party, and was tapped by Domenici to replace Iglesias as US Attorney for New Mexico.

    Rogers did not respond to emails seeking comment.

    Armijo was also unavailable for comment. During his tenure in the US attorney’s office he was in charge of issues related to voter fraud in New Mexico. Iglesias said in an interview that he launched an in-depth investigation into claims of voter fraud in New Mexico and found the allegations to be “non-provable in court.” He said he is certain that his firing was due, in part, to the fact that he would not file criminal charges of voter fraud in New Mexico. Iglesias added that, based on evidence that had surfaced thus far and “Karl Rove’s obsession with voter fraud issues throughout the country,” he now believes GOP operatives had wanted him to go after Democratic-funded organizations in an attempt to swing the 2006 midterm elections to Republicans.

    Armijo spoke to the Senate Ethics Committee last year about numerous telephone calls and emails dating back to 2005 he received from Rogers related to voter fraud, and Iglesias’s alleged failure to investigate the matter while Iglesias was US attorney, Iglesias confirmed.

    Last May, House Democrats released a transcript of an interview congressional investigators had with one of Gonzales’s senior Justice Department staffers, Matthew Friedrich, in which Friedrich recounted that over breakfast in November 2006, Rogers and Barnett told him they were frustrated about Iglesias’s refusal to pursue cases of voter fraud and that they had spoken to Karl Rove and Domenici about having Iglesias fired.

    “I remember them repeating basically what they had said before in terms of unhappiness with Dave Iglesias and the fact that this case hadn’t gone anyplace,” Friedrich said, according to a copy of the interview transcript. “It was clear to me that they did not want him to be the US attorney. And they mentioned that they had essentially . . . they were sort of working towards that.”

    According to media reports, Rogers said he does not recall speaking to Rove about Iglesias.

    Additionally, Barnett and Rogers met with Monica Goodling, the Justice Department’s White House liaison, in June 2006 to complain that Iglesias was ignoring voter fraud. Goodling’s meeting with Rogers and Barnett took place at the urging of a colleague. Rogers also drafted a lengthy letter that he sent to Domenici detailing what he claimed were Iglesias’s prosecutorial failures, Iglesias said he had been told.

    Allen Weh, the New Mexico Republican Party chairman, told McClatchy Newspapers in March that he urged Rove to use his influence to have Iglesias fired because Weh was unhappy with Iglesias’s alleged refusal to bring criminal charges against Democrats in a voter fraud investigation.

    At best, nothing will happen until Attorney General John Edwards(?) can order an investigation on January 21, 2009. But the fact that justice will not be served by the Department of Justice does not mean that justice must be denied:

    ANY person residing in ANY state can file a grievance against Alberto Gonzales.

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    E-mail to Harriet E. Miers

    Harriet E. Miers, Esq.
    Locke Liddell & Sapp

    Dear Ms. Miers,

    I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility, including Alberto Gonzales, D. Kyle Sampson and yourself. In my opinion, you have committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of both Texas and Washington D.C that raise a substantial question as to your honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. (For what it’s worth, I am an attorney licensed to practice in at least one of the 50 states.)

    I’m interested in your response to the criticisms that your conduct while employed at the White House violated the D.C. Rules of Procedure.

    Thank you for your attention to this matter.

    E.M.

    (Whatever it does mean, the fact that I have not publicly identified myself changes neither the facts nor the severity of my allegations.)

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    Employment of Kyle D. Sampson reflects poorly on Hunton & Williams, LLP

    Updated March 10, 2009 to reflect Mr. Sampson’s leave of absence from Hunton & Williams.

    Updated on July 29, 2008, with a July 28, 2008,  update to my post on Kyle D. Sampson.

    I have not previously sent my copies of my posts directly to their targets. At time of posting, I had no e-mail address for Alberto Gonzales, Harriet Miers or Kyle D. Sampson and I didn’t send send a copy to Senator Lisa Murkowski through her webmail system. When I was writing my post about his unethical conduct in the Don Siegelman matter, though, I found Judge Mark Everett Fuller’s e-mail address in his Alabama State Bar profile.

    While I was thinking about sending Judge Fuller a copy of my post, I read about the recent engagement of Grievance Project-eligible Monica Goodling at Above the Law. Scrolling down the page, I came across this reference to D. Kyle Sampson, another alumnus of the Alberto Gonzales-era Department of Justice.

    As TPMMuckraker’s Paul Kiel explained at the time:

    So what’s next for Alberto Gonzales’ former chief of staff Kyle Sampson? Where does a senior Justice Department official with an expertise in politicization, who has experience orchestrating a purge of prosecutors, engaging in a clumsy cover-up, and getting drubbed when testifying before Congress, go next?

    The answer: working for drug companies. The Salt Lake Tribune reports [Dead link. Article available in Salt Lake Tribune's archives. Reg. req'd.] that Sampson has landed a gig with the mega-firm Hunton & Williams, in their food and drug practice. There, Sampson will help companies navigate the wilds of Food and Drug Administration regulation, among other duties.

    And Mr. Sampson didn’t just land a ‘job’, he made partner at Hunton & Williams, a firm that prides itself on ‘excellence and hard work’, whose diversity programs and commitment to providing pro bono legal services (although they consider representing Super Bowl XLV for free to be pro bono work) make it possible for Hunton to ‘offer you the opportunity to work alongside creative and gifted people on interesting and real projects that matter‘.

    If a firm such as this accepts Mr. Sampson as one of its own, maybe I’m wrong about him. Maybe his conduct at the Department of Justice was completely ethical and demonstrated excellence and hard work. So I asked Andrea Bear Field, Hunton & Williams DC Office Managing Partner, if either Mr. Sampson of Hunton wanted to respond to the criticisms that Mr. Sampson’s conduct while employed at the Department of Justice violated the D.C. Rules of Procedure.

    My e-mail to Ms. Field:

    Andrea Bear Field
    DC Office Managing Partner

    cc: D. Kyle Sampson, Partner

    Dear Ms. Field,

    It has now been several months since your colleague, Mr. D. Kyle Sampson, joined Hunton & Williams, as a partner no less. Since that time, I have been researching the conduct of various attorneys in the service of the government of the United States, whether that conduct is a violation of the rules of professional conduct with which each such attorney must comply and authoring factual allegations of conduct that establish violations of the applicable rules of professional responsibility. Mr. Sampson is the second attorney about whose conduct I have written. (Alberto Gonzales was the first.) In my opinion, Mr. Sampson committed numerous violations of the rules of professional conduct of both Utah and Washington D.C that raise a substantial question as to his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. (For what it’s worth, I am an attorney licensed to practice in at least one of the 50 states.)

    Hunton & Williams is a firm that prides itself on ‘excellence and hard work’ and whose diversity programs and commitment to providing pro bono legal services (Do you really consider representing Super Bowl XLV for free to be pro bono work?) make it possible for Hunton to ‘offer you the opportunity to work alongside creative and gifted people on interesting and real projects that matter ‘. The corporate culture your firm describes, however, seems incongruous with the ethical judgment Mr. Sampson demonstrated in his recent past. I’m interested in both the firm’s and Mr. Sampson’s response to the criticisms that Mr. Sampson’s conduct while employed at the Department of Justice violated the D.C. Rules of Procedure.

    Thank you for your attention to this matter.

    E.M.

    (Whatever it does mean, the fact that I have not publicly identified myself changes neither the facts nor the severity of my allegations.)

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    It’s not paranoia if they ARE out to get you, No. 2

    From Scott Horton at Harper’s:

    Seems that people who raise their voice in support of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman are often the victims of unfortunate accidents. Ask Dana Jill Simpson, the Rainsville Republican lawyer who notes that as soon as she told some friends that she had resolved to file an affidavit exposing what was going on in the Siegelman case, unfortunate accidents started happening. Like a fire at her home, and a brush with a motor vehicle operated by an off-duty law enforcement officer that resulted in her car being totaled. Well, maybe these were just accidents. In fact, Simpson seems convinced they were. But it’s clear that she has some vague and lingering doubts.

    And then, following the sentencing phase of the Siegelman trial, his lawyer, Susan James, reports that her office was ransacked. These weren’t your ordinary vandals, it seems. They left computers, television sets, champagne and bottles of alcohol untouched. And they focused with laser-like intensity on her client files.

    Full article here.

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    Mark Everett Fuller

    The Preamble to the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct states, inter alia, that

    A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.

    As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, of the administration of justice, and of the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law, and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.

    In multiple instances, Mark Everett Fuller has failed to adhere to these – and many other – standards of conduct.

    Mark Everett Fuller was nominated by President George W. Bush on August 1, 2002 to the U.S. District Court in Alabama and was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on November 14, 2002. Since taking the bench, Judge Fuller has breached various rules of professional conduct, most notably in his handling of the prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman. Judge Fuller should be investigated by the Alabama State Bar Office of Legal Counsel to answer for his violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct. The following analysis establishes the factual basis needed to file a grievance against Judge Fuller. Due to the complexity of the case, I have quoted extensively from the work of Scott Horton to establish a factual basis for Judge Fuller’s violations.

    Personal Information:

    • Name: Hon. Mark Everett Fuller
    • Firm: U. S. District Court
    • Address: One Church Street
      Montgomery , AL 36104-0000
    • Phone: (334) 954-3640
    • Fax: (334) 954-3649
    • Date Admitted: September 27, 1985
    • Law School: Alabama, University of

    Grievance Information: Alab